Worker C v. Ministry of Children and Family Development, 2025 BCHRT 137
Date Issued: December 16, 2025
File: CS-000036
Indexed as: Worker C v. Ministry of Children and Family Development, 2025 BCHRT 137
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before F
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Worker C
COMPLAINANT
AND:
His Majesty the King in Right of the Province of British Columbia as Represented by The Ministry of Children and Family Development
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)
Tribunal Member: Andrew Robb
On her own behalf: Worker C
Counsel for the Respondent: Zachary Ansley
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Worker C filed a human rights complaint against her employer, the Ministry of Children and Family Development [the Ministry]. She says her supervisors and co-workers at the Ministry bullied and harassed her based on a perception that she had a mental disability. After she went on leave from her employment, she says Ministry staff continued to harass and treat her poorly, for reasons related to her mental disability, and the Ministry failed to reasonably accommodate her during her attempts to return to work. Worker C says this was discrimination in her employment, contrary to s. 13 of the Human Rights Code.
[2] The Ministry denies discriminating. The Ministry says the incidents that Worker C describes as discriminatory harassment had no connection to her disability, or to a perception that she had a disability. Additionally, the Ministry says it reasonably accommodated her, including during her attempts to return to work.
[3] The Ministry applied to dismiss the complaint, arguing that it has no reasonable prospect of success. This application requires me to decide whether there is no reasonable prospect that Worker C will prove her supervisors’ and co-workers’ conduct caused an adverse impact on her employment, which was connected to her disability, or to a perception that she had a disability. The application also requires me to decide whether the Ministry is reasonably certain to prove it discharged its duty to reasonably accommodate Worker C after she went on disability leave, particularly during her attempts to return to work.
[4] For the reasons set out below, I find the complaint has no reasonable prospect of success, and I dismiss the complaint. Even if the conduct that Worker C describes as harassment had an adverse impact on her employment, I am satisfied that she has no reasonable prospect of proving it was connected to her disability, or to a perception that she had a disability. Regarding the accommodation process, it appears that some aspects of the process could have been better. Nonetheless, I find the Ministry is reasonably certain to prove that, considering the process as a whole, the Ministry reasonably accommodated Worker C.
[5] After the parties’ initial submissions on the application to dismiss were complete, I requested, and the parties provided, further submissions about three specific allegations in Worker C’s complaint, related to the accommodation process. To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties, including the further submissions I requested. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision.
II BACKGROUND
[6] The Ministry provides child protection services under the Child, Family and Community Service Act. Worker C was employed by the Ministry as a child protection worker, in a small community in BC [the Community].
[7] The Ministry says it received complaints about Worker C being rude and confrontational, from people she worked with outside the Ministry, in 2017 and 2018. Worker C says complaints against child protection workers are common, and she denies the allegations in the complaints against her. The Ministry says it investigated the complaints and found they were substantiated. The Ministry issued a letter of reprimand to Worker C because of the 2017 complaint.
[8] Worker C attended a meeting on April 10, 2018, about a different complaint against her. Also attending the meeting were two of Worker C’s supervisors, who I refer to as Supervisor 1 and Supervisor 2, and a union steward. Supervisor 2 had recently been appointed as a supervisor, after working as a child protection worker, along side Worker C, since 2014.
[9] Worker C’s human rights complaint suggests the meeting on April 10, 2018, was tense, with Worker C disputing allegations made by Supervisors 1 and 2, and the supervisors getting angry at her in response. Worker C says Supervisor 2 brought up an incident from 2014, while Supervisor 2 and Worker C were both training for the child protection worker position and Supervisor 2 complained about Worker C to management. Worker C says Supervisor 2 described her conduct in 2014 as “crazy”, and called her crazy again during the meeting on April 10, 2018. Worker C says she interpreted this to mean Supervisor 2 believed she had a mental disability. She says Supervisor 1 and Supervisor 2 made other comments about her mental health, at the meeting on April 10, 2018, including:
a. Worker C had a poor recollection of her own actions because of her mental health issues.
b. Worker C had trauma issues from her past that she needed to deal with.
c. Worker C did not have insight about her own behaviour and how she impacted people.
[10] The Ministry did not submit any evidence about what happened at the meeting on April 10, 2018.
[11] Worker C says she was shocked to learn that Supervisor 2 had thought she was “crazy” since 2014. Worker C says Supervisor 2 told their co-workers that Worker C was crazy, and this affected how her co-workers and supervisors perceived her. There is no evidence before me from Supervisor 2.
