Wolfe v. West Kootenay Women’s Association and others, 2025 BCHRT 156
Date Issued: June 27, 2025
File: CS-005665
Indexed as: Wolfe v. West Kootenay Women’s Association and others, 2025 BCHRT 156
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Reasha Wolfe
COMPLAINANT
AND:
West Kootenay Women’s Association, Vita Luthmers, and Donna Macdonald
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
TIMELINESS OF COMPLAINT (RECONSIDERED)
Section 22
Tribunal Member: Devyn Cousineau
Counsel for the Complainant: Alanna Mackenzie (original submissions), Robbie Fleming (reconsideration)
For the West Kootenay Women’s Association: Terri-Lynn Wilkinson (original submissions), Michael Bellomo (reconsideration)
For Vita Luthmers: Vita Luthmers (original submissions), Michael Bellomo (reconsideration)
For Donna Macdonald: Donna Macdonald (original submissions), Michael Bellomo (reconsideration)
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Reasha Wolfe filed a human rights complaint against her former employer, West Kootenay Women’s Association, and two former directors of the Association. The complaint was filed outside the one-year time limit and so the Tribunal sought submissions about whether to accept it under s. 22(3) of the Human Rights Code. In a letter decision dated May 18, 2023, the Tribunal declined to exercise its discretion to accept the complaint [Original Decision]. On judicial review, the BC Supreme Court found that the Original Decision was based on an error of law and was patently unreasonable: Wolfe v. West Kootenay Women’s Association, 2025 BCSC 469. It set the Original Decision aside and remitted it to the Tribunal for reconsideration.
[2] This is my decision reconsidering the timeliness issue. Although the Tribunal’s usual process is that decisions are reconsidered by the Tribunal Member who made the original decision, that was not possible in this case. To make my decision, I have considered the issue afresh, based on the parties’ original submissions and brief supplementary submissions addressing the impact of the Court’s decision.
[3] For the reasons that follow, I find that it is in the public interest to accept Ms. Wolfe’s complaint for filing, and that there is no substantial prejudice to any party in doing so. I exercise my discretion under s. 22(3) of the Code to accept the complaint for filing. I begin by addressing three preliminary issues: (1) an application to limit publication, (2) an application to file further submissions, and (3) the scope of supplemental submissions.
II PRELIMINARY ISSUES
A. Application to limit publication
[4] The Respondents apply to limit publication of their names in connection with this complaint. Ms. Wolfe opposes the application. Respectfully, the application is denied.
[5] Complaints at the Tribunal are presumptively public: Mother A obo Child B v. School District C, 2015 BCHRT 64 at para. 7. This openness serves four main goals: maintaining an effective evidentiary process, ensuring that Tribunal members act fairly, promoting public confidence in the Tribunal, and educating the public about the Tribunal’s process and development of the law: Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), 1989 CanLII 20 (SCC), at para. 61; JY v. Various Waxing Salons, 2019 BCHRT 106 at para. 25. These goals align with the purposes of the Code, which include fostering a more equitable society and identifying and eliminating persistent patterns of inequality: Code, s. 3. The main way that the Tribunal furthers these purposes is through its public decisions: A. and B. v. Famous Players Films and C, 2005 BCHRT 432 at para. 14.
[6] The Tribunal has discretion to limit publication of identifying information where a person can show their privacy interests outweigh the public interest in full access to the Tribunal’s proceedings: Tribunal Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 5(6); Stein v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2020 BCSC 70 at para. 64(a). The Tribunal may consider factors like the stage of the proceedings, the nature of the allegations, private detail in the complaint, harm to reputation, or any other potential harm: JY at para. 30. Finally, the Tribunal may consider whether an order limiting publication would be effective in achieving the purposes of such an order. Generally, the Tribunal should not make orders which “it knows from the outset will be meaningless”: RR v. Vancouver Aboriginal Child and Family Services Society (No. 3), 2019 BCHRT 269 at para. 11.
[7] The Association argues that publishing its name in association with the allegations in the complaint will undermine its ability to deliver its important services to women and children in the community. It argues that its work, and its funding, depends on its good reputation and trust within a small community. It argues that the “scandalous” allegations could undermine this trust and its ability to serve the community. In order to protect its identity, it argues that it is also necessary to limit publication of the individual respondents.
[8] I acknowledge that allegations of discrimination may be damaging to an organization’s reputation, even where they are unproven. In some cases, the risk to a respondent’s reputation and their ability to deliver important services can support an order limiting publication, especially at the early stages of the Tribunal’s process.
