Sun v. Vancouver City Savings Credit Union (No.4), 2025 BCHRT 149
Date Issued: June 25, 2025
File: CS-009395
Indexed as: Sun v. Vancouver City Savings Credit Union (No.4), 2025 BCHRT 149
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Mary Li Yee Sun
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Vancouver City Savings Credit Union
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
TIMELINESS OF COMPLAINT [RECONSIDERED]
Section 22
Tribunal Member: Steven Adamson
On her own behalf: Mary Li Yee Sun
Counsel for the Respondent: James D. Kondopulos, Jaime H. Hoopes, Nazanin Panah
I Introduction
[1] This decision is about whether to accept Mary Li Yee Sun’s retaliation complaint under s.22(3) of the Human Rights Code.
[2] The history of this matter is somewhat protracted. Ms. Sun filed an employment discrimination complaint based on age with the Tribunal on September 23, 2021, that is currently proceeding [the Initial Complaint]. Ms. Sun then filed the retaliation complaint on April 6, 2023, for events ending in October 2021. On January 16, 2024, the Tribunal initially accepted the retaliation complaint for processing under s. 22(3) of the Code, in reasons indexed as Sun v. Vancouver City Savings Credit Union, 2024 BCHRT 9 [the Initial Decision].
[3] The Vancouver City Savings Credit Union [the Credit Union] then applied for reconsideration. On July 12, 2024, the Tribunal allowed the reconsideration application in reasons indexed as Sun v. Vancouver City Savings Credit Union (No. 2), 2024 BCHRT 206 [the Reconsideration Decision]. The Tribunal agreed to revisit the Initial Decision after providing the Credit Union with an opportunity to make further submissions in response to new issues raised by Ms. Sun in her Form 5 – Time Limit Reply submissions.
[4] The Credit Union has now provided its further submissions, following an unsuccessful application for disclosure, dismissed by the Tribunal in reasons indexed as Sun v. Vancouver City Savings Credit Union (No. 3), 2025 BCHRT 25 [the Disclosure Decision]. Ms. Sun also filed a further submission in reply.
[5] In its further submissions, the Credit Union argued among other things that Ms. Sun’s alleged receipt of poor legal advice is not a compelling reason to allow the late filed complaint to proceed because the reason is not supported by any evidence and is inconsistent with her other reasons for the delay. Ms. Sun argued in her reply to these further submissions that she did seek advice and relied on it to her detriment. She also gave further reasons for late filing.
[6] With the benefit of the parties’ further submissions, I have decided to revisit my previous determination that it is in the public interest to accept Ms. Sun’s late filed retaliation complaint. In deciding the public interest was not engaged I also considered Ms. Sun’s most recent reasons for late filing.
[7] The only issue before me is whether to accept the retaliation complaint against the Credit Union under s. 22(3) of the Code. I make no findings of fact.
[8] For the reasons that follow, I am not satisfied that it is in the public interest to accept the late filed complaint.
II Background to complaint
[9] The relevant background is set out in the Initial Decision and will not be repeated here.
[10] It is useful, however, to set out the reasons offered for late filing by Ms. Sun to put this decision in context.
[11] Ms. Sun filed her retaliation complaint form on April 6, 2023. At the time, she was represented by legal counsel, which I will refer to as Ms. Sun’s second previous legal counsel [PLC2]. The retaliation complaint form acknowledges that the complaint was late filed and states that Ms. Sun was not aware of the significance of filing a retaliation complaint, nor was she aware it had to be filed within a specific timeframe. In the form, Ms. Sun appears to argue that the Tribunal’s delay in scheduling a mediation in early 2023 concerning the Initial Complaint played a role in Ms. Sun’s ignorance about the retaliation complaint. Basically, if Ms. Sun had been required to prepare for the mediation sooner, she would have noticed a correlation between the sudden change in how she was treated by her new employer and her filing of the Initial Complaint. No other reasons for late filing were provided.
