Akinbiyi v. Community Builders Benevolence Group (No.2), 2025 BCHRT 177
Date Issued: July 30, 2025
File: CS-000354
Indexed as: Akinbiyi v. Community Builders Benevolence Group (No.2), 2025 BCHRT 177
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Oluwatobi (Tobi) Akinbiyi
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Community Builders Benevolence Group (Metson Shelter)
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(d)(ii)
Tribunal Member: Edward Takayanagi
On their own behalf: Oluwatobi (Tobi) Akinbiyi
Counsel for the Respondent: Jennifer Kwok
I INTRODUCTION
[1] In this decision, I explain why I dismiss Oluwatobi (Tobi) Akinbiyi’s complaint under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) of the Human Rights Code, on the basis that it would not further the purposes of the Code to proceed with a hearing in circumstances where a respondent made a reasonable settlement offer.
[2] Mr. Akinbiyi is a Black man who stayed at a shelter operated by Community Builders Benevolence Group [CBG]. He says that CBG assigned him a bed next to another resident who had, three weeks earlier, called Mr. Akinbiyi the N-word. Mr. Akinbiyi alleges a group of residents called him the N-word and shouted “white power” at him, and when he reported this to a CBG staff person, they took no action.
[3] CBG made a with prejudice settlement offer to Mr. Akinbiyi to resolve the complaint. CBG advised Mr. Akinbiyi that if he rejected the offer, they may apply to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) of the Code.
[4] Mr. Akinbiyi rejected the offer, and CBG now applies to dismiss the complaint.
[5] Mr. Akinbiyi opposes the application and disputes the offer is reasonable. Mr. Akinbiyi filed an application to submit additional evidence after the submission period had closed. He also filed an application seeking costs against CBG because of improper conduct.
[6] For the reasons that follow, I grant CBG’s application and dismiss the complaint. I find the settlement offer is reasonable and that it would not further the purposes of the Code to proceed with the complaint where Mr. Akinbiyi has rejected the reasonable settlement offer.
[7] I deny Mr. Akinbiyi’s applications. I find there is no basis to allow Mr. Akinbiyi to make further submissions after the submission period closed. I also find he has not shown that the conduct of CBG warrants an award of costs.
[8] To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision.
II BACKGROUND
[9] Mr. Akinbiyi alleges that CBG discriminated in service on the basis of race contrary to s. 8 of the Human Rights Code.
[10] On October 9, 2024, the Tribunal issued a decision on CBG’s application to dismiss the complaint without a hearing: Akinbiyi v. Community Builders Benevolence Group and another, 2024 BCHRT 287. The Tribunal granted the application in part and dismissed all but two of Mr. Akinbiyi’s allegations. The two allegations the Tribunal allowed to move forward are that: during his stay at the shelter Mr. Akinbiyi was assigned a bed next to a person who had three weeks earlier called him a racial slur; and after other guests of the shelter called Mr. Akinbiyi a racial slur and chanted “white power” at him, and Mr. Akinbiyi reported it to CBG staff, CBG’s staff took no action.
[11] On November 27, 2024, Mr. Akinbiyi filed his statement of remedy. Mr. Akinbiyi is seeking the following remedies:
a. An order that CBG cease its contravention and refrain from committing similar contraventions.
b. A declaration that the conduct complained of is discriminatory.
c. An award of $100 for expenses incurred because of the discrimination.
d. Compensation for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect of $220,000.
e. Interest on the monetary awards.
[12] On March 26, 2025, CBG, through its counsel, wrote to Mr. Akinbiyi and made a with prejudice offer to settle the complaint on the following terms:
a. A lump sum payment of $15,000 for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect.
b. A payment of $100 for expenses incurred related to the complaint.
c. The offer remains open for acceptance notwithstanding the filing of the application to dismiss the complaint. The offer will expire two weeks following the Tribunal’s decision on the Respondents’ application to dismiss.
[13] Mr. Akinbiyi rejected the settlement offer.
[14] CBG applied for permission to file an application to dismiss the complaint by filing a Form 7.5 under the Tribunal’s case path process. By a letter dated April 16, 2025, the Tribunal granted CBG’s request to file a dismissal application under s.27(1)(d)(ii) of the Code. Deadlines for submissions were set.
[15] Mr. Akinbiyi was given until May 14, 2025, to file a response to the dismissal application. Mr. Akinbiyi filed his response and evidentiary materials on May 12, 2025. He provided additional evidence on May 13 and May 14, 2025.