[12] The Ministry says it received another complaint about Worker C’s conduct, from a client of the Ministry, on April 20, 2018. The Ministry investigated the complaint and found it was substantiated, as described below.
[13] Between April and September 2018, Worker C says Supervisor 2 singled her out for bad treatment and tried to make her feel mentally unstable. For example, Worker C says Supervisor 2 told her she was not aware of the effect she had on others, other people talked about her, and she still needed to deal with her issues. Worker C says Supervisor 2’s conduct emboldened others in the workplace to single her out for poor treatment, during this period. She gives examples including arguments in the break room, and accusations about her office etiquette.
[14] On September 14, 2018, another supervisor, Supervisor 3, had a disagreement with Worker C about a child protection case, and Supervisor 3 decided to remove Worker C from the case. Contemporaneous notes made by their co-workers say Worker C and Supervisor 3 had a heated argument, and an office manager had to intervene. The office manager then called Supervisor 2, who was on vacation at the time, and Supervisor 2 came to the office to address the incident. Worker C says that when Supervisor 2 came to the office, she yelled and screamed at Worker C. Supervisor 2 later acknowledged raising her voice in anger, in this incident.
[15] Worker C submitted a complaint about Supervisor 2’s conduct to a director at the Ministry [the Director]. The office manager and Supervisor 2 also notified the Director about the incident. The office manager filed a report with the Workers’ Compensation Board [WCB], saying she and other Ministry employees were afraid of Worker C and did not want to be left alone with her.
[16] The Ministry appointed an investigator to review the incident on September 14, 2018. The investigator concluded that Worker C and Supervisors 2 and 3 were all culpable for the incident, to varying degrees. The investigator recommended that Supervisors 2 and 3 receive support for effectively managing the workplace before taking on future supervisory assignments.
[17] On September 17, 2018, the Director issued a letter suspending Worker C for three days. The Ministry says the suspension was not related to the incident on September 14, 2018—it was based on the complaint the Ministry received about Worker C on April 20, 2018. The Director’s letter said the Ministry’s investigation found Worker C had breached the Ministry’s standards of conduct by behaving in a disrespectful and unprofessional way with a client of the Ministry.
[18] Immediately after receiving the suspension letter, Worker C went on short-term disability leave from her employment. On September 18, 2018, she filed a report with WCB, alleging that Supervisor 2 had bullied her on September 14, 2018, harming her emotional and physical health.
[19] The Ministry says it learned for the first time that Worker C had a mental disability when it received her short-term disability leave documents, on October 2, 2018. There is evidence that Worker C reported to her doctor that she felt anxiety and physical symptoms after her interaction with Supervisor 2 on September 14, 2018. She was later diagnosed with depression and anxiety, caused, at least in part, by her relationship with Supervisor 2. Neither party provided any evidence or argument suggesting she had a mental disability before September 2018.
[20] In October 2018, the Director notified Worker C that her disability leave claim had been approved. In an email, the Director said it appeared that Worker C’s work site was exacerbating her condition, and asked if Worker C felt she could return to work at the Ministry’s satellite office in a different community, approximately 133 kilometres from the Community.[1] The Director’s email described this option as a short-term medical accommodation, “until we could complete any process that is required” for Worker C’s return to her normal work location, in the Community.
[21] On or about December 4, 2018, Worker C’s doctor cleared her to return to work. The doctor filled in a form, provided by the Ministry, indicating that she was restricted from working in the Community office and from working with Supervisor 2. The form indicated both these restrictions might be permanent. The doctor said Worker C could work in a different Ministry office. The doctor also indicated she needed appropriate time off work for medical and counseling appointments, and a flexible schedule, so she could get community and family support, and rest as needed.
[22] Worker C returned to work on December 10, 2018, at the Ministry’s satellite office. She continued to live in the Community. She used a fleet vehicle provided by the Ministry for her daily commute, and the Ministry agreed that her commuting time would count towards her daily hours of work. She was on reduced hours, and worked a shortened work‑week, during a gradual return to work trial period. The plan was to ramp up to full time hours over a period of about six weeks.
[23] Worker C requested vacation time in December 2018, and the Director denied her request. The Ministry says the vacation request was denied because Worker C was still involved in a gradual return to work trial period, and taking a vacation in the middle of the trial period could have extended or undermined the return to work plan. The Director made a sworn statement, in support of the application to dismiss, saying she understood it was Ministry policy not to approve vacation leaves during gradual return to work trials, but the Ministry provided no documentation of such a policy.