[9] However, in this case, the nature of the allegations and the issues raised by Ms. Wolfe’s complaint are already public. As Ms. Wolfe points out, the controversy regarding trans inclusion, and turmoil at the Association during the period of this complaint, were reported in several local media articles and are known within the community. In addition, and significantly, the parties’ names have already been published in connection with this complaint in the BC Supreme Court’s reasons for judicial review. While the Court’s decision does not detail Ms. Wolfe’s allegations, it clearly says that Ms. Wolfe alleges that the Respondents have discriminated against her based on various protected characteristics: see e.g. para. 2. In short, the Respondents have already been exposed to the potential reputational consequences from unproven allegations of discrimination: RR (No. 3) at para. 13. An order limiting publication in this proceeding would serve little, if any, purpose.
[10] In this circumstance, I am not persuaded that the Respondents’ privacy interests outweigh the public interest in full access to the Tribunal’s proceedings. The application to limit publication is denied.
B. Application to file further submissions
[11] The Tribunal’s process for deciding whether to accept a late-filed complaint usually involves three submissions: Step 4 of the complaint form regarding timeliness, a response by the respondent, and a reply by the complainant: Rule 28(2). The Tribunal has discretion to accept further submissions where fairness requires that a party be given an opportunity to respond to new issues raised in a reply, or to address new information not available when they filed their submission: Kruger v. Xerox Canada Ltd (No. 2), 2005 BCHRT 24 at paras. 17-18; Rule 28(5).
[12] The Respondents apply to file further submissions to address what they say are new issues raised in Ms. Wolfe’s reply. Specifically, they seek to address factual issues addressed in the reply about a complaint to the Employment Standards Branch, a petition in BC Supreme Court, the composition of the Board of Directors, and the Association’s efforts to rebuild community trust.
[13] Respectfully, I am not persuaded that fairness requires that I consider this further submission. The issues that the Respondents seek to address are not relevant to my analysis at this stage. I have not considered the further submissions filed by either the Respondents or Ms. Wolfe.
C. Scope of Supplemental Submissions
[14] After the Court remitted this decision back to the Tribunal, I invited the parties to make brief written submissions about the Court’s reasons [the Supplemental Submissions]. The Tribunal’s direction was:
The purpose of these submissions is not to reargue issues that were already addressed in the original submission process. Rather, they are only to address any relevant issues raised by the court’s reasons on judicial review.
[15] During a case management call, Ms. Wolfe’s counsel argued that the parties should be permitted to make fresh submissions about timeliness. I denied that request, finding that the usual rule applied: the parties are “back to the circumstances that prevailed prior to the decision”: Friesen (Brian Neil) Dental Corp. et al. v. Director of Companies Office (Man.) et al,, 2011 MBCA 71 at para. 11. I said that I would base my decision on the original application material.
[16] The Respondents object to paras. 6-18 of Ms. Wolfe’s Supplemental Submissions on the basis that they are inconsistent with my direction and seek to reargue or reopen issues that were already addressed in the original submission process.
[17] I agree that these paragraphs go beyond the scope of what the parties were permitted to address in their Supplemental Submissions. Paragraphs 6-10 do not relate to any aspect of the Court’s reasons but rather expand on Ms. Wolfe’s original arguments about why the complaint should be accepted for filing. This was not the purpose of the Supplemental Submissions. I have disregarded these paragraphs in this decision.
[18] In paras. 11-18 of Ms. Wolfe’s Supplemental Submissions, she asks the Tribunal to reconsider its earlier decision not to allow her complaint to proceed on the grounds of sex and gender identity. This decision was made as part of the Tribunal’s screening process: letter dated August 18, 2022.
[19] These paragraphs introduce a whole new topic and are not responsive to the Court’s reasons on judicial review. At this stage, I am not prepared to consider Ms. Wolfe’s request as an application for reconsideration. If she would like to apply for reconsideration, she can do so using a Form 7.1-General Application and applying the principles set out in Rule 36. Among other things, she must address the fact that her application is made outside the 14-day time limit and persuade the Tribunal to consider it late. If or when Ms. Wolfe files this application, the Tribunal will set a schedule for submissions to decide it. I have disregarded these paragraphs in this decision.
III DECISION
[20] Allegations of discrimination must be filed within one year of the alleged contravention: Code, s. 22(1). The purpose of this time limit is “to require allegations of discrimination to be brought forward in a timely way so that remedial steps can be taken if appropriate”: School District v. Parent obo the Child, 2018 BCCA 136 at para. 79. It is a “substantive provision which is intended to ensure that complainants pursue their human rights remedies with some speed and to allow respondents the comfort of performing their activities without the possibility of dated complaints”: Chartier v. School District No. 62, 2003 BCHRT 39 at para. 12.
