Cooper v. Mozel and another, 2025 BCHRT 166
Date Issued: July 17, 2025
File: CS-005145
Indexed as: Cooper v. Mozel and another, 2025 BCHRT 166
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Harry (Sonny) Cooper
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Edward Mozel and Lynda Moller
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)
APPLICATION TO LIMIT PUBLICATION
Rule 5
APPLICATION FOR COSTS
Section 37(4)
Tribunal Member: Laila Said Alam
On their own behalf: Harry (Sonny) Cooper
On their own behalf: Edward Mozel and Lynda Moller
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Harry (Sonny) Cooper was employed by a strata plan as the resident caretaker of a condominium building. In his complaint filed in September 2021, Mr. Cooper alleges that residents Edward Mozel and Lynda Moller discriminated against him regarding his employment with the strata on the basis of mental disability, contrary to s. 13 of the Human Rights Code.
[2] Mr. Mozel and Ms. Moller deny discriminating against Mr. Cooper and say the complaint has no merit. Mr. Mozel and Ms. Moller each filed applications to dismiss the complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c). They say he has not taken his disability, adverse impacts, or a connection between his disability and adverse impacts out of the realm of conjecture. They also say that there is no employment relationship between themselves and Mr. Cooper.
[3] Mr. Cooper did not respond to the applications, but I am satisfied he had notice of the applications and an opportunity to respond. The issue in this case turns on whether there is no reasonable prospect Mr. Cooper will prove a connection between the adverse impacts he alleges, and his mental disability.
[4] For the following reasons, I dismiss the complaints against Ms. Moller and Mr. Mozel in their entirety. To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision. I make no findings of fact.
[5] Mr. Mozel and Ms. Moller both made applications to limit publication and an order for costs against Mr. Cooper. These applications are denied. Mr. Mozel also made an application for document disclosure. Because I allow the applications to dismiss, it is unnecessary to decide the document disclosure application.
II BACKGROUND
[6] Ms. Moller has been a resident of the building since 2014. Neither Mr. Mozer nor Ms. Moller have ever been a member of the strata council.
[7] The strata plan hired Mr. Cooper as a resident caretaker for the building in the fall of 2017. He says in his complaint he has a mental disability.
[8] On June 4, 2021, Ms. Moller sent a letter to the strata council stating her concerns and opinions about Mr. Cooper. The strata investigated and found Ms. Moller’s concerns to be unfounded.
[9] On August 28, 2021, Mr. Mozel posted a letter on the building bulletin board complaining about trespassing and the cleanliness of the building. The strata investigated and determined the conditions in the strata to be satisfactory.
III DECISION
A. Section 27(1)(c) – No reasonable prospect of success
[10] Ms. Moller and Mr. Mozel apply to dismiss Mr. Cooper’s complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c). The onus is on Ms. Moller and Mr. Mozel to respectively establish the basis for dismissal.
[11] Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing.
[12] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan,2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77.
[13] A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority,2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission,[1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 at para. 27.
[14] To prove his complaint at a hearing, Mr. Cooper will have to prove that he has a characteristic protected by the Code, he was adversely impacted in employment, and his protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33.
[15] Both Ms. Moller and Mr. Mozer say Mr. Cooper has no reasonable prospect of successfully proving the last of the Moore factors. I agree.
[16] Mr. Cooper provides scant description in his complaint on the adverse impacts he experienced and how they are connected to his mental disability. Nonetheless, I have reviewed the evidence to see whether it is more than mere speculation and conjecture that he will prove his disability was a factor in the alleged adverse impacts in his employment.
[17] Below I explain my reasons for dismissing the complaints against Ms. Moller and Mr. Mozel, respectively, under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code. I then explain my reasons for denying their respective applications to limit publication and applications for an order to pay costs against Mr. Cooper. Finally, I determine that it is unnecessary to decide the disclosure application.
B. Mr. Cooper’s complaint against Ms. Moller has no reasonable prospect of success
[18] Mr. Cooper alleges that Ms. Moller sent letters to the strata council on June 4, 2021, containing false accusations to tarnish Mr. Cooper’s reputation. He alleges that the letters accused him of taking advantage of elderly people living in the building, taking drugs, and being a sociopath and a liar. He says he has a copy of the letters, but did not provide them to the Tribunal to consider on this application. He said the letters resulted in a meeting (I presume, with the strata council) that found Ms. Moller’s complaints unsubstantiated. He felt depressed over the accusations.