[24] Worker C says that in December 2018, the Ministry advised her co-workers that she would be returning to work in the Community in January 2019, and consequently Supervisor 2 and other co-workers contacted her about child protection cases that they expected her to work on when she returned. In her human rights complaint, Worker C says this went against her doctor’s recommendations that she should not be exposed to Supervisor 2, and it aggravated her symptoms.
[25] Worker C also says Ministry workers made false reports against her during December 2018, in order to thwart her return to work. She provided copies of emails sent by her co-workers in the Community office to the Director. The emails say, among other things, that her co‑workers did not feel safe being alone with her, that the office was better off without her, and that news of her imminent return was “devastating.”
[26] In January 2019, Worker C’s doctor notified the Ministry she would be unable to ramp up to full-time hours within the six weeks anticipated in the return to work plan. The Ministry says it ended Worker C’s return to work trial at the satellite office on January 24, 2019, because its fleet vehicle was no longer available for her commute, and the arrangement did not give Worker C enough time to work, due to the long commute.
[27] Worker C says the Director told her, on January 25, 2019, that the Ministry could no longer accommodate her, and she had to either go on long-term disability leave or return to the Ministry’s office in the Community. She says she had previously asked if she could work from home, but the Ministry denied her request. Worker C says the Ministry allowed other employees to work from home, but the Ministry says Worker C did not provide medical information that supported her request to work from home. There is evidence that the Ministry determined it would not be feasible for her to work anywhere other than a Ministry office because she was unable to work independently without supervision.
[28] Worker C did not return to work at the Ministry, after her return to work trial ended, in January 2019. She initially went back on short-term disability leave. In March 2019, she applied for long-term disability insurance benefits [LTD]. In April 2019, the Ministry’s LTD administrator denied her claim. The denial letter said her claim was based on diagnoses of anxiety and depression, but there was insufficient medical evidence demonstrating that her symptoms prevented her from doing her job.
[29] Worker C later provided further medical information, and in August 2019 the Ministry’s LTD administrator reversed its decision, and found she was unable to return to her job, due to her disability. She was found eligible for LTD retroactive to March 2019.
[30] In November 2019, WCB accepted Worker C’s claim for depression and anxiety, based on bullying and harassment by Supervisor 2. WCB found she was capable of doing child protection work, but she was permanently restricted from working with Supervisor 2, or at the Ministry’s office in the Community.
[31] The Ministry says it worked with Worker C to try to find a child protection position within reasonable commuting distance from her residence, but the two nearest Ministry offices were too far away to commute, and Worker C did not want to relocate her residence.
[32] The parties held a meeting with WCB representatives on September 1, 2020, to discuss how Worker C could be accommodated. Contemporaneous notes prepared by a Ministry representative who attended the meeting say:
a. Worker C asked about working remotely, but the Ministry said her position must be done in the office, with clinical oversight, as part of a team, and Worker C had no concerns about this response.
b. Worker C said she could not commute more than 32 kilometres from the Community.
c. Worker C asked about working in a different position in the Ministry, but the Ministry would only consider child protection positions because she did not have any restrictions from child protection work.
d. WCB representatives asked about other positions in the provincial public service.
[33] By November 2020, the BC Public Service Agency [PSA] began investigating potential job placements for Worker C in the Community, in the provincial public service but outside the Ministry. PSA case notes show that in January and February 2021, PSA made inquiries about job placements for Worker C, at other government offices in or near the Community. But in March 2021, she advised that she was unable to return to work in any capacity, and PSA then stopped looking for other job placements for her.
[34] On April 13, 2021, the Ministry’s LTD administrator notified Worker C that her LTD claim would be closed as of May 31, 2021, as there were no medical barriers to her seeking alternate employment after that date. Worker C appealed this decision to a claims review committee, but the committee denied the appeal. Worker C appealed the committee’s decision to the Labour Relations Board, but the Labour Relations Board denied the appeal, on April 20, 2022.
[35] On June 1, 2022, Worker C retired from her employment with the Ministry.
