O’Brien-Hornsey v. British Columbia Ferry Services Inc., (No. 2), 2025 BCHRT 158
Date Issued: July 16, 2025
File: CS-003323
Indexed as:
O’Brien-Hornsey v. British Columbia Ferry Services Inc., (No. 2), 2025 BCHRT 158
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Erin O’Brien-Hornsey
COMPLAINANT
AND:
British Columbia Ferry Services Inc.
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO RECONSIDER A DECISION: Rule 36
APPLICATION TO LIMIT PUBLICATION: Rule 5(6)
APPLICATION FOR DOCUMENT DISCLOSURE: Rule 23
Tribunal Member: Kathleen Smith
For the Complainant: Erin O’Brien-Hornsey
Counsel for the Respondent: Nicole C. M. Toye and Alyssa L. Paez
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Erin O’Brien-Hornsey filed a human rights complaint against her former employer, British Columbia Ferry Services Inc. [BC Ferries].
[2] BC Ferries applied to dismiss the complaint. The parties filed written submissions in the usual course and attached extensive evidence. Ms. O’Brien-Hornsey was self-represented, and BC Ferries was represented by counsel. I granted the dismissal application in part: O’Brien‑Hornsey v. British Columbia Ferry Services Inc., 2025 BCHRT 72 [the Decision]. Specifically, I dismissed the discipline and termination allegations, as well as the disability-based allegations. As stated in the decision, the allegation of a culture of sexism onboard the Baynes Sound Connector [BSC] will proceed to a hearing.
[3] Ms. O’Brien-Hornsey now applies for reconsideration of the Decision to dismiss parts of her complaint. Her application includes two additional requests: (1) she seeks an order retroactively limiting the publication of her name, and (2) she seeks an order that BC Ferries disclose certain video evidence that she says will show the termination of her employment was not reasonable or justified.
[4] BC Ferries opposes the application and argues that all of the requests should be denied.
[5] For the following reasons, I dismiss the application. In short, Ms. O’Brien-Hornsey has not persuaded me that there is an appropriate basis to reconsider the Decision, order BC Ferries to disclose video evidence, or make a retroactive order limiting publication of her personal information. My reasons follow.
II BACKGROUND
[6] I set out the background to the complaint in paragraphs 6 to 23 of the Decision and will not repeat it here.
III ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[7] In this section I will review each of Ms. O’Brien-Hornsey’s requests in turn, starting with her request for retroactive anonymity.
A. Should the Tribunal retroactively limit publication of Ms. O’Brien-Hornsey’s personal information?
[8] I begin by setting out the relevant legal principles.
[9] Complaints at the Tribunal are presumptively public: Mother A obo Child B v. School District C, 2015 BCHRT 64 at para. 7. This openness serves four main goals: maintaining an effective evidentiary process; ensuring that Tribunal members act fairly; promoting public confidence in the Tribunal, and; educating the public about the Tribunal’s process and development of the law: JY v. Various Waxing Salons, 2019 BCHRT 106 [JY] at para. 25. These goals align with the purposes of the Human Rights Code, which include fostering a more equitable society and identifying and eliminating persistent patterns of inequality: Code, s. 3. The main way that the Tribunal furthers these purposes is through its public decisions: A and B v. Famous Players Films and C, 2005 BCHRT 432 at para. 14.
[10] The Tribunal has discretion to limit publication of identifying information where a person can show their privacy interests outweigh the public interest in full access to the Tribunal’s proceedings: Rule 5(6) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure; Stein v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2020 BCSC 70 at para. 64(a). The Tribunal may consider factors like the stage of the proceedings, the nature of the allegations, the nature of the private details in the complaint, harm to reputation, or any other potential harm: JY at para. 30. It may also consider whether the proposed limitation relates to only a “sliver” of information that minimally impairs the openness of the proceeding: C.S. v. British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal), 2019 BCCA 406 at para. 37. It is not enough to assert that a person’s reputation may be tarnished: Stein at para. 64(c).