[21] There is no dispute that Ms. Wolfe’s human rights complaint was filed outside this one-year time limit. Her allegations of discrimination span the period from February 2018 until the termination of her employment on April 15, 2020. Her complaint was filed on December 2, 2021 – about 7.5 months late. The only way it can go forward is if the Tribunal exercises its discretion to accept the complaint under s. 22(3) of the Code because it is in the public interest to do so, and no substantial prejudice will result to any person because of the delay. The burden is on Ms. Wolfe to persuade the Tribunal to accept the complaint.
[22] I begin with a brief summary of the allegations in Ms. Wolfe’s complaint and then consider the factors of public interest and substantial prejudice.
A. Summary of complaint
[23] This summary is based on allegations set out in Ms. Wolfe’s complaint. At this stage, these allegations are disputed and unproven.
[24] The Association is a non-profit organization operating as the Nelson & District Women’s Centre. Ms. Wolfe was employed by the Association as a Co-Executive Director from February 2018 until April 2020. She shared the role of Executive Director with a non-binary genderqueer trans person. Ms. Wolfe is a cisgender woman. She identifies as an ally of trans people and says that she actively supported their inclusion at the Association.
[25] Ms. Wolfe alleges that, during the period of the complaint, trans inclusion was a controversial topic at the Association. She alleges that she was harassed by members of the Association’s Board of Directors, clients, and community members, because of her support for trans inclusion. She says that this harassment impacted her mental health to the point that she was directed to take a three to six month leave. She says that, while she was on leave, she was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and major depressive disorder because of a toxic work environment.
[26] Ms. Wolfe began a graduated return to work in January 2020. She says she continued to raise complaints about harassment. At the same time, she says that people questioned her capacity, because of her mental health-related leave. On April 15, 2020, while she was still formally on leave and participating in a gradual return to work process, the Association terminated Ms. Wolfe’s employment. Ms. Wolfe alleges that she was terminated because of her vocal support for trans people, including her advocacy for trans inclusion, and her complaints about anti-trans behaviour.
[27] After her termination, Ms. Wolfe filed a prohibited action complaint with WorkSafeBC (May 2020) and a complaint to the Employment Standards Branch (August 2020). She filed this human rights complaint on December 2, 2021.
[28] The Respondents have not yet filed their response to the complaint, and their response is not relevant to the issues I must decide in this application. However, I will note that they dispute the allegations in Ms. Wolfe’s complaint and say that her employment was terminated because of organizational restructuring. The Individual Respondents say they have been improperly named.
[29] I turn now to whether I should exercise my discretion to accept Ms. Wolfe’s complaint after the one-year time limit.
B. Public interest
[30] The Tribunal assesses the public interest in a late-filed complaint in light of the purposes of the Code, which include identifying and eliminating persistent patterns of inequality, and providing a means of redress for persons who are discriminated against: s. 3. The enquiry is fact and context specific. The Tribunal may consider factors like the complainant’s interest in accessing the Tribunal, the length and reason for the delay in filing, whether the complainant had access to legal advice, and the novelty or importance of the human rights issues raised: British Columbia (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General) v. Mzite, 2014 BCCA 220 [Mzite] at paras. 53-81. It also considers “the respondent’s interest in going about its activities without the worry of stale complaints”: Hoang v. Warnaco and Johns, 2007 BCHRT 24 at para. 26. These are important factors, but they are not necessarily determinative and not every factor will be relevant in every case: Goddard v. Dixon, 2012 BCSC 161 at para. 152; Mzite at para. 55. In this case, I find that two factors support a strong public interest in allowing the complaint to proceed: the reasons for the delay and the significance of the issues in the complaint.
1. Length and reasons for delay
[31] Ms. Wolfe filed her complaint about 7.5 months late. This is a significant delay. A long delay in filing may weigh against accepting the complaint but is not determinative: Mzite at para. 55.
[32] Ms. Wolfe offers several reasons for why her complaint was late. First, she says that her mental health was significantly impacted by her harassment and termination. This is supported by a letter from her therapist, who explains that Ms. Wolfe’s cognitive functioning was impacted by her post traumatic stress disorder and that Ms. Wolfe risked being triggered by a process requiring her to re-live events in her workplace. She attributes about six months of delay to her poor mental health. Second, Ms. Wolfe says that she was occupied with her prohibited action complaint at WorkSafeBC. Third, Ms. Wolfe says that after her termination, she was subjected to ongoing harassment in the community which prolonged her mental health injury and undermined her efforts to find new employment. Finally, and in my view most importantly, she says that her complaint was filed late due to her former lawyer’s misunderstanding about the time limit for filing.
