Champagne v. Synergy Day Spa and another (No. 2), 2025 BCHRT 174
Date Issued: July 29, 2025
File: CS-002416
Indexed as: Champagne v. Synergy Day Spa and another (No. 2), 2025 BCHRT 174
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Christine Champagne
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Synergy Day Spa and Joline Vanderwal
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
Tribunal Member: Edward Takayanagi
On their own behalf: Christine Champagne
Agent for the Respondents: Rhiannon Whitney
Date of Hearing: April 28, 2025
Location of Hearing: Videoconference
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Christine Champagne filed a human rights complaint alleging her former employer, Synergy Day Spa and former manager, Joline Vanderwal discriminated against her on the basis of physical disability contrary to s. 13 of the Human Rights Code when they terminated her employment after she provided a doctor’s note stating she required an eight-week medical leave.
[2] The Respondents deny discriminating. They say they did not terminate Ms. Champagne’s employment but rather temporarily laid her off so she could collect medical EI and CERB benefits. They say Ms. Champagne’s position was kept open so she could return to work when she recovered from her injuries. They say the Spa was unable to recover from financial losses associated with the pandemic and permanently closed on March 31, 2021.
[3] The parties called witnesses and introduced evidence over the course of a one-day hearing. While I do not refer to it all in my decision, I have considered all of the evidence and submissions of the parties. This is not a complete recitation of that information, but only that which is necessary to come to my decision.
[4] For the reasons that follow, I find that the Respondents terminated Ms. Champagne’s employment because of her physical disability and breached the Code.
II Preliminary Issue: Application to anonymize
[5] Together with their closing submissions, the Respondents requested the Tribunal anonymize Ms. Vanderwal’s name in the final decision. The Respondents say Ms. Vanderwal should not be named because she did not discriminate.
[6] It will be already apparent that I have denied the Respondents’ request.
[7] Complaints at the Tribunal are presumptively public: Mother A obo Child B v. School District C, 2015 BCHRT 64 at para. 7. This openness serves four main goals: maintaining an effective evidentiary process, ensuring that Tribunal members act fairly, promoting public confidence in the Tribunal, and educating the public about the Tribunal’s process and development of the law: Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 SCR 1326 at para. 61; JY v. Various Waxing Salons, 2019 BCHRT 106 at para. 25. These goals align with the purposes of the Code, which include fostering a more equitable society and identifying and eliminating persistent patterns of inequality: Code, s. 3. The main way that the Tribunal furthers these purposes is through its public decisions: A and B v. Famous Players Films and C, 2005 BCHRT 432 at para. 14. The Tribunal has discretion to limit publication of identifying information where a person can show their privacy interests outweigh the public interest in full access to the Tribunal’s proceedings: Tribunal Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 5(6); Stein v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2020 BCSC 70 at para. 64(a).
[8] Here, the Respondents argue that because Ms. Vanderwal did not discriminate, her privacy interest outweighs the public interest in her name. However, I have found that the Respondents discriminated. The Respondents have provided no other arguments to support a finding that Ms. Vanderwal’s privacy interests outweigh the presumption of a public complaint.
[9] Further and in any event, the Tribunal has already published a decision with respect to this complaint. This complaint is at the final stage of the Tribunal’s proceedings and details of the complaint and the identities of the parties have been in the public domain since the publication of the preliminary decision on the Respondents’ application to dismiss in November 2023. I find it would be of little use to limit publication at this late stage of proceedings, as the privacy Ms. Vanderwal seeks to protect is already in the public domain and she has provided no persuasive basis on which to decide otherwise: Bakhtiyari v. BCIT (No. 2), 2006 BCHRT 482 at para. 5; Ng v. City of Vancouver (No. 2), 2024 BCHRT 228 at para. 15.
III BACKGROUND
[10] Ms. Champagne was an esthetician employed by Synergy Day Spa. She was a full-time employee working five days a week. Ms. Champagne was paid by commission based on the clients she served.
[11] Rhiannon Whitney was the owner of the Spa. Joline Vanderwal was the manager and Ms. Champagne’s direct supervisor. Ms. Vanderwal was responsible for payroll. Decisions about hiring and firing of employees were made jointly by Ms. Vanderwal and Ms. Whitney.
[12] On May 8, 2019, Ms. Champagne was in a motor vehicle accident and suffered injuries requiring time off from work.
[13] She started a gradual return to work with light duties on September 18, 2019. On the recommendation of Ms. Champagne’s doctor, she worked two days a week.