III DECISION
A. Preliminary issue: disclosure
[36] In her response to the application to dismiss, Worker C says the Ministry did not disclose all relevant records. She refers to reports about her that were subject to union grievances, and says the documentation regarding these reports has not been fully disclosed. She does not provide any further information about the records that she says were not disclosed, and she did not file an application to compel the Ministry to disclose the records, after she received the application to dismiss. She did file a disclosure application in June 2022, after the Ministry first provided disclosure. In that application she sought audio recordings, records of emails and other communications, and case notes related to investigations into her conduct, and the events giving rise to those investigations. In a decision dated May 18, 2023, the Tribunal dismissed her disclosure application, finding her requests were overly broad and not sufficiently connected to the issues the Tribunal must decide.
[37] I decline to order any further disclosure by the Ministry. I do not accept that further disclosure is necessary, for Worker C to respond to the application to dismiss. Her response to the application to dismiss does not say what specific records she is seeking, and it does not explain why they are relevant or necessary. Nor does she explain how this request differs from her previous disclosure application that was dismissed by the Tribunal.
B. Section 27(1)(c) – No reasonable prospect of success
[38] The Ministry applies to dismiss Worker C’s complaint under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code, on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success. Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing.
[39] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan, 2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77.
[40] The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application under s. 27(1)(c), a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the “realm of conjecture”: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 at para. 27.
[41] The Code prohibits discrimination against a person on the basis of a perceived disability, even if the person does not actually have a disability: Jubran v. Board of Trustees, 2002 BCHRT 10, affirmed 2005 BCCA 201. To prove her complaint at a hearing, Worker C would have to prove she had or was perceived to have a mental disability, she was adversely impacted in her employment, and her mental disability, real or perceived, was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33. If she did that, the burden would shift to the Ministry to justify the impact as a bona fide occupational requirement. If the impact is justified, there is no discrimination.
[42] In this application, the Ministry does not appear to deny that Worker C had a disability, after September 2018, or that her employment was adversely impacted by the incidents described in her human rights complaint. But the Ministry says there is no reasonable prospect Worker C will prove that her mental disability, real or perceived, was a factor in the alleged harassment and poor treatment of Worker C by Ministry staff. Additionally, the Ministry says it is reasonably certain to prove it discharged its duty to accommodate Worker C, after she went on leave in September 2018.
[43] Regarding the accommodation issue, the Ministry can justify its conduct by showing it was based on a standard which the Ministry adopted for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of her job, in an honest and good faith belief that it was necessary to the fulfillment of that legitimate purpose, and the standard is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of that legitimate purpose. This last element encompasses the Ministry’s duty to accommodate Worker C to the point of undue hardship: British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. British Columbia Government and Service Employees’ Union (Meiorin Grievance), [1999] 3 SCR 3 at para. 54. To succeed in an application to dismiss, the Ministry must show it is reasonably certain to prove its conduct was justified: Purdy v. Douglas College and others, 2016 BCHRT 117.
[44] Worker C alleges numerous incidents of “discriminatory harassment” and other misconduct by Ministry staff, but she does not clearly explain how it was connected to a disability. Taking her argument at its strongest, I understand Worker C is saying Supervisor 2 formed a perception that she had a mental disability based on her previous conduct, and shared this perception with other Ministry staff, and due in part to this perception, Ministry staff bullied and harassed her, treated her poorly in the workplace, and did not trust her judgment about her work.
[45] Worker C alleges the Ministry and its staff continued to harass her and treat her poorly after she went on leave, in September 2018. These allegations include: the Director failed to give her a positive reference when she applied for different positions in 2018; the Ministry delayed her WCB claim by failing to provide required information to WCB and by providing incorrect information; the LTD administrator initially denied her LTD claim; Ministry staff withheld information that should have been provided under Worker C’s request for records under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act; and Ministry staff shared her confidential information with others.
[46] Worker C further argues that the Ministry and its staff failed to accommodate her after she went on leave. As evidence of the Ministry’s failure to accommodate her, she cites the Ministry’s denial of her request for vacation time in December 2018; Ministry staff expressing opposition to her return to the Ministry’s office in the Community, in December 2018; Supervisor 2’s contacts with her in December 2018 and January 2019, despite Worker C’s doctor’s recommendation to minimise contact with Supervisor 2; the Ministry’s refusal to let her work remotely, in December 2018 and January 2019; and the Ministry providing confusing information about the possibility of returning to work, in December 2020.