[19] For her part, Ms. Moller says her letter expressed her concerns, as an owner, about an employee of the strata plan. She denies making any false accusations. The letters are not in evidence, and Ms. Moller does not provide further details of the letter’s contents. She said she had no control to direct the strata council on what to do with the comments in her letter. She says she has never been on the strata council and has no authority to hire or remove an employee that works for the strata plan. Further, she says she was not aware that Mr. Cooper allegedly has a mental disability or had filed a human rights complaint until the Tribunal issued the notice of complaint on March 21, 2023.
[20] I understand the alleged adverse impact in employment to be that Ms. Moller’s letters triggered the strata council meeting about Mr. Cooper’s job performance. Mr. Cooper’s complaints against Ms. Moller does not make a clear connection between his mental disability and the strata council’s meeting, and the Tribunal cannot speculate what evidence he may file at a hearing: Chan at para. 77. While Mr. Cooper may have understandably felt depressed by the accusations, I am not satisfied that he has taken a connection between his mental disability and Ms. Moller’s letter or the resulting strata meeting out of the realm of conjecture. I am persuaded that there is no reasonable prospect his complaint against Ms. Moller will succeed at a hearing.
C. Mr. Cooper’s complaint against Mr. Mozel has no reasonable prospect of success
[21] Mr. Cooper says Mr. Mozel posted a letter on the building’s bulletin board stating that the common areas were dirty and should be kept to a higher standard, and that trespassers in the building were becoming an increasing problem. Mr. Cooper says he felt publicly humiliated and stressed. I understand from Mr. Cooper’s complaint that after the letter was discussed at a strata council meeting, he and the strata council did a walk through the building and the strata found the conditions to be satisfactory.
[22] Before me is a copy of the letter Mr. Mozel posted on the building’s bulletin board on August 28, 2021. I agree with Mr. Mozel that Mr. Cooper is not named implicitly or explicitly, and, in my view, the letter reads as a general request for residents to contact the strata management company if residents shared Mr. Mozel’s concerns about the security, cleanliness, and management of the property. Again, Mr. Cooper provides scant details of his allegations in his complaint, and I cannot speculate what evidence he may file at a hearing: Chan at para. 77. On the materials before me, the connection between his disability and the strata council meeting or the subsequent walk through remains speculative. I am satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect Mr. Cooper’s complaint against Mr. Mozel will succeed at a hearing.
IV APPLICATION TO LIMIT PUBLICATION
[23] Complaints at the Tribunal are presumptively public: Mother A obo Child B v. School District C, 2015 BCHRT 64 at para. 7. This openness serves four main goals: maintaining an effective evidentiary process, ensuring that Tribunal members act fairly, promoting public confidence in the Tribunal, and educating the public about the Tribunal’s process and development of the law: Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 SCR 1326 at para. 61; JY v. Various Waxing Salons, 2019 BCHRT 106 at para. 25. These goals align with the purposes of the Code, which include fostering a more equitable society and identifying and eliminating persistent patterns of inequality: Code, s. 3. The main way that the Tribunal furthers these purposes is through its public decisions: A and B v. Famous Players Films and C., 2005 BCHRT 432 at para. 14.
[24] The Tribunal has discretion to limit publication of identifying information where a person can show their privacy interests outweigh the public interest in full access to the Tribunal’s proceedings: Tribunal Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 5(6); Stein v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2020 BCSC 70 at para. 64(a). The Tribunal may consider factors like the stage of the proceedings, the nature of the allegations, private detail in the complaint, harm to reputation, or any other potential harm: JY at para. 30. It may also consider whether the proposed limitation relates to only a “sliver” of information that minimally impairs the openness of the proceeding: C.S. v. British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal), 2019 BCCA 406 at para. 37. It is not enough to just assert that a person’s reputation may be tarnished: Stein at para. 64(c).
[25] Ms. Moller requests an application to limit publication as she does not want her name or profession affected by any association to Mr. Cooper. Ms. Moller asserts that identifying her in this decision may impact her reputation, but she does not give the Tribunal information how or why that may be. Ms. Moller has not persuaded me that general concerns about her reputation warrants an order to limit publication in the circumstances: Stein at para. 64(c).
[26] Mr. Mozel requests an application to limit publication on the basis that he believes Mr. Cooper filed the complaint in bad faith. He says the complaint is in retaliation for posting the letter, which Mr. Cooper considered as a criticism against him. I have not been asked to consider an application under s. 27(1)(e) of the Code. At this stage, I cannot, based on a review of the material, determine that Mr. Cooper’s complaint against Mr. Mozel was made in bad faith or for improper motives.