[14] On or about March 20, 2020, the Spa closed and all staff, including Ms. Champagne, were laid off temporarily due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
[15] On May 20, 2020, Ms. Champagne’s doctor recommended a return-to-work of two days a week starting June 8, 2020.
[16] The Spa reopened on June 2, 2020.
[17] On June 5, 2020, before Ms. Champagne could attempt a return to work, her doctor advised her to “remain off work for the next 8 weeks while she is underogoing [sic] a course of treatment for a chronic shoulder injury.” Ms. Champagne sent her doctor’s letter to Ms. Vanderwal.
[18] On June 9, 2020, Ms. Vanderwal emailed Ms. Champagne and said:
Thank you for your email with a copy of your doctors note. As our temporary lay off agreement stipulates 13 weeks, this requirement exceeds this. As such we are hereby notifying you of your 2 week notice here at Synergy. Your final date of work is June 23, 2020. We truly, want you to focus on recovery and care for yourself. Thank you for being apart of our team and serving our guests with your skill and heart.
If you have any questions or concerns, please let us know.
Please, reply to this email with your signature agreeing to these terms. Your key will need to be returned by June 23, 2020. [reproduced as written]
[19] On June 10, 2020, Ms. Vanderwal texted Ms. Champagne to inform her that her final pay would be issued on June 24, 2020.
[20] On June 27, 2020, the Respondents issued a Record of Employment (ROE) which provided that the employment was terminated because the employee “quit/health reasons.”
[21] Ms. Champagne texted Ms. Vanderwal to say that she did not quit. The Respondents issued a revised ROE on June 29, 2020. It provided the reason for the end of employment as “shortage of work/end of contract or season.” In the notes section of the ROE, the Respondents wrote, “Recalled to work June 2nd, received Dr. note 05.20/20, saying Christine could return to work 06/08/20, 06/06/20 received doctors note asking for 8 weeks” [reproduced as written].
[22] On July 23, 2020, the Respondents issued another ROE with the same reasons for terminating the employment and notes as the June 29 ROE.
[23] The Spa closed permanently on March 31, 2021. It was unable to recover form the negative financial impacts from the COVID-19 pandemic.
IV ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[24] To prove discrimination under s. 13 of the Code, Ms. Champagne must establish that: (1) she has a protected characteristic, in this case a physical disability; (2) she experienced an adverse impact in employment, in this case by being terminated from her employment; and (3) her physical disability was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33. Ms. Champagne must prove her case on a balance of probabilities, which means that a scenario is more likely than not.
[25] There is no dispute that Ms. Champagne has a physical disability. Ms. Champagne had ongoing injuries causing physical limitations as a result of her 2019 motor vehicle accident. The Respondents dispute that Ms. Champagne experienced any adverse impact in her employment. Specifically, they deny that Ms. Champagne’s employment was terminated and say they told her she could return to her job at the Spa at any time.
[26] Therefore, I must decide if Ms. Champagne experienced an adverse impact in employment, and if so, whether her physical disability was a factor in that adverse impact.
[27] Termination of employment is an adverse impact under the Code: s. 13(1)(a) and De Medeiros v. Rovalution Automotive Ltd. and another, 2023 BCHRT 182 at para. 22. A layoff too, is a cessation of employment, and may be an adverse impact in employment even if the employer intends to reinstate the employee in the future: Westendorf v. 33 Acres Brewing Company Inc., 2023 BCHRT 118 at para. 20.
[28] Based on all the evidence, I am satisfied Ms. Champagne has established that her employment was terminated by the Respondents.
[29] I begin with the email sent by Ms. Vanderwal to Ms. Champagne on June 9, 2020. I find the email speaks for itself. Ms. Vanderwal gives Ms. Champagne notice and states that her final day of work will be June 23, 2020. In my view, the email clearly conveys the Respondents are ending Ms. Champagne’s employment.
[30] The Respondents say that the email was not intended to terminate Ms. Champagne’s employment but initiate discussion about her medical leave. They point to the fact that they wrote “if you have any questions or concerns, please let us know.” I do not find this explanation persuasive. The Respondents’ explanation is not consistent with the other contents of the email. Specifically, they say they are giving Ms. Champagne notice, telling her when her last day will be, and requiring her to return her keys. This is more consistent with a termination than the start of a discussion. It is not clear to me why any employee receiving such an email would reasonably interpret it to mean anything but their employment was being terminated. At most the statement the Respondents rely on invites Ms. Champagne to contact them to discuss the termination. Nothing on the face of the email suggests the Respondents were willing to discuss a medical leave.