[12] Next, Ms. Sun filed her August 14, 2023, Form 5 – Time Limit Reply . In that form, Ms. Sun describes her dealings with three different lawyers (PLC2 and two others) to explain the delay in filing her retaliation complaint. Ms. Sun says that she retained the services of her first previous legal counsel [PLC1] on September 28, 2020. She states that PLC1 advised her to file the Initial Complaint as it appeared that she had a prima facie case of discrimination. It appears that Ms. Sun then held off filing the Initial Complaint (which was not filed until September 2021) and pursued settlement negotiations with the Credit Union on her own, without the assistance of PLC1 because she had limited financial resources. She describes using PLC1 “sparingly as a source for advice” and “trying her best not to involve the first legal counsel to avoid costs”.
[13] In the Time Limit Reply Form, Ms. Sun states that she told the Credit Union about the possibility of filing the Initial Complaint. I infer that this was during settlement negotiations, which appear to have occurred sometime between September 2020 and September 2021. She alleges that after she told the Credit Union about the possibility of filing the Initial Complaint, the Credit Union engaged in retaliation behaviour. She says that representatives of the Credit Union yelled at her to intimidate her and interfered with her new job prospects and job security. I understand Ms. Sun to allege that from the spring of 2021 to October 27, 2021, the Credit Union influenced the new employer to turn hostile towards her and unfairly scrutinize her performance resulting in her being fired. The alleged retaliation also extended to the Credit Union negatively influencing a third prospective employer’s hiring decision in the second half of 2021 by divulging her discussions with the Credit Union about filing a complaint with the Tribunal.
[14] Ms. Sun states that between June and September 2021, when she filed the Initial Complaint with the assistance of PLC1, she made PLC1 “aware on several occasions that [she] was being sabotaged at the new work” and it “related to her refusal to accept the Respondent’s settlement offer”. She alleges that on October 28, 2021, she emailed PLC1 to inform him that she had been fired by her new employer. In terms of poor legal advice being a reason for late filing, it appears that Ms. Sun in hindsight expected PLC1 to have identified the issue of the Credit Union retaliating because she filed the Initial Complaint with the Tribunal when she reported being sabotaged at the new workplace for reasons related to not accepting the Credit Union’s settlement offer.
[15] Ms. Sun states that in mid November, 2022, PLC1 informed her that he was leaving the firm as of November 18, 2022, and PLC2 was subsequently assigned to take over from PLC1.
[16] Ms. Sun states that on February 17, 2023, PLC2 called her to recommend that she immediately file a wrongful dismissal court action. Ms. Sun reports being confused by this advice since PLC1 had told her not to file a wrongful dismissal action. In again reviewing the Initial Complaint filed by PLC1, Ms. Sun states she was surprised to discover that he had ignored her instructions by limiting the remedies being sought.
[17] Ms. Sun alleges that on March 20, 2023, she sought a legal opinion from another law firm. She reports that a third lawyer, PLC3, advised her to make amendments to the Initial Complaint to broaden the remedies sought. Ms. Sun says that PLC3 also advised her to focus on either the Initial Complaint or the wrongful dismissal court action after explaining the risks and limitations of pursing the court action.
[18] Ms. Sun further alleges that PLC3 also advised her to file a retaliation complaint immediately because PLC3 “learnt that what she endured at the new company was ’Retaliation’”. [reproduced as written]
[19] Ms. Sun says that shortly after, on the same day, she told PLC2 that she wanted to file a retaliation complaint. She says that PLC2 tried to dissuade her from doing so, told her it was “futile” and would not be accepted. Ms. Sun states that she believes that PLC2 did not want to admit that PLC1 had failed in his duty to inform her about filing a timely retaliation and that PLC2 was concerned about being implicated in the situation. Ms. Sun alleges PLC2 confirmed knowing about her description of being “sabotaged” and “accepted the fact that [PLC1] did not advise [Ms. Sun] on Retaliation or even discuss Retaliation when informed of being sabotaged at work”. [reproduced as written]
[20] Ms. Sun alleges that the next day, on March 21, 2023, PLC2 attempted to file a wrongful dismissal action on her behalf contrary to her instructions. However, Ms. Sun alleges she managed to block the filing by responding to an email sent by PLC2 regarding this action.