[33] The Respondents dispute that any of these constitute sufficient explanation for a 7.5-month delay in filing the complaint. They point out that Ms. Wolfe was able to file timely complaints with WorkSafeBC and the Employment Standards Branch, and that WorkSafeBC considered her “employment ready” within the time limit for filing. They argue that a lawyer’s mistake should not be used against them, to their detriment.
[34] In my view, I do not have to weigh and consider Ms. Wolfe’s submissions about how her mental health, and other personal issues, impacted her ability to file the complaint on time. This is because it is apparent that she was ready to file the complaint as early as August 2020 and had retained legal counsel for that purpose. At that point, she could have filed her complaint on time but for the mistake of her previous counsel. This counsel was under the misapprehension that the Tribunal’s time limits had been suspended in accordance with an emergency order by the government. The error was discovered when the file was transferred to another lawyer in October 2021. The complaint was filed several weeks later, on December 2.
[35] In this case, I find that this circumstance favours the public interest in allowing the complaint to proceed. Ms. Wolfe consulted with counsel in a timely way and reasonably relied on her counsel’s advice regarding the time limit. In that regard, I disagree with the Respondents that there is no evidence that Ms. Wolfe relied on counsel’s advice. In her affidavit, Ms. Wolfe says that she was prepared to file her complaint within one year, but did not do so because of her lawyer’s error: para. 6. After the error was discovered by a different lawyer, they acted with reasonable diligence to file the complaint. These are factors that the Tribunal has found weigh in the public interest to accept a late-filed complaint: see cases discussed in School District at paras. 40-49.
[36] I also put weight on the unique context of this error. It occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic. During this period, the government had temporarily suspended limitation periods in relation to certain types of litigation, in recognition of the fact that people involved in legal proceedings may be unable to take necessary steps. This order was the basis of legal counsel’s error: they had misunderstood that the suspension applied to the time limit in the Code.
[37] I distinguish the cases relied on by the Respondents. In Thandi v. Abbotsford Police Department, 2017 BCHRT 152, counsel was aware of the time limit and option to file a human rights complaint and simply failed to do so because of the other pressures of their practice: para. 37. The Tribunal was not compelled by the various and somewhat inconsistent explanations given for the decision not to file the complaint. Unlike the circumstances here, the complainant did not rely on erroneous legal advice: School District at para. 47.
[38] Similarly, in Adolphs v. Boucher Institute of Naturopathic Medicine, 2014 BCSC 298, there was no evidence that the late filing was due to counsel error: para. 45. Rather, the complainant (and their counsel) opted to take a “convoluted and nonsensical” position that the complaint had in fact been filed on time: para. 44; School District at paras. 34-36. This is unlike the circumstances here, where Ms. Wolfe has presented evidence in her own affidavit, an affidavit from her previous counsel’s legal assistant, and – to a certain extent – in counsel’s own submissions which directly identify the error, its basis, and its impact on the filing of the complaint. The point is made most directly in a footnote in Ms. Wolfe’s Supplemental Submissions: “But for this error, the complaint would have been filed in time”.
[39] In my view, this is a circumstance where the public interest is not served by visiting the “sins of the lawyer … upon the client”: Navarro v. Doig River First Nation, 2015 BCSC 2173 at para. 24. The length of the delay is mitigated by the circumstances underlying it. This is a factor that weighs towards the public interest in accepting the late complaint.
2. Significance of issues in the complaint
[40] The public interest may be served by allowing a late complaint to proceed where it raises unique issues: Mzite at paras. 65-67. Ms. Wolfe says that is the circumstance here. I agree.
[41] This complaint arises in a context where Ms. Wolfe alleges she was harassed and penalized for supporting trans inclusion within an Association that has traditionally served women. This is a subject at the forefront of public consciousness right now and there are very few human rights cases that offer guidance. The case also raises unique issues about how the Tribunal should interpret “political belief” in relation to a person’s views about trans inclusion in traditionally women-only spaces, and how an “ally” of a protected group may be protected from discriminatory harassment towards that protected group.
[42] The Respondents dispute that there is anything novel raised by the complaint. They argue that Ms. Wolfe’s employment was terminated due to restructuring, and there is nothing novel about this type of allegation. I agree that the allegation of termination based on Ms. Wolfe’s mental disability does not raise any novel issues. If that were the only allegation in the complaint, it would not support a public interest in allowing the complaint to proceed. However, for the reasons set out above, the complaint raises other issues that are of wider social interest and are under-addressed in the Tribunal’s case law.