[11] In the application, Ms. O’Brien-Hornsey states that her name appeared in the news after the Decision was released. She now requests that her name not be used by the Tribunal, the other party, or anyone else including the media. As I understand it, Ms. O’Brien-Hornsey seeks an order retroactively anonymizing the Decision to protect her identity going forward.
[12] Ms. O’Brien-Hornsey did not make any arguments or present any evidence in support of this part of her application. She specifically did not explain what her privacy interests are or how they would outweigh the public interest in full access to the Tribunal’s proceedings. She also did not address the fact that the Decision was in the public domain for two weeks before she filed this application and continues to be available on the Tribunal’s website and legal databases such as CanLII.
[13] A party seeking anonymization has the burden to establish that there are strong grounds for limiting the publication of personal information: A v. University and others, 2014 BCHRT 235 at para. 5.
[14] In circumstances where Ms. O’Brien-Hornsey has not offered any basis to support her request, she has not met her burden. For this reason, I decline to grant the order requested.
[15] Although not necessary, I have also considered whether, in the absence of information from Ms. O’Brien-Hornsey, there was a basis within the Decision itself to support anonymization. I am not satisfied that the Decision contains the type of highly personal or sensitive information that would support limiting publication on the Tribunal’s own motion.
[16] I deny the application to limit publication.
B. Should the Tribunal reconsider the Decision that dismissed parts of the complaint?
[17] The Tribunal has a limited jurisdiction to reconsider its own decisions: Rule 36. Specifically, the Tribunal may reconsider a decision if it is in the interests of justice and fairness to do so: Routkovskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2012 BCCA 141 at para. 23. The Tribunal exercises this power sparingly, giving due consideration to the principle of finality in administrative proceedings: Grant v. City of Vancouver and others (No. 4), 2007 BCHRT 206 [Grant] at para 10.
[18] The burden is on the person seeking to have a matter re-opened to show that the interests of fairness and justice demand such an order: Grant at para. 10.
[19] The Tribunal does not have authority to reconsider a decision based on an argument that the decision was wrong or unreasonable: Fraser Health Authority v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal, 2014 BCCA 499 at para.160. The Tribunal will not reconsider a decision to address arguments that could have been made in the first instance but were not, or to hear a party reargue its case: Ramadan v. Kwantlen Polytechnic University and another (No. 2), 2018 BCHRT 56 at para. 13. When a party simply disagrees with a Tribunal decision, the appropriate recourse is judicial review by the BC Supreme Court.
[20] I begin with the substantive arguments.
[21] The application before me repeats and restates many of the same arguments advanced by Ms. O’Brien-Hornsey in the application to dismiss process. For example, she continues to dispute BC Ferries’ reasons for terminating her employment, including the accusation of dishonesty; and repeats her view that her version of events was given less weight than the men who were interviewed during the investigations into her conduct. It is apparent that Ms. O’Brien-Hornsey continues to view the termination decision as severe, unfair, and wrong. She also disagrees with the Decision to dismiss the discipline and termination allegations.
[22] As set out above, the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to reconsider its own decisions is narrow. Reconsideration is not an opportunity to repeat or reiterate arguments that were already considered and decided. It is also not an opportunity to advance arguments that could have been made during the dismissal application process but were not. Where Ms. O’Brien-Hornsey reargues her case seeking a different result, I do not find a basis to reconsider the Decision.
[23] Ms. O’Brien-Hornsey also advances arguments that I understand to be alleged breaches of procedural fairness. I will review each argument in turn.
[24] Ms. O’Brien-Hornsey states that she faced a “large challenge” in initially providing the Tribunal with enough evidence to grasp the gravity of the discrimination onboard the BSC and within the culture of BC Ferries.