[47] Worker C’s amendment to the complaint, filed in August 2021, also alleged discrimination based on a physical injury, namely a severe ankle sprain which caused mobility challenges. She says she took sick days as a result of the injury, and other Ministry staff treated her disrespectfully, in relation to her sick days and her injury. The Tribunal accepted the amendment for filing, but did not formally add the ground of physical disability to her complaint. Worker C’s allegations based on her injury did not provide details about what Ministry staff did to her, or whether she needed accommodation. She gives no information about when the injury happened.
[48] The parties’ submissions in the application to dismiss did not address Worker C’s allegation of discrimination based on her physical injury. Considering that the ground of physical disability was not formally added to the complaint, and that Worker C has not provided details about how the Ministry discriminated against her in relation to her injury, and that her allegations on this issue are undated, I find the allegation of discrimination based on physical disability has no reasonable prospect of success.
[49] In the following sections of this decision, I address Worker C’s allegations of discrimination based on mental disability. I first explain why her allegations from before September 2018 have no reasonable prospect of success, when she says she faced discrimination based on a perception that she had a mental disability. Then I address her allegations about the Ministry’s conduct after she went on leave, and whether it amounts to harassment based on her disability. Finally, I consider her allegation that the Ministry failed to accommodate her, during and after the return to work trial.
C. Discrimination based on perceived mental disability
[50] Much of Worker C’s response to the application to dismiss focuses on the conduct of Ministry staff, especially Supervisor 2, in the months leading up to Worker C going on leave, in September 2018. Worker C does not say she had a mental disability during this period, but she suggests that Ministry staff bullied and harassed her based on a perception that she had a mental disability. In support of her argument that she was perceived to have a mental disability, she cites Supervisor 2 calling her “crazy” during the meeting on April 10, 2018, and the other comments about her mental health during that meeting.
[51] The Ministry says it denies Worker C’s account of the meeting on April 10, 2018, but it did not provide any evidence that contradicts her, or any evidence about the meeting at all. In its response to the complaint, the Ministry says that even if Supervisor 2 made the comments alleged by Worker C, those comments themselves do not amount to discrimination under the Code, and there is no evidence beyond conjecture that any subsequent conduct by the Ministry or its staff was connected to a perception that Worker C had a mental disability.
[52] For the following reasons, I am satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect that Worker C will prove that the bullying and harassment she alleges, before she went on leave in September 2018, were connected to a perception that she had a mental disability. Even if Supervisor 2 or Worker C’s other co-workers perceived her to have a mental health disability, she has not provided any evidence, beyond speculation and conjecture, that the alleged bullying and harassment were connected to this perception.
[53] There is ample evidence that some of Worker C’s co-workers, including Supervisor 2, did not get along with her, did not always trust her judgment, and objected to some of her conduct and communications. There is some evidence that her co-workers may have believed her conduct was consistent with a mental disability, but this does not necessarily mean that perception was connected to the harassment alleged by Worker C. To the extent that Worker C’s co-workers harassed her or treated her poorly, all the evidence before me, including Worker C’s own evidence, suggests that this was because they disagreed or were uncomfortable with her conduct and communications. There is no evidence that their perception that she had a mental disability, if they had such a perception, had any impact on how they treated her.
[54] Even if Supervisor 2 called Worker C “crazy” and made other comments about her mental health at the meeting on April 10, 2018, I find Worker C has no reasonable prospect of proving discrimination based on the comments themselves.
[55] In analysing whether negative comments rise to the level of an adverse impact on a person’s employment, the Tribunal considers factors including “the involved parties, the context in which the comment was made, whether an apology was offered, and whether or not the recipient of the comment was a member of a group historically discriminated against”: Pardo v. School District No. 43, 2003 BCHRT 71at para. 12. Regarding the involved parties and the context in which the comments at issue were made, based on Worker C’s allegations about the meeting, it appears her supervisors were trying to establish whether conduct for which she faced possible discipline could have been affected by a mental disability. This is not necessarily discriminatory, as a supervisor who suspects an employee’s mental disability is affecting their job performance may be obliged to inquire about this, in order to fulfill their duty to accommodate the employee: Skerry v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2023 BCSC 1819 at para. 36.
[56] The evidence before me suggests that Worker C did not have a mental disability at the time of the meeting, so she was not a member of a group that has historically faced discrimination. There is evidence of a form of apology by Supervisor 1, the other supervisor at the meeting; Worker C says Supervisor 1 told her Supervisor 2 “shouldn’t have said that”, apparently in relation to Supervisor 2 using the word “crazy”.