[31] The evidence of Ms. Champagne’s final payment is also consistent with the Respondents terminating the employment. Included in the final payment is Ms. Champagne’s accrued vacation pay. The evidence before me is that on March 19, 2020, when the Spa was laying off its staff due to COVID-19 restrictions, Ms. Vanderwal told Ms. Champagne she would not be paid out her accrued vacation “because it’s a temporary lay off” but would be entitled to vacation pay “if it was termination.”
[32] The Respondents say that the reason they laid off Ms. Champagne and issued an ROE was so that Ms. Champagne could apply for EI and CERB benefits. They say they understood only active employees were eligible for those benefits. They say that the first ROE stating Ms. Champagne quit was issued in error and the revised ROE correctly provides that the reason the employment ended is shortage of work/end of contract or season. They say they did not pay any severance and communicated to Ms. Champagne that she was welcome to return when she was recovered from her injuries. I have considered these arguments but do not find them persuasive. I agree that issuing an ROE is not, on its own, determinative of whether an employee has been terminated. As I explain next, my conclusion that Ms. Champagne’s employment was terminated by the Respondents is based on the totality of the evidence in the particular circumstances of this case, not just the ROE.
[33] Here, Ms. Champagne was given notice of her final day of work and told to return her keys. She was paid her accrued vacation days which Ms. Vanderwal had previously said the Spa did when terminating employment. The undisputed evidence is that Ms. Vanderwal said she hoped Ms. Champagne would return to the Spa when her injuries would allow her to do so. However, there is no evidence before me to suggest this statement guaranteed a return to work or was anything more than a pleasantry. In fact, it seems equally if not more consistent with ending an employment relationship than affirming a continuing employment relationship where an employee is merely on leave.
[34] The Respondents also say they did not hire another esthetician to replace Ms. Champagne until the Spa went out of business. However, the evidence before me is that the COVID-19 pandemic caused a significant loss of business for the Spa and they reduced the number of employees and their hours after reopening in June 2020. In this circumstance I do not find the evidence that the Spa did not hire another esthetician to be persuasive evidence that the Spa intended for Ms. Champagne to return to work.
[35] In the circumstances, I am satisfied that Ms. Champagne has established that the Respondents terminated her employment. Having found that the Respondents terminated Ms. Champagne’s employment, I turn to the third element of Moore: whether Ms. Champagne’s physical disability was a factor in the termination. I find that it was.
[36] Employers rarely announce that they are dismissing an employee for discriminatory reasons. However, in this instance the June 9, 2020, email is quite clear. Ms. Champagne sought a medical leave supported by a note from her doctor, which she provided to the Spa. The Spa responded by saying the requested leave exceeded a previous agreement and, therefore, it was giving her two weeks notice. That Ms. Champagne’s disability-related need for time off was not just “a factor” in the termination (which is all that is required at law) but the sole factor, seems irrefutable in this case.
[37] Based on the evidence, I find that Ms. Champagne’s disability was a factor in the Respondents’ decision to terminate her employment. Therefore, I find the compliant is justified and the Respondents have contravened s.13(1) of the Code.
[38] In many cases, employers argue a justification defence against a complaint of discrimination: British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. British Columbia Government and Service Employees’ Union (Meiorin Grievance), [1999] 3 SCR 3 at para. 54. In such cases, after a complainant has made out its case the burden shifts to the employer. Even on a generous approach to the Spa’s arguments the Spa has not argued a justification defence in this case. Therefore, the inquiry ends here on the merits of the case.
[39] Having found that the Respondents discriminated. I next turn to what remedies are appropriate.
V Remedies
A. Section 37(2)(a) Cease the Contravention
[40] Having found the Respondents discriminated against Ms. Champagne based on disability, contrary to s. 13 of the Code, I order the Respondents to cease and refrain from committing the same or similar discrimination, pursuant to s. 37(2)(a) of the Code.
B. Section 37(2)(b) Declaratory Order
[41] Under s. 37(2)(b) of the Code, the Tribunal may make a declaratory order that the conduct complained of, or similar conduct, is contrary to the Code. In the circumstances of this case, I consider it appropriate to make such an order. I declare that the Respondents’ conduct in terminating Ms. Champagne’s employment is discrimination contrary to s. 13 of the Code.