[27] Mr. Mozel also says an application to limit publication is appropriate in the circumstances because the complaint against him should not have proceeded this far into the Tribunal’s process. It is unexceptional in the Tribunal’s processes for complaints to come before the Tribunal that are ultimately dismissed, either during an interim application such as this one, or after a hearing on the merits. I am not persuaded by Mr. Mozer’s reasons that his privacy interests outweigh the public interest in this complaint.
[28] Ms. Moller and Mr. Mozel’s applications to limit publication under Rule 5(6) are denied.
V APPLICATION FOR COSTS
[29] Ms. Moller and Mr. Mozel separately apply for an order of costs against Mr. Cooper for improper conduct in the course of a complaint: Code, s. 37(4).
[30] Ms. Moller says Mr. Cooper has wasted her time and money, ruined the reputation of the apartment building, and made many residents move out because they lived in fear of him. She says Mr. Cooper failed to diligently pursue his complaint and participate in the Tribunal’s processes. She also requests costs on behalf of the strata council as an award for “their worthy efforts” and reimbursement for their time.
[31] Mr. Mozel also says costs should be ordered against Mr. Cooper because he failed to diligently pursue his complaint. He points to Mr. Cooper’s failure to file a Form 9.1 – Complainant Document Disclosure, produce documents, file a response to the applications for limited publication or an order for costs, attend the Tribunal’s mandatory teleconference, or communicate with the Tribunal to request an extension to meet the deadline for any of these deficient filings. Mr. Mozel requests compensation for Mr. Cooper’s conduct which he says wasted time and money and damaged the reputation of all the parties involved in this complaint.
[32] Both seek reimbursement for legal expenses.
[33] The Tribunal may award costs “against a party to a complaint who has engaged in improper conduct during the course of the complaint”: Code, s. 37(4)(a). The purpose of a costs award is punitive: Terpsma v. Rimex Supply (No. 3), 2013 BCHRT 3 at para. 102. It aims to deter conduct that has a significant and detrimental impact on the integrity of the Tribunal’s process: Oger v. Whatcott (No. 7), 2019 BCHRT 58 at para. 246.
[34] Improper conduct is “not necessarily limited to intentional wrongdoing”: McLean v. B.C. (Min. of Public Safety and Sol. Gen.) (No. 3), 2006 BCHRT 103 at para. 8. Rather, “[a]ny conduct which has a significant impact on the integrity of the Tribunal’s processes, including conduct which has a significant prejudicial impact on another party, may constitute improper conduct”: McLean at para. 8.
[35] I decline to order costs or to find that Mr. Cooper engaged in improper conduct.
[36] Mr. Cooper’s filing of a human rights complaint alleging discrimination in employment is not in itself improper, and does not warrant an order to reimburse Ms. Moller or Mr. Mozer for seeking legal advice or using their time to defend against this complaint.
[37] With respect to both Ms. Moller and Mr. Mozel’s requests for costs for improper conduct, I am not prepared to order costs against Mr. Cooper for, generally, not engaging in the Tribunal’s processes after filing his complaint. Without more information about Mr. Cooper’s disengagement, I am not prepared to order costs for these failures alone. I am of the view that it is enough that Mr. Cooper, to his detriment, did not engage the Tribunal’s processes, including this dismissal application, such that I dismiss his complaint, and it will not be proceeding to a hearing.
[38] Lastly, with respect to Ms. Moller, her allegations that he ruined the reputation of the building and caused residents to move are not a basis for a cost award. Costs are awarded for improper conduct that occurs within the Tribunal proceeding, and these allegations fall outside of these proceedings. There is no basis to order costs on behalf of the strata council.
VI Application to ORder Disclosure
[39] Lastly, I note Mr. Mozel also made an application for an order to disclose documents to defend this application on the basis it does not have a reasonable prospect of success. Because I dismiss the complaint in its entirety, it is not necessary to order Mr. Cooper to disclose documents.
VII CONCLUSION
[40] The complaint is dismissed under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code.
[41] Ms. Moller’s application to limit publication under Rule 5(6) is denied.
[42] Mr. Mozer’s application to limit publication under Rule 5(6) is denied.
[43] Ms. Moller’s application for costs under s. 37(4) of the Code is denied.
[44] Mr. Mozer’s application for costs under s. 37(4) of the Code is denied.
Laila Said Alam
Tribunal Member