[21] Ms. Sun also says that on April 6, 2023, PLC2 filed the retaliation complaint as instructed.
[22] Apart from saying that she was delayed by “a lack of advice from her legal counsels”, Ms. Sun states that she was suffering from ongoing mental disability from the time she left her new job in October 2021 until the time she filed the retaliation complaint in April 2023. She reports that her various mental disability symptoms limited her capacity for additional stress, which affected her ability to file in time.
[23] Ms. Sun also states that the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting state of emergency contributed to her delay in filing but provides no further details in the Form 5 – Time Limit Reply.
[24] In her March 13, 2025, submission to the Tribunal responding to the Credit Union’s further submissions, Ms. Sun provided further information about why the retaliation complaint was late.
[25] Ms. Sun alleges that the April 6, 2023, complaint form contains a factual error about her discovering her ability to file a retaliation complaint while preparing for a mediation at the Tribunal. Ms. Sun admits that she did not find out about making a retaliation complaint while preparing for a mediation. She says that she might have addressed this error in her Form 5 – Time Limits Reply, but she was rushed and did not have sufficient time to review it before it was filed. I note the Tribunal subsequently allowed Ms. Sun to amend her Form 5 – Time Limit Reply.
[26] Ms. Sun also discusses her limited engagement with lawyers regarding the retaliation complaint. She alleges hiring PLC1 on September 28, 2020, to review the Credit Union’s termination notice and to provide legal advice during her direct negotiations with the former employer.
[27] Ms. Sun also repeats that the COVID-19 pandemic impacted her ability to file the retaliation complaint on time. She says it disrupted the Tribunal’s process and caused delays in getting free legal advice. Ms. Sun further states that after she terminated her relationship with PLC2 she was “blacklisted by legal firms”. Ms. Sun also notes the challenges she faced at home during the pandemic, and also those associated with her mental disability.
III ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[28] Section 22 of the Code provides that if a complaint is filed after the expiration of the one-year time limit, the Tribunal may accept all or part of the complaint if it determines that it is in the public interest to accept the complaint, and no substantial prejudice will result to any person because of the delay.
[29] The time limit set out in s. 22 of the Code is a substantive provision which is intended to ensure that complainants pursue their human rights remedies diligently: Chartier v. School District No. 62, 2003 BCHRT 39.
[30] In the Initial Decision, the Tribunal found the retaliation complaint filed on April 6, 2023, was late filed for allegations up to September and October 2021.
[31] Whether it is in the public interest to accept the late-filed complaint is a multi-faceted analysis. The enquiry is fact and context specific and assessed in accordance with the purposes of the Code: Hoang v. Warnaco and Johns, 2007 BCHRT 24 at para. 26. The Tribunal considers a non-exhaustive list of factors, including the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, and the public interest in the complaint itself: British Columbia (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General) v. Mzite, 2014 BCCA 220 [Mzite] at para. 53. These are important factors, but they are not necessarily determinative: Goddard v. Dixon, 2012 BCSC 161 at para. 152; Mzite at para. 55.
[32] In determining whether acceptance of a late-filed complaint is in the public interest, the Tribunal also considers whether there is anything particularly unique, novel, or unusual about the complaint that has not been addressed in other complaints: Hau v. SFU Student Services and others, 2014 BCHRT 10 at para. 22; Bains v. Advanced Air Supply and others, 2013 BCHRT 74 at para. 22; Mathieu v. Victoria Shipyards and others, 2010BCHRT 224 at para. 60. Where a complaint raises a novel issue on behalf of a vulnerable group, which advances the purposes of the Code, this factor may weigh in favour of finding a public interest in accepting the complaint: Mzite at paras. 65-66. The Tribunal has considered gaps in its jurisprudence, on the one hand, and the existence of good precedents, on the other hand, in determining whether to permit a complaint to proceed: Mzite at para. 67.