C. Section 37(2)(d)(ii) Compensation – Lost Income
[42] Section 37(2)(d)(ii) of the Code gives the Tribunal discretion to compensate a person for all, or a part, of any wages or salary lost because of discrimination. The purpose of compensation is to restore a complainant, to the extent possible, to the position they would have been in had the discrimination not occurred. There must be a causal connection between the loss claimed and the discriminatory conduct: Gichuru v. Law Society of British Columbia (No. 9), 2011 BCHRT 185 [Gichuru] at para. 298-303, upheld in 2014 BCCA 396.
[43] Ms. Champagne seeks an award of $17,759.48 for lost wages. She says she calculated her average weekly earning as $479.99 based on earning $3,359.90 from January 1, 2020, to April 11, 2020. She says that but for the discrimination, she would have returned to work on August 1, 2020, and continued to work for 35 weeks until the Spa went out of business. She also says that she would have been entitled to two weeks severance pay and calculates her losses as: $479.99 x (35 weeks lost wages + two weeks severance).
[44] I agree that Ms. Champagne is entitled to some lost wages in this case. However, I do not agree with the amount of Ms. Champagne’s claim for the following reasons.
[45] First, the undisputed evidence is that Ms. Champagne was paid bi-weekly. I accept the undisputed evidence that Ms. Champagne earned $3,359.90 for the period of January 1, 2020, to April 11, 2020. That is a period of 14-weeks. Therefore, Ms. Champagne’s average weekly earning would be $239.99 ($3,359.90/14 weeks). Based on the average weekly earning Ms. Champagne’s total losses over the 35-week period from August 1, 2020 (when she would have returned to work) to March 31, 2021 (when the Spa went out of business) is $8,399.65 ($239.99 x 35 weeks).
[46] The parties also agree that no severance was paid to Ms. Champagne and that she was entitled to two-weeks severance. Therefore, I find Ms. Champagne incurred a loss of $479.98 ($239.99 x two weeks) for unpaid severance.
[47] To the extent that Ms. Champagne received CERB or EI benefits between August 1, 2020, and March 31, 2021, CERB payments and EI benefits are not deductible from compensation awards: Yates v. Langley Moto Sport Centre Ltd., 2022 BCCA 398; Bayongan v. Shimmura and another, 2023 BCHRT 27 at para. 66.
[48] Based on the materials, I find the total amount of Ms. Champagne’s income loss is $8,879.63.
[49] Next, I consider what would be a fair, reasonable, and appropriate amount of compensation by exercising my discretion on a principled basis, taking into account the remedial purposes of the Code: Gichuru at para. 303.
[50] The Tribunal may reduce a wage loss award if a complainant has not reasonably mitigated their loss, or to account for other contingencies: Benton v. Richmond Plastics, 2020 BCHRT 82 at para.91. The duty to mitigate requires a person to take reasonable steps to avoid or reduce their financial losses, including by looking for other comparable work. The burden lies with the Respondents to show Ms. Champagne failed to take reasonable steps and that alternative employment could have been found if she had taken those steps: Okano v. Cathay Pacific Airways Limited, 2022 BCSC 881 at para. 23.
[51] In my view, some deduction is appropriate to account for the contingency that Ms. Champagne would have earned the same amount during the 35-week period of August 1, 2020, to March 31, 2021, as she did prior to the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. The undisputed evidence is that the COVID-19 pandemic had a devastating effect on the Spa’s business and there was a significant reduction in the number of clients after it reopened. Ms. Vanderwal said after reopening, the Spa saw about half the business it did prior to the COVID-19 shutdown. Of those, Ms. Vanderwal said most were returning clients of other estheticians who would not have requested Ms. Champagne’s services, and therefore she would not have been paid commission for those clients.
[52] I am also satisfied the Respondents have established that Ms. Champagne did not take reasonable steps to mitigate her losses.
[53] Ms. Champagne testified that she contacted two potential employers before deciding that a career as an esthetician was not for her and gave up seeking employment entirely. Ms. Champagne’s evidence about her job search was sparse. She was unable to recall when she applied to these positions and there are no documentary materials to support her testimony.
[54] The Respondents argue that Ms. Champagne did not take reasonable steps to mitigate her losses. They dispute she engaged in any job search and say there is no documentary evidence to support that she contacted potential employers. They submit that there were approximately six spas in the city, and over 25 spas in a neighboring municipality 30 minutes away that Ms. Champagne could have applied to. They say that if Ms. Champagne engaged in a job search it was merely a cursory attempt, limited in scope, and not reasonable under the circumstances.