[43] Finally, the Respondents argue that the complaint will hamper the Association’s ability to provide vital support to the vulnerable women and children that it serves. Given its mandate, they argue that this is not in the public interest.
[44] I appreciate that it is difficult for any organization, or individual, to face the prospect of defending themselves against a human rights complaint. This requires resources and energy that may otherwise have been channeled to other important work. However, the nature of a respondent’s work cannot immunize it from compliance with, and scrutiny under, the Code. Given the serious allegations in Ms. Wolfe’s complaint, which engage the issue of how the Association serves its community and treats its employees, the Code’s purposes are served by allowing the complaint to proceed. Within this process, the Respondents will have a full and fair opportunity to defend themselves.
[45] On balance, I find that Ms. Wolfe’s allegations raise important and unique questions, and the public interest favours allowing them to proceed.
3. Public interest: conclusion
[46] In sum, given the reasons underlying Ms. Wolfe’s delay in filing the complaint, and the significance of the issues it raises, I find it is in the public interest to accept the complaint for filing after the time limit.
C. Substantial prejudice
[47] Next, Ms. Wolfe must persuade me that “no substantial prejudice will result to any person” because of her delay in filing. While Ms. Wolfe bears the burden under s. 22(3)(b) of the Code, the Respondents are more likely to have information about substantial prejudice: Ferguson v. Ausenco Engineering Canada and another, 2015 BCHRT 28 at para. 87. It is not enough to just say there is prejudice. A respondent must give facts and details about what the prejudice is, and why it is substantial: Rezaei v. University of Northern British Columbia and another, 2009 BCHRT 406 at para. 80. In some cases, the Tribunal may infer substantial prejudice from a long delay in filing a complaint: Naziel-Wilson v. Providence Health Care and another, 2014 BCHRT 170 at para. 31. In these cases, the delay is usually measured in years, not in months: Alford and another v. B.C. (Ministry of Social Development and Social Innovation), 2016 BCHRT 64 at para. 64.
[48] The Respondents say that they are substantially prejudiced by the delay. They say that the Association’s record keeping was poor during the period of the complaint, and all the staff and board members who were present no longer work for the Association. The Association’s former Chair of the Human Resources Committee, who was extensively involved with Ms. Wolfe, passed away in April 2022, and her evidence is no longer available to support the Association’s defence.
[49] I acknowledge that a 7.5 month delay in filing the complaint may have prejudiced the Respondents’ ability to preserve evidence relevant to their defence. However, in my view, the circumstances fall short of demonstrating “substantial prejudice”. After Ms. Wolfe’s termination, the parties were involved in litigation before other administrative bodies, involving many of the same events. Presumably they gathered and preserved some relevant evidence in the course of those proceedings. In addition, Ms. Wolfe says that the Association has staff and membership rosters with current contact information for people who may have relevant evidence. Except for the one person who has passed away, there is no evidence that the Respondents have been unable to reach any specific person with relevant evidence. While the person who passed was involved in her termination, she was not the only person involved; there is evidence available from other sources. Ms. Wolfe also says that, as a non-profit organization, the Association was required to keep adequate records, including during Directors’ meetings. She says that, in her role as Co-Executive Director, she was required to and did take records in compliance with the Societies’ Act. Finally, she says that she has preserved relevant records, which will be available to the Respondents through the disclosure process.
[50] Most of the delay in this process, and any corresponding prejudice, is not attributable to Ms. Wolfe’s 7.5 month delay in filing. Rather, it is a result of systemic backlogs at the Human Rights Tribunal during the COVID-19 pandemic, which caused about a nine-month delay between the filing of the complaint and notice to the Respondents, and this process of deciding whether the complaint can proceed under s. 22(3), which has included a lengthy judicial review process. In this circumstance, I am persuaded that no person will suffer substantial prejudice as a result of the Tribunal accepting the complaint after the one-year time limit.
IV CONCLUSION
[51] In this decision, I have not found it necessary to address the parties’ submissions that relate to the substance and merits of the complaint. I reiterate that the Respondents strongly dispute Ms. Wolfe’s allegations. They will have a full opportunity to present their defence in the Tribunal’s process, and the Tribunal will address the substance of the complaint in its usual course.
[52] I exercise my discretion to accept this complaint for filing under s. 22(3) of the Code. The case manager will contact the parties about their next steps.
Devyn Cousineau
Vice Chair