Parenteau v. WorkSafeBC and another, 2025 BCHRT 171
Date Issued: July 25, 2025
File: CS-006903
Indexed as: Parenteau v. WorkSafeBC and another, 2025 BCHRT 171
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Jennifer Parenteau
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Workers’ Compensation Board doing business as WorkSafeBC and Coralee Spier
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c) and (d)(ii)
Tribunal Member: Edward Takayanagi
On their own behalf: Jennifer Parenteau
Counsel for the Respondents: Ryan J.M. Androsoff
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Jennifer Parenteau filed a complaint alleging the Workers’ Compensation Board doing business as WorkSafeBC [WCB] and its employee, Coralee Spier discriminated against her on the ground of mental disability in the area of service contrary to s. 8 of the Human Rights Code. She says that during WCB’s vocational rehabilitation service [VRS] process, Ms. Spier placed her in a job that was unsuitable for her because of limitations related to her disability.
[2] The Respondents deny discriminating. They apply to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code because they say Ms. Parenteau’s complaint has no reasonable prospect of success at a hearing.
[3] For the following reasons, I allow the application and dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c). I am persuaded that Ms. Parenteau has no reasonable prospect of succeeding in establishing that her disability was a factor in the Respondents’ decision that a job was suitable for her during the VRS process.
[4] To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision. I make no findings of fact.
II BACKGROUND
[5] Ms. Parenteau was injured in the course of her employment. On April 30, 2020, WCB accepted her claim for a mental health injury and provided her temporary wage loss benefits and health care benefits.
[6] WCB provides workers with vocational rehabilitation services to assist the worker to return to work in an occupation suitable for their limitations and/or need for accommodations. Ms. Spier is a vocational rehabilitation consultant who makes decisions about whether potential jobs are suitable for workers and their eligibility for vocational rehabilitation planning benefits.
[7] In November 2020, WCB determined that Ms. Parenteau could not return to her pre-injury job because of restrictions arising from her injuries.
[8] In August 2021, Ms. Parenteau was offered and accepted a new job. Prior to commencement of employment, Ms. Spier spoke with Ms. Parenteau’s new supervisor to explain the limitations accepted by WCB and the need for the employer to provide accommodations.
[9] On October 26, 2021, Ms. Parenteau wrote to Ms. Spier asking her to determine that her new job was unsuitable for her and requesting that Ms. Spier find her a different job. In a written decision dated November 9, 2021, Ms. Spier determined that the job was suitable based on the restrictions and limitations accepted by WCB. She acknowledged that Ms. Parenteau said the job was challenging but determined that the reported challenges were not related to the disability accepted by WCB. She advised Ms. Parenteau that WCB would not assist her in finding a different job and the VRS process would be concluded.
[10] On February 7, 2022, Ms. Parenteau applied to the WCB’s review division for a review of Ms. Spier’s November 9, 2021, decision. Ms. Parenteau was successful, and the review decision determined that Ms. Parenteau’s new job was not suitable for her in light of her disabilities. The Review Division retroactively reinstated Ms. Parenteau’s benefits and resumed the VRS process.
III DECISION
A. Section 27(1)(c) – No reasonable prospect of success
[11] The Respondents apply to dismiss Ms. Parenteau’s complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c) The onus is on the Respondents to establish the basis for dismissal.
[12] Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing.
[13] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan, 2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77.
[14] A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority, 2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission,[1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 at para. 27.
[15] To prove her complaint at a hearing, Ms. Parenteau will have to prove that she has a characteristic protected by the Code, she was adversely impacted in services, and her protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33.
[16] The focus of Ms. Parenteau’s complaint is Ms. Spiers’ decision that the new job was suitable for her in light of her disabilities. She argues that Ms. Spiers failed to give proper weight to the medical evidence about Ms. Parenteau’s limitations and made an incorrect decision about the suitability of the new job. She says the Respondents’ decision to conclude the VRS process adversely affected her by denying her a service.