[16] On May 16, 2025, Mr. Akinbiyi filed an application seeking permission to submit additional evidence after the submission deadline.
III Prelminary issue – application to file further submissions
[17] Generally speaking, the Tribunal’s application process involves three submissions: the application, the response, and the reply: Rule 28(2) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure. The Tribunal may accept further submissions where fairness requires that a party be given an opportunity to respond to new issues raised in reply: Rule 28(5); Kruger v. Xerox Canada Ltd. (No. 2), 2005 BCHRT 24 at para. 17; or address new information not available to the party when they filed their submission: Rule 28(6). The overriding consideration is whether fairness requires an opportunity for further submissions: Gichuru v. The Law Society of British Columbia (No. 2), 2006 BCHRT 201, at para. 21.
[18] Mr. Akinbiyi says he wants to resubmit a video he previously provided and submit additional videos and screenshots of social media posts of people he believes are employees or agents of CBG.
[19] I am not convinced that fairness requires an opportunity for Mr. Akinbiyi to make further submissions. Mr. Akinbiyi argues that the materials are relevant because they show people, who he believes are connected to CBG, have deleted social media posts. What Mr. Akinbiyi has not explained is how this is relevant to the issue I must decide of whether it would not further the purposes of the Code to proceed with the complaint given CBG’s settlement offer. Nor has Mr. Akinbiyi argued that he needs an opportunity to address new information or evidence that was not previously available. Under the circumstances, I am not persuaded there is any basis to allow Mr. Akinbiyi to make further submissions and deny his application.
IV DECISION on dismissal application
[20] CBG applies to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) because it says, it would not further the purposes of the Code to proceed where it has made a reasonable offer to settle the complaint.
[21] There are two pre-requisites for the Tribunal to consider dismissing a complaint based on a reasonable settlement offer. First, the settlement offer must be made “with prejudice” because the Tribunal cannot rely on information about settlement discussions that is inadmissible based on privilege: at Dar Santos v. University of British Columbia, 2003 BCHRT 73 para. 64; Carter v. Travelex Canada and Travelex UK (No. 3), 2007 BCHRT 275 at para. 25. Second, the offer must remain open for the complainant’s acceptance regardless of the outcome of the application to dismiss: Issa v. Loblaw, 2009 BCHRT 264at para. 35. There is no dispute that both prerequisites are met in this case.
[22] Next, to determine whether it furthers the purposes of the Code to proceed, the Tribunal takes account of two considerations. First, it determines whether the offer is reasonable. Generally, it will not further the purposes of the Code to proceed where the respondent has made a reasonable, with prejudice, settlement offer: Dar Santos at para. 59. Second, even if the offer is reasonable, the Tribunal may consider whether there are considerations that weigh in favour of proceeding with the complaint, considering the purposes set out in s. 3 of the Code.
[23] I begin my analysis by determining whether the offer is reasonable.
A. Is the settlement offer reasonable?
[24] In assessing whether an offer is reasonable, the Tribunal assumes that the complainant will prove their allegations at a hearing and considers what the Tribunal would likely order as a remedy. At the same time, the offer does not need to mirror exactly what the Tribunal would order and does not need to contain an admission of liability: Carter at para. 30; Frick v. University of British Columbia and another, 2009 BCHRT 85 at para. 54. However, the offer must fully address the allegations and available remedies, both monetary and non-monetary the Tribunal would likely order if the matter were to proceed to a hearing and be successful: Heitner v. BC Provincial Renal Agency and others (No. 3), 2020 BCHRT 134 at para. 48.
1. Non-monetary remedies
[25] In his statement of remedies Mr. Akinbiyi seeks a declaratory order that the conduct complained of is discrimination. While the settlement offer does not incorporate the order sought, the absence of such an order does not in itself provide a basis for denying the dismissal application: McQueen v. Three Point Motors, 2017 BCHRT 120 at para. 33.
2. Out of Pocket Expenses
[26] Mr. Akinbiyi seeks $100.00 for the costs of pursuing his complaint. He says he incurred costs to print and serve materials, and travel to the Tribunal office. The settlement offer fully compensates him for this amount. Therefore, I find the Respondents’ offer, in this respect, is reasonable.
3. Injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect
[27] The Tribunal has the discretion to award compensation for injury to dignity: Code, s. 37(2)(d)(iii). The purpose of these awards is compensatory, not punitive. The amount of compensation depends on the specific facts and circumstances in a given case and relevant factors: Gichuru v. Law Society of British Columbia (No. 9), 2011 BCHRT 185, aff’d in 2014 BCCA 396 at para. 260. At the same time, for the purposes of consistency and fairness, it is often helpful to consider the range of awards made in similar cases. In making an injury to dignity award the Tribunal often considers several factors including the nature of the discrimination; the complainant’s vulnerability; and the effect on the complainant: Oger v. Whatcott (No. 7), 2019 BCHRT 58 at para. 225.
[28] In his statement of remedies Mr. Akinbiyi requests $220,000 in compensation for injury to dignity.
[29] CBG offers a lump sum payment of $15,000 for injury to dignity and argues that this amount is within the reasonable range of what the Tribunal might order assuming Mr. Akinbiyi proves his case.
[30] For the following reasons, I am persuaded that $15,000 falls within the reasonable range the Tribunal might award if Mr. Akinbiyi was successful at a hearing.
[31] I begin with the nature of the discrimination. Any discrimination is serious; however, the egregiousness of the discriminatory conduct varies depending on the specific facts of the case: Cyncora v. Axton Inc., 2022 BCHRT 36 at para. 114. Because the Tribunal dismissed all but two of Mr. Akinbiyi’s allegations in the dismissal application, the scope of the present complaint is discrete. There are only two, discrete allegations.
[32] Mr. Akinbiyi says the conduct of CBG after he filed his complaint should be considered when assessing the appropriate amount of an award. I appreciate that Mr. Akinbiyi believes people connected to CBG have harassed him during the complaint process. However, this is immaterial to my analysis of the appropriate remedy for the impact of the discrimination.
[33] Next, I consider Mr. Akinbiyi’s vulnerability or the social context of the discrimination. Mr. Akinbiyi’s social context as a racialized, underhoused person with limited options made him especially vulnerable to the impacts of the discrimination: Morriss v. Ruth and Naomi’s Mission, 2021 BCHRT 19 at para. 82. He relied on CBG to provide safe shelter.
[34] Finally, I consider the effect of the discrimination on Mr. Akinbiyi. Mr. Akinbiyi says he felt humiliated and was extremely angry. He says he had difficulty sleeping because he was worried the resident placed in the bed next to him might hurt him.
[35] Much of Mr. Akinbiyi’s submissions are about allegations beyond the scope of his human rights complaint. Many of these relate to events he says occurred during the complaint process which are not relevant to assessing the reasonableness of CBG’s offer regarding injury to dignity damages. I have not considered these submissions about the effect of other events, in my analysis.
[36] The parties have cited a number of cases in support of their positions. None of the cases cited by the parties mirror the exact circumstances of this case. However, I have reviewed and considered all of them in reaching my conclusion in relation to the range of reasonable injury to dignity awards that Mr. Akinbiyi might receive if he is successful in a hearing of his complaint.
[37] The cases cited by Mr. Akinbiyi include awards between $35,000 and $176,000 for injury to dignity.
[38] I find the circumstances of this complaint distinguishable from the cases Mr. Akinbiyi cites. Araniva v. RSY Contracting and another (No.3), 2019 BCHRT 97 ($40,000) is a complaint about sexual harassment in employment. Biggings obo Walsh v. Pink and others, 2018 BCHRT 174 ($35,000) is a complaint about a landlord’s failure to accommodate a tenant’s disability by building a wheelchair accessible ramp in the context of a longer-term tenancy relationship. Neither of these cases are about race-based discrimination in services and are not helpful for my analysis of a reasonable settlement offer for discrimination in services.
[39] I also find the case of Francis v. BC Ministry of Justice (No. 5), 2021 BCHRT 16 ($176,000) distinguishable on its facts. Francis involves multiple incidents of racial discrimination in employment over an extended period of time, and retaliation by the employer resulting in loss of employment and development of a mental illness. This is distinguishable from the circumstance of the discrimination in this case which involves two discrete instances where CBG assigned a resident a bed next to Mr. Akinbiyi and failed to act after other residents chanted racial slurs.
[40] While they do not mirror the present circumstances exactly, I find the cases relied on by CBG to be more relevant to my analysis. The cases cited are complaints about the failure of an institutional respondent to take action after a complainant was subjected to discrimination. They include awards for injury to dignity between $1,000 and $15,000: Ibrahim v. Immigrant Services Society of British Columbia, 2003 BCHRT 1 ($2,000); Ben Maaouia and others v. Toscani Coffee Bar and another, 2021 BCHRT 23 ($1,000); Martinez Johnson v. Whitewater Concrete Ltd. and others (No.2), 2022 BCHRT 129 ($2,500); Bhangu v. Inderjit Dhillon and others, 2023 BCHRT 24 ($6,000); Garneau v. Buy-Rite Foods and others, 2015 BCHRT 77 ($15,000).