[25] Ms. O’Brien-Hornsey also states that she produced a career timeline in her original submission that is difficult to interpret, and she intended to speak to it at the anticipated hearing. She does not explain; however, why she could not or did not speak to this evidence in her original submission. Moreover, my review of her original submission indicates that she did explain her career progression with BC Ferries.
[26] I begin by acknowledging that Ms. O’Brien-Hornsey is a self-represented litigant and that pursuing a complaint at the Tribunal is not an easy endeavor. At the same time, I find that Ms. O’Brien-Hornsey has conducted herself throughout the process in a comprehensive, coherent, and responsive manner. For example, I observe that she filed fulsome submissions on the application to dismiss that included 15 pages of argument, and extensive evidence (approximately 800 pages of documents and several recordings).
[27] Aside from the issue of the video footage, which I will address next, Ms. O’Brien-Hornsey does not explain the nature of the challenge she says she faced, including any barriers to provide evidence and argument or why the Tribunal’s process was procedurally unfair. In circumstances where Ms. O’Brien-Hornsey has provided comprehensive evidence and arguments and not identified a specific barrier, I do not find an appropriate basis to reconsider the Decision. Being a self-represented litigant, on its own, does not support a conclusion that the process was unfair.
[28] For all of the above reasons, I am not satisfied that Ms. O’Brien-Hornsey has met her burden of showing that it would be in the interests of fairness and justice to reconsider the Decision. I deny the application for reconsideration.
C. Should the Tribunal order disclosure?
[29] Ms. O’Brien-Hornsey seeks an order from the Tribunal that would require BC Ferries to disclose video footage related to incidents on June 15, 2019, and March 3, 2020. Those incidents are at the heart of the discipline and termination allegations, which the Tribunal dismissed.
[30] As I understand it, Ms. O’Brien-Hornsey argues that the video evidence will contradict BC Ferries’ position that she engaged in misconduct during the June 2019 and March 2020 incidents.
[31] BC Ferries opposes this request on several bases. It argues that:
a. The footage is no longer relevant given that the Tribunal dismissed the discipline and termination allegations.
b. Ms. O’Brien-Hornsey made no effort to try to obtain the footage prior to the Decision, even though she raised the issue of video surveillance in an earlier arbitration process.
c. The surveillance system does not record audio.
d. Even if the footage showed what is asserted by Ms. O’Brien-Hornsey, it would not change BC Ferries’ conclusion about her misconduct.
e. The footage would not establish any connection between Ms. O’Brien-Hornsey’s sex or disability and the discipline which followed.
[32] As set out above, Ms. O’Brien-Hornsey continues to dispute the basis for the termination of her employment. As I read this part of her submission, she speculates that the video surveillance footage related to the June 2019 and March 2020 incidents would vindicate her and show that she did not engage in misconduct.
[33] I agree with BC Ferries that the video footage is not relevant given that the Tribunal has already dismissed the discipline and termination allegations. On this basis alone, I decline to make an order.
[34] I pause to also observe that Ms. O’Brien-Hornsey raised the issue of the video footage during the application to dismiss process. In those submissions, she referred to the video footage as lost, missing, no longer existing, and destroyed. As I understand it, she sought to rely on the footage during a much earlier arbitration process but was advised in December 2021, that it no longer exists. Her materials on the application to dismiss include an email exchange between counsel where the lawyer for BC Ferries advises that, “Efforts were made to locate but they no longer exist.” Ms. O’Brien-Hornsey does not address or explain her current request in light of her previous submission and evidence that suggests the footage no longer exists.
[35] Ms. O’Brien-Hornsey has not met her burden to show that the requested video footage is relevant to an issue before the Tribunal, or that it would support the just and timely resolution of the remaining complaint: Rule 23. In these circumstances, I deny the application for document disclosure.
IV Conclusion
[36] The application is denied.
[37] The Tribunal will not reconsider the Decision.
[38] The Tribunal will not issue the requested orders to limit publication or disclose documents.
Kathleen Smith
Tribunal Member