[55] I agree with the Respondents that the evidence before me suggests Ms. Champagne’s job search was not particularly thorough. While I appreciate that Ms. Champagne says she took some steps to find alternate employment, there is little evidence about her job search. Even accepting she applied for two jobs, that is a rather abbreviated search.
[56] However, an employer relying on failure to mitigate must also show that alternative employment could have been found if the employee had taken those steps. I am not satisfied that the Spa has done so.
[57] The Spa points to the number of other spas in the region and says that Ms. Champagne could have found comparable employment. What this ignores is that Ms. Champagne’s job search occurred in the circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic. Ms. Vanderwal’s evidence is that the Spa’s clients did not fully return after reopening. She said the Spa only did about half the business it did before COVID-19. I expect other spas faced similar operational difficulties and business downturns. Further, it is generally accepted that many people had a difficult time finding work during the uncertainty of the COVID-19 pandemic.
[58] Viewed in the context of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic I am not satisfied that the Respondents have shown that Ms. Champagne would have been able to obtain comparable employment had she taken additional steps to search for jobs. That said, I am also satisfied that Ms. Champagne’s earnings would have dropped significantly had she returned to work after eight weeks and had continued to work until the Spa closed. There were simply not as many customers who could be served at the Spa during this time. The evidence is that only half the clients returned to the Spa during COVID-19. Therefore, her earnings would have been reduced.
[59] In these circumstances, I find a contingency deduction of approximately 60% is appropriate. The loss of income of $8,879.63, less a 60% deduction is $3,551.85. Therefore, I issue an award in Ms. Champagne’s favour in the amount of $3,551.85 for lost income pursuant to section 37(2)(d)(ii) of the Code.
D. Section 37(2)(d)(iii) Injury to Dignity, Feelings, and Self-Respect
[60] Ms. Champagne seeks an award of $5,000 for injury to her dignity, feelings, and self-respect.
[61] Under s. 37(2)(d)(iii) of the Code, the Tribunal has the discretion to award compensation for injury to dignity. The purpose of these awards is compensatory, not punitive. Determining the amount of an injury to dignity award depends on the specific facts and circumstances in a given case. At the same time, for the purposes of consistency and fairness, it is often helpful to consider the range of awards made in similar cases.
[62] An award for compensation for injury to dignity is not automatic. There is a presumption that a breach of the Code will give rise to a compensable injury to a complainant’s dignity. Nonetheless, the Tribunal may decline to award such damages absent evidence that the discrimination had an impact on the complainant: Ingenthron v. Overwaitea Food Group and Van Pelt (No. 2), 2006 BCHRT 556 at paras. 80-82. It is not necessary, however, for there to be evidence of a “medical impact”, for the Tribunal to award compensation for injury to dignity: Gichuru.
[63] Determining the amount of compensation for the impact of the discrimination is “highly contextual and fact-specific”: Gichuru at para. 256. Relevant factors the Tribunal generally considers are the nature of the discrimination, the complainant’s social context or vulnerability, and the effect on the complainant: Basic v. Esquimalt Denture Clinic and another, 2020 BCHRT 138 at para. 193; Gichuru at para. 260.
[64] I begin with the nature of the discrimination. The Tribunal has described termination of employment as the “ultimate employment-related consequence”: Nelson v. Goodberry Restaurant Group Ltd. dba Buono Osteria and others, 2021 BCHRT 137 at para. 129. The Tribunal has recognized that loss of employment often warrants compensation at the high end of the range given the significance of employment to a person’s identity, self-worth, and dignity: Ms. K v. Deep Creek Store and another, 2021 BCHRT 158 at para. 131.
[65] Next, the social context of the discrimination is one of employer and employee. There is an inherent power imbalance between employers and employees that make employees vulnerable, especially at the time of termination: Senyk v. WFG Agency Network (No. 2), 2008 BCHRT 376 at paras. 463-464. Further, the termination occurred during the uncertainty of a global pandemic when Ms. Champagne had a physical disability. I find the social context made Ms. Champagne particularly vulnerable.
[66] Finally, I consider the effect of the discrimination on Ms. Champagne. Ms. Champagne provided little evidence of the impact upon her of the discrimination. In her closing submissions, she referred in general terms to feeling devalued and dismissed. Although there is little evidence before me of Ms. Champagne’s injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect, I find that such damages can be inferred from the very loss of a job due to discrimination. I do not find Ms. Champagne’s stoicism diminishes the impact of the discrimination: Lall v. Apidel Staffing Inc. operating as Apidel Technologies and another, 2023 BCHRT 45 at para. 66.