[41] In the circumstances of this case, I find that the amount offered of $15,000 is within the reasonable range of what the Tribunal might award. The amount acknowledges that Mr. Akinbiyi suffered a negative impact from the discrimination. CBG has acknowledge that the Tribunal’s trend for injury to dignity awards is trending upwards: Benton v. Richmond Plastics, 2020 BCHRT 82 at para. 78. The amount is on the higher range of the cases CBG has cited and the same amount as the 2015 case of Garneau where the complainant was repeatedly subjected to slurs from his employer over a period of years and was also physically assaulted.
[42] On the information and case law before me, I find that the Tribunal, exercising its broad discretion to determine compensatory relief could reasonably award Mr. Akinbiyi what CBG has offered for injury to dignity in the event that Mr. Akinbiyi is successful at a hearing on its merits.
4. Interest
[43] In his statement of remedies Mr. Akinbiyi seeks an award of interest on all monetary awards. The settlement offer does not incorporate an award of interest. However, a settlement offer does not need to mirror what the complainant asks for or everything the Tribunal could order to be reasonable: Michaud v. Ministry of Finance (No. 2), 2024 BCHRT 341 at para. 106.
[44] In conclusion, looking at the entirety of the offer, I am satisfied that it fully addresses the allegations and available remedies and offers monetary compensation that is within the reasonable range of what the Tribunal might order. I find the offer reasonable.
[45] I next consider whether there are factors that weigh in favour of proceeding with the complaint, based on the purposes set out in s.3 of the Code.
B. Will it serve the purposes of the Code to proceed despite the reasonable settlement offer?
[46] The assessment of whether proceeding with a complaint will further the purposes of the Code, involves more than an assessment of an individual complaint. It encompasses broader public policy issues including the efficiency and responsiveness of the human rights system, and the expense and time involved in processing a complaint to a hearing: Dar Santos at para. 59. In general, it does not further the purposes of the Code to proceed to a hearing where the respondent has made a reasonable settlement offer: Salanguit v. Parq Vancouver and another, 2024 BCHRT 119 at para. 47.
[47] Here, I find there are no factors that favour proceeding with the complaint in light of the reasonable settlement offer. Mr. Akinbiyi has not argued that there is any factor, other than his allegation that CBG has harassed him during the complaint process, which warrants the complaint proceeding.
[48] The Tribunal routinely hears and decides cases alleging racial discrimination by service providers, and I am not persuaded that the present complaint engages broader public policy issues. Further, considerable resources of the parties and the Tribunal would be required for a four-day hearing, and the Tribunal encourages parties to resolve their disputes in good faith on a voluntary basis. Allowing this complaint to proceed would not further the purpose of a just and timely human rights system.
V Decision on costs application
[49] The Tribunal may award costs against a party who has engaged in improper conduct during the course of a complaint: Code, s. 37(4). The purpose of a costs award is punitive: Terpsma v. Rimex Supply (No. 3), 2013 BCHRT 3 at para. 102. It aims to deter conduct that has a significant and detrimental impact on the integrity of the Tribunal’s process: Oger at para. 246.
[50] Mr. Akinbiyi seeks an order of costs against CBG for improper conduct. He says all of CBG’s materials are fabricated and the Tribunal should consider everything submitted by CBG to be falsehoods.
[51] In support of his application, Mr. Akinbiyi has provided tracking information for materials he sent to CBG and a copy of an email from CBG’s counsel dated May 16, 2025. In the email counsel for CBG says they have received Mr. Akinbiyi’s evidentiary materials. Counsel says they understand Mr. Akinbiyi has sent additional materials which they have not yet received and will not address in their reply submissions.
[52] On the evidence before me I am not persuaded that CBG has engaged in improper conduct that warrants an order of costs against them. There is nothing before me to support Mr. Akinbiyi’s allegations, which are serious, other than Mr. Akinbiyi’s belief that any submission by CBG must be untrue. I do not find CBG engaged in improper conduct and the application for costs is denied.
VI CONCLUSION
[53] Mr. Akinbiyi’s applications to submit evidence after the submission period and for a cost award are denied.
[54] I grant CBG’s application and dismiss the complaint in its entirety under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) of the Code.
[55] As set out in the materials, the settlement offer will expire two weeks following the date of this decision.
Edward Takayanagi
Tribunal Member