[57] Based on Worker C’s allegations, it appears that her supervisors were not as sensitive or respectful as they should have been, in raising the possibility that Worker C had a mental disability. But considering the facts alleged by Worker C in context, I find there is no reasonable prospect she will prove her supervisors’ comments on April 10, 2018, had an adverse impact on her employment.
[58] Supervisor 2’s conduct toward Worker C on September 14, 2018, may have been inappropriate—the Ministry’s investigation seems to have found as much—but on the evidence before me, I am satisfied Worker C has no reasonable prospect of proving it was connected to a perception about her mental disability. The evidence suggests the incident was the culmination of Supervisor 2’s frustrations with what she saw as Worker C’s refusal to take direction and cooperate with her co-workers and others. But even if Supervisor 2 believed Worker C had a mental disability, the evidence does not take the connection between Supervisor 2’s conduct on September 14, and any perception about Worker C’s mental disability, beyond conjecture.
[59] There is evidence that Supervisor 2’s conduct contributed to Worker C’s disability. However, conduct that results in a person experiencing a mental disability, on its own, is not discrimination on the ground of mental disability. Even if Supervisor 2 caused or contributed to Worker C’s anxiety and depression, that would not establish a contravention of the Code: Vandale v. Town of Golden and others, 2009 BCHRT 219 at para. 43.
[60] On the evidence before me, I find Worker C has no reasonable prospect of proving the Ministry is responsible for discriminating against her based on a perception that she had a mental disability, before she went on leave in September 2018.
D. The Ministry’s conduct after Worker C went on leave
[61] I understand Worker C’s allegations from after she went on leave in September 2018 to be based on her actual disability, rather than a perception that she had a disability. The Ministry approved her short-term disability leave claim in October 2018, and does not appear to dispute that she had a mental disability, within the meaning of the Code, at this point.
[62] In this section I explain why Worker C’s allegations about negative treatment by Ministry staff, after September 2018, have no reasonable prospect of success. Even if the conduct Worker C describes as discrimination was inappropriate or unfair, I find she has no reasonable prospect of proving it was connected to her disability.
[63] In the amendment to her complaint, Worker C says the Director failed to give her a positive reference when she applied for different jobs, in April 2018 and again in November 2018. She suggests this was a form of discrimination because, according to Worker C, the Director gave her a negative reference because of Supervisor 2’s discriminatory comments about her. Worker C’s amendment did not provide further detail, such as what the Director said about her, or what Supervisor 2 said to the Director about her. Nor did she say how she knows the Director gave her a negative reference at all. On the limited materials before me, I find this allegation is speculative, and there is no reasonable prospect it could support a finding that the Ministry discriminated against Worker C.
[64] Worker C says the Ministry delayed her WCB claim by failing to provide correct information to WCB in a timely way. In her complaint she says the Ministry delayed the WCB claim by prioritising an investigation into allegations against Worker C, in relation to the September 14, 2018 incident, over an investigation into her allegations against Supervisor 2 and others, in relation to the same incident. But the Ministry says it investigated all allegations about this incident at the same time, and in her response to the application to dismiss Worker C acknowledges this. In any event, there is no dispute that the WCB claim was ultimately approved, before Worker C’s LTD claim expired, so it is not clear that she experienced any adverse impact, as a result of delays in her WCB claim. I find Worker C has no reasonable prospect of proving that any delays in her WCB claim had an adverse impact on her, which was connected to her disability.
[65] Worker C’s allegation that the LTD administrator initially denied her LTD claim for discriminatory reasons appears to be based on speculation. There is no evidence before me that could suggest the LTD claim was denied for any reason other than a lack of adequate medical evidence. The LTD administrator reversed its decision a few months later, upon receiving additional medical evidence. The decision to accept her claim was retroactive to the date when her short-term disability benefits expired. I find Worker C has no reasonable prospect of proving the initial denial of her LTD claim had an adverse impact on her, which was connected to her disability.
[66] Worker C’s allegations that Ministry staff withheld information that should have been provided after she requested her records from the Ministry, and that Ministry staff shared her confidential information with others, are not supported by any evidence in the materials before me. I find they are speculative. In any event, Worker C has not explained how these allegations are connected to her disability.
[67] For these reasons, I am satisfied that Worker C has no reasonable prospect of proving a connection between her disability and the conduct of Ministry staff, based on her allegations about negative treatment she received after she went on leave, in September 2018.