[67] The Respondents suggest that no award is payable because they did not intend to discriminate and say they had previously supported Ms. Champagne throughout her employment. They say they had never dealt with an employee who requested medical leave and were doing as they were instructed by Service Canada.
[68] I accept that the Respondents did not intend to discriminate. I agree that there was no preceding harassment or negative treatment of Ms. Champagne. I also agree that the email of June 9, 2020, terminating the employment does not contain harsh language. In fact, it compliments Ms. Champagne for her “skill and heart” with guests of the Spa. The evidence before me is that after issuing the termination email, the Respondents communicated with Ms. Champagne, addressed her concerns and issued multiple ROEs to support her applying for benefits.
[69] However, the Code does not require an intention to discriminate: Code, s.2. As I have said, the purpose of an award for injury to dignity is compensatory, not punitive. The fact that a respondent may not have meant to discriminate does not lessen the impact on a complainant of the fact that the respondent did, in fact, discriminate.
[70] Second, I accept that this was the first time the Respondents encountered a situation with an employee who was seeking medical leave. However, it was incumbent on them as employers to educate themselves properly about their legal obligations under the Code. I accept that Ms. Vanderwal took some steps by calling Service Canada. To my knowledge Service Canada does not provide legal advice about employment or human rights law matters but even if it does, the result would be the same: the Respondents breached the Code and Ms. Champagne is entitled to remedies.
[71] Ms. Champagne refers me to the case of: National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers of Canada (CAW – Canada) Local 111 v. Coast Mountain Bus Company (No. 9), 2008 BCHRT 52 [Coast Mountain]. The complainants in that case were each awarded between $5,000 and $6,000 for injury to dignity: paras. 673, 681, 689, 695, 699, and 704. That case did no involve termination. Rather, it involved a workplace policy that resulted in “systemic discrimination against some employees who suffer from chronic or recurring disabilities”: para. 611. The facts of this case make it distinguishable from Ms. Champagne’s. It provides minimal, direct, assistance in determining an appropriate injury to dignity award in the circumstances of this case.
[72] However, Coast Mountain is useful in two regards. First, it shows what the Tribunal awarded in an employment discrimination case that involved disability but not termination. As I noted above, termination cases often attract awards at the higher end of the spectrum. Second, Coast Mountain was decided in 2008. There has been an upward trend in Tribunal awards in recent years: Nelson at para. 42. I take from the foregoing that an award in the $5,000 range is not unreasonable for a termination case at this point in time.
[73] Ms. Champagne is asking for an award of $5,000. Recognizing the social context of the discrimination, the vulnerable position of Ms. Champagne, and the Tribunal’s case law, I find it appropriate to award the full amount sought. This is a relatively modest amount compared to recent Tribunal cases involving termination. For example, in Nelson the Tribunal awarded $20,000 and in Ms. K the Tribunal awarded $45,000. The facts of those cases were in some ways more egregious, so I cite them only to put the amount Ms. Champagne seeks in context. I find $5,000 to be an appropriate amount to award in the circumstances of this case.
E. Interest
[74] The Tribunal has the discretion to award interest on awards. An award of interest is part of the compensatory nature of the Tribunal’s awards, recognizing that but for the discrimination a complainant would have had use of the money now awarded. The interest places the complainant in the economic position they would have been in but for the discrimination: Vasil v. Mongovius and another (No. 3), 2009 BCHRT 117.
[75] I find it appropriate to order pre-judgment interest for wage loss and post-judgment interest on all the amounts awarded as part of an attempt to fully compensate Ms. Champagne for the loss and injury. The interest is to be paid based on the rates set out in the Court Order Interest Act.
VI CONCLUSION
[76] I make the following orders:
a. I order the Respondents to cease and refrain from committing the same or a similar contravention of the Code: s.37(2)(a).
b. I declare that the Respondents’ conduct contravened s. 13 of the Code: s. 37(2)(b).
c. I order the Respondents to pay Ms. Champagne $3,551.85 as wages lost because of discrimination: s. 37(2)(d)(ii) of the Code.
d. I order the Respondents to pay Ms. Champagne $5,000.00 as compensation for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect: s.37(2)(d)(iii) of the Code.
e. I order the Respondents to pay Ms. Champagne pre-judgement interest on the wage loss award until paid in full, based on the rates set out in the Court Order Interest Act.
f. I order the Respondents to pay Ms. Champagne post-judgment interest on all awards until paid in full, based on the rates set out in the Court Order Interest Act.
Edward Takayanagi,
Tribunal Member