[33] I first consider the length of delay in filing. As noted above, the latest allegations in this case occurred in September and October 2021. As such, the complaint was more than five months late, which is not insignificant and weighs against the acceptance of the complaint: Allen v. Kruger and CEPU, 2008 BCHRT 153 at para. 22.
[34] Next, I consider the reasons for the delay offered by the Complainant. Ms. Sun provided multiple reasons for her delay in filing the retaliation complaint with the Tribunal. The first involves poor or erroneous legal advice from her former counsel. The second involves her disability. The third is related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The fourth involves the challenges Ms. Sun faced at home. Finally, Ms. Sun submits that dealing with her former lawyers’ alleged incompetence delayed her filing the retaliation complaint.
[35] Starting with the first reason, Ms. Sun’s complaint form states she was unaware of the “significance of filing a retaliation [complaint], nor was she aware that it had to be filed within a specific timeframe”. Ms. Sun submits that it was not until March 2023, when she sought a second opinion from a lawyer that she realized she had a retaliation complaint.
[36] On this consideration, I note that ignorance of the Code, or the time required to become aware of one’s rights, is generally not an acceptable reason, on its own, for filing out of time : Rashead v. Vereschagin (No. 2), 2006 BCHRT 74 at para. 12; Ferrier v. BCAA, 2009 BCHRT 412 at para. 31. Ms. Sun appears to argue that her case is distinguishable because of the allegedly poor legal advice she received from her former counsel. As I understand it, Ms. Sun says it is in the public interest to allow her late filed retaliation complaint to proceed because her previous counsel knew about the retaliation allegations against the Credit Union and failed to inform her about her right to file a retaliation complaint and the timeframe for doing so.
[37] In assessing whether a legal advice error attracts the public interest in allowing a complaint to proceed late, the Tribunal asks whether the complainant sought legal advice in a timely way, whether the complainant has provided some evidence about the nature of the advice and their reliance on it, and whether the complainant shows diligence in filing despite that advice: The Parent obo the Child v. The School District, 2020 BCCA 333 at para. 49. These are some of the factors to be considered in determining whether to accept a late-filed complaint for public interest reasons. The overarching question remains whether it is in the public interest to accept the late filed complaint.
[38] In the Initial Decision, I was satisfied on the materials before me that Ms. Sun had sought legal advice from PLC1 regarding a possible retaliation complaint. However, with the benefit of further submissions from the parties, I have now reached a different conclusion. I agree with the Credit Union that Ms. Sun’s evidence indicates that she exhibited a degree of autonomy from PLC1, which makes it unclear to me whether she sought advice from PLC1 about a possible retaliation complaint. Rather, on the evidence before me, Ms. Sun appears to have deliberately limited the scope of the advice and services she sought from PLC1. Ms. Sun states that she engaged PLC1 in September 2020 to review the termination notice and provide services in relation to “her direct negotiations with the Respondent’s HR personnel”. Without more from Ms. Sun, this appears to limit services provided by PLC1 to advice on settlement discussions with the Credit Union. My reading of the scope of PLC1’s services is supported by Ms. Sun description of PLC1 being “engaged to provide advice/assistance on a limited basis”. When Ms. Sun lost confidence in her own ability to negotiate a settlement agreement with the Credit Union, Ms. Sun notes that she was “Again, trying her best not to involve the first legal counsel to avoid costs”. In circumstances where Ms. Sun engaged PLC1 on a limited basis, it is not apparent to me that she sought legal advice about filing a retaliation complaint.