[17] The Respondents do not dispute that Ms. Parenteau has a disability. Therefore, the first element of Moore is not at issue in this application. The Respondents say there is no reasonable prospect Ms. Parenteau will be able to prove the second and third elements of Moore: adverse impact and nexus. They argue that Ms. Spier deciding that a job is suitable for Ms. Parenteau and closing her VRS process is not an adverse impact in service. They also say there is no reasonable prospect Ms. Parenteau will be able to prove that her disability was a factor in that decision.
[18] I deal first with whether there is no reasonable prospect Ms. Parenteau will be able to establish that she suffered an adverse impact when Ms. Spier decided that her job was suitable for her and closed the VRS process. The Respondents say Ms. Parenteau’s complaint is about her dissatisfaction with Ms. Spier’s November 9, 2021, decision. They argue that a WCB decision that Ms. Parenteau disagrees with is not an adverse impact in service under the Code. I disagree. As I understand Ms. Parenteau’s submissions she does not just allege that Ms. Spier’s decision was incorrect, but alleges she experienced adverse impacts from being placed in an unsuitable job including worsening symptoms of her mental disability, stress, and loss of opportunity to find an appropriate job. On the low threshold required at this stage, I am persuaded Ms. Parenteau has taken this element out of the realm of conjecture.
[19] Regarding the third element of Moore, I am persuaded that there is no reasonable prospect that Ms. Parenteau could prove that her disabilities were a factor in the November 9, 2021, decision.
[20] The Respondents argue the complaint arises out of their authority to make decisions regarding rehabilitation services under the Workers Compensation Act and WCB policies. They concede that Ms. Parenteau’s disability, including her functional limitations, are at the core of any decision they make regarding her rehabilitation. However, they argue that it does not follow that Ms. Parenteau’s disability was a factor in any adverse impact flowing from the VRS decision, so that the decision is discriminatory. They say the appropriate forum for Ms. Parenteau to seek remedies with respect to a decision determining if a job is suitable and closing the VRS process is a review through the WCB’s internal appeal mechanism, which she pursued and was granted.
[21] The Respondents rely on Randell v. Workers’ Compensation Board, 2006 BCHRT 7, where the complainant said the termination of his WCB benefits was discriminatory. There, the complainant gave no factual basis for his allegation that the termination of benefits was discriminatory, and the Tribunal found it would not further the purposes of the Code to duplicate the role of WCB’s internal appeal mechanism.
[22] I am persuaded that the reasoning applies in the circumstances of this case. As in Randell, Ms. Parenteau has not alleged a factual basis on which she says the Respondents’ handling of her claim was discriminatory. Instead, she says that Ms. Spier’s decision of November 9, 2021, was incorrect and she should have been placed in a job more suitable for her given her limitations. She says that the review decision varied the November 9, 2021, decision which supports her position that Ms. Spier’s ought to have made a different decision.
[23] I cannot agree with Ms. Parenteau’s arguments. To do so would be tantamount to sitting in review of WCB’s decision, which is not the role of the Tribunal. As the Respondents point out, this is the role of the WCB’s internal appeal mechanism, which Ms. Parenteau pursued. There is nothing in the materials before me that takes the allegation that Ms. Spier’s decision itself was tainted by discriminatory beliefs or stereotype. It is not enough to say Ms. Parenteau has a protected characteristic and the Respondents made a wrong or unfair decision: Ingram v. Workers’ Compensation Board and others, 2003 BCHRT 57 at para. 20; Rogers v. Canada Life Assurance Company and another, 2024 BCHRT 308 at para. 87. There must be some connection or nexus between the two that is based on more than speculation or conjecture. Here, there is not.
[24] In my view, this part of Ms. Parenteau’s complaint remains almost entirely speculative. I am therefore persuaded that Ms. Parenteau’s complaint has no reasonable prospect of success at a hearing. Accordingly, I dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code.
IV CONCLUSION
[25] I allow the application and dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code.
Edward Takayanagi
Tribunal Member