[39] Further, though Ms. Sun says she told PLC1 about her belief that the Credit Union had engaged in “sabotage”, and I accept this, without more information from Ms. Sun about what information she shared about these allegations, it is not apparent to me that the advice sought could reasonably be understood to be in respect of retaliation allegations under the Code. Without specific evidence from Ms. Sun as to what she said to PLC1 and his responses, in addition to the nature of the services he was providing at the time, it is difficult for me to accept that informing him about her concerns that the Credit Union was “sabotaging” her new employment had anything to do with the prospect of her filing a retaliation complaint. Again, Ms. Sun’s evidence indicates that PLC1 was working for her on a limited basis due to financial constraints. However, without more information, I am not satisfied that Ms. Sun’s delay in filing was the result of erroneous legal advice, as she argues. Put another way, the fact that she told PLC1 that she believed her former employer was engaged in “sabotage” is not enough, without more, to satisfy me that her delay in filing the retaliation complaint was the result of a legal error by PLC1.
[40] In circumstances where it does not appear that Ms. Sun sought legal advice on filing a retaliation complaint, it is unnecessary to discuss her reliance on such advice. In this case, it appears that Ms. Sun acted relatively quickly to file the complaint once PLC3 advised her to do so.
[41] Before leaving this matter, I have considered whether any other explanation exists capable of excluding this case from the conclusion that ignorance of the Code, or the time required to become aware of one’s rights, is generally not an acceptable reason. In this case, no such exception exists. I agree with the Credit Union that Ms. Sun demonstrated the capability of learning about retaliation protections under the Code and the deadline for filing a retaliation complaint and did nothing from late 2021 until the spring of 2023. Ms. Sun’s work experience as a senior finance officer indicates she had the language skills and education necessary to research her rights under the Code on the Tribunal’s website. This conclusion is supported by Ms. Sun’s evidence that she understood the legal nuances in pursuing the Initial Complaint in relation to whether to seek redress in a Court action or at the Tribunal, and comprehended the need to formulate the extent of remedies sought at the Tribunal. This level of involvement with her previous lawyers and her ability to provide direction to them indicates to me that Ms. Sun could have familiarized herself with retaliation under the Code if she had decided to do her own research about the alleged sabotage. More importantly, Ms. Sun’s actions suggest that she is not one to passively take direction from her lawyers without questioning them. Her evidence indicates that she reached out to PLC3 when she felt uneasy with the direction PLC2 was taking her dispute with the Credit Union. Further, Ms. Sun demonstrated the ability to question and direct counsel through her insistence that PLC2 file a separate retaliation complaint as opposed to amending the Initial Complaint to add the retaliation allegations.
[42] I next consider Ms. Sun’s submission that her disabilities are a reason for late filing. Ms. Sun states that her physical and mental health was negatively impacted by her negotiations with the Credit Union after she was terminated and by the former employer’s alleged retaliatory conduct. At the end of March 2023, she reports being diagnosed with a mental disability and receiving treatment for her condition.
[43] Where the delay is due to a disabling condition, the Tribunal has observed that it may be in the public interest to accept a late-filed complaint: MacAlpine v. Office of the Representative for Children and Youth, 2011 BCHRT 29 at para. 42. Disabling conditions can include physical and mental ailments resulting in great difficulty coping with even the basic daily tasks of life: Naziel-Wilson v. Providence Health Care and another, 2014 BCHRT 170, at para. 21.
[44] Without doubting the existence of Ms. Sun’s various disabilities, I am not convinced that they provide a sufficient explanation for the delayed filing to attract the public interest in accepting a late filed complaint. During the timeframe for filing the retaliation complaint I agree with the Credit Union that Ms. Sun demonstrated the ability to secure new employment, seek the advice of multiple legal advisors, and conduct her own negotiations. Ms. Sun acknowledges that she was able to both endure her mental health disability symptoms and remain focused on applying for jobs. In reaching this conclusion, I am in no way diminishing the amount of suffering Ms. Sun has endured or the barriers she has faced.
[45] I have also considered Ms. Sun’s reference to the COVID-19 pandemic as a reason for her delay in filing. Ms. Sun made a bare statement in Form 5 – Time Limit Reply submission that the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting national state of emergency contributed to the delay in filing. In her most recent submissions, which I decided to consider as a matter of fairness to her as she is currently self-represented, Ms. Sun provided more details about the pandemic as a reason for her delay. She claims that the Tribunal’s process and access to legal aid were disrupted and delayed by the pandemic such that her delay was not by choice or a lack of due diligence. However, from my review of her evidence, Ms. Sun had not provided any details related to her seeking or waiting to receive legal aid assistance in filing this complaint because of the pandemic. Her evidence indicates she sought paid legal advice from several lawyers in the past, with the most recent being PLC3, in early 2023, which triggered her filing of the retaliation complaint. While appreciating the pandemic may have generally impacted access to free legal advice services, Ms. Sun has not detailed any such attempts on her part to seek legal aid or pro bono legal services.
[46] While appreciating the pandemic resulted in delays regarding the processing of complaints at the Tribunal, it also is unclear to me how this affected Ms. Sun’s ability to access Tribunal information about her rights under the Code concerning retaliation and the timelines for filing. The Tribunal’s website information and intake functions were maintained during the pandemic. Although it took longer to process incoming complaints, Ms. Sun has not provided any relevant information as to how this negatively affected her ability to file the retaliation complaint in time. I note her reason for late filing related to the retaliation complaint being tied to the time it took for the Tribunal to schedule a mediation for her Initial Complaint was later retracted by her because it had been set out in error by PLC2.
[47] Ms. Sun provided other reasons for late filing related to the pressures at home she faced during the pandemic. I have no doubt that Ms. Sun was under a great deal of pressure during the pandemic, which made it more difficult to find time to file the retaliation complaint. However, these stressors unfortunately do not explain why she could not have made some time available to file the retaliation complaint. In my view, Ms. Sun has not demonstrated the type of family pressures sufficient to attract the public interest.
[48] Finally, Ms. Sun reports that she was occupied with addressing the alleged omissions in the Initial Complaint, and a lack of financial stability related to the Credit Union not providing her with a timely record of employment. Again, without doubting the time requited to navigate these other issues, I am not satisfied that these events precluded Ms. Sun from filing on time, or that they attract the public interest in accepting a substantially late filed complaint. In the context of Ms. Sun diligently pursuing the Initial Complaint at the relevant time, along with seeking employment benefits and attempting to negotiate with the Credit Union, I am not convinced that she was precluded from filing this complaint within the allotted timeframe.
[49] I now turn to the question of whether the nature of Ms. Sun’s complaint attracts the public interest in allowing it to proceed late. Ms. Sun is seeking justice for the alleged acts of retaliation by the Credit Union in her subsequent employment. She further argues this case involves a respondent that holds itself out at a higher standard by espousing socially responsible business practices. Finally, Ms. Sun submits that employees, like herself, are a vulnerable group that experience systemic disadvantage and barriers to holding employers accountable.
[50] While appreciating Ms. Sun’s vulnerabilities as a worker, her retaliation complaint lacks novelty in the sense that retaliation complaints in work environments are relatively common and the law in this area is fairly settled.
[51] In terms of justice related to the nature of Ms. Sun’s complaint, it is important to note that she did manage to successfully file the Initial Complaint related to discrimination in employment based on her age. She will have access to justice in continuing to pursue the Initial Complaint. While appreciating the retaliation issue will not be before the Tribunal, the panel hearing that matter may be interested in considering the sabotage allegations in the context of an appropriate remedy. In the end, I am not convinced that the nature of the retaliation complaint itself weighs in favour of accepting a complaint that was substantially delayed in filing.
[52] With the benefit of further submissions from the parties, I have exercised my discretion in not allowing the Complaint to proceed. This case involves an approximately five-month delay that weighs against its acceptance. Further, I am not convinced that Ms. Sun’s reasons for late filing taken individually or together are sufficient to attract the public interest in accepting the late filed retaliation complaint. Finaly, I am not convinced that the nature of the complaint itself attracts the public interest in this case.
[53] For these reasons, I do not find that it is in the public interest to accept the late-filed complaint, and I need not address the issue of whether substantial prejudice would result.
IV Conclusion
[54] The complaint is not accepted for filing.
Steven Adamson
Tribunal Member