E. The accommodation process
[68] I now turn to the Ministry’s argument that it is reasonably certain to prove it discharged its duty to accommodate Worker C. The parties did not address the first two steps of the Meiorin analysis; their arguments focused on whether the Ministry reasonably accommodated Worker C, after she went on leave in September 2018.
[69] The Tribunal considers employers’ efforts to accommodate employees with disabilities against a standard of reasonableness, not perfection: Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud, [1992] 2 SCR 970; Klewchuk v. City of Burnaby (No. 6), 2022 BCHRT 29 at para. 425. In assessing whether the employer acted reasonably, the Tribunal takes a global approach, considering the accommodation process as a whole, rather than focusing on each incident in the process in isolation: Klewchuk at para. 413.
[70] The Ministry says it reasonably accommodated Worker C by helping her to apply for short- and long-term disability benefits, moving her workplace to the satellite office during the return to work trial, providing a vehicle for the commute, and trying to find her a new position, when she was unable to return to the Ministry’s office in the Community.
[71] Worker C appears to dispute that the Ministry helped her apply for disability benefits, but there is no dispute that she received these benefits, from the time she first went on leave, in September 2018, until she started receiving benefits from WCB.
[72] Worker C’s human rights complaint makes several allegations suggesting the Ministry failed to accommodate her, after she went on leave. The complaint referred to the Ministry’s refusal of her request for vacation time during the gradual return to work trial; Supervisor 2’s contacts with her in December 2018, despite her doctor’s recommendations; her co-workers’ opposition to her return to work; and the Ministry’s refusal to let her work from home. The amendment to the complaint includes an allegation that the Ministry thwarted her return to work by giving her incorrect information about the possibility of a return to work in December 2020. I address each of these allegations in turn, before examining whether, considering all the evidence before me about the accommodation process, the Ministry is reasonably certain to prove it accommodated her to the point of undue hardship.
[73] There is no dispute that the Ministry refused Worker C’s request for vacation time in December 2018. The Ministry says this was because Worker C was in the middle of a gradual return to work trial period, and if she took a vacation during this period it could have undermined the trial. Worker C’s doctor supported the gradual return to work plan, but the evidence shows the doctor advised the Ministry that, during Worker C’s return to work trial, she “needs [a] flexible work schedule to reach her community/family supports/relaxation.” In light of this evidence, the Ministry’s refusal to give her vacation time could weigh against a finding that the Ministry is reasonably certain to prove its justification defence. However, this incident must be viewed in the context of the accommodation process as a whole. Before I consider the process as a whole, I address Worker C’s other concerns about the accommodation process.
[74] There is no dispute that Supervisor 2 contacted Worker C in late 2018 and early 2019, when the Ministry apparently expected Worker C to return to work in the Community. But the Ministry says it had not received medical information, at that time, suggesting that Worker C should have no contact with Supervisor 2. The evidence before me shows Worker C’s doctor advised the Ministry that, due to a medical diagnosis, Worker C was unable to work with Supervisor 2, possibly permanently. In her submissions in response to the application to dismiss, Worker C appears to acknowledge this did not necessarily mean Supervisor 2 should not contact her at all, but she says the Ministry did nothing to reduce her exposure to Supervisor 2. However, it appears that reducing that exposure was part of the reason for having Worker C work in the satellite office.
[75] There is evidence that the Ministry advised Worker C’s co-workers that she was expected to return to the Ministry’s office in the Community at some point, and that the Ministry told Worker C it could not accommodate her working anywhere other than the Community. The Ministry does not deny that Worker C’s co-workers told the Director they were opposed to Worker C’s return to the Community office, in December 2018. But there is no evidence before me that her co-workers’ opposition to her return had any impact on the Ministry’s decisions, or the accommodation process in general.
[76] The Ministry does not deny that it refused Worker C’s request to work from home, in late 2018. The Ministry says Worker C’s doctor did not recommend this option, and before 2020 the Ministry did not support working from home for child protection workers, due to confidentiality and security concerns, and for reasons related to supervision of workers who may require support. There is evidence, in an email from PSA to the Ministry’s insurance administrator, that the Ministry did not want Worker C to work from home because she was unable to work independently without supervision.
[77] Worker C says, and the Ministry does not deny, that child protection workers routinely worked outside the office, with Ministry-issued laptops and phones. The Ministry does not explain how this evidence can be reconciled with its claims about security and confidentiality concerns arising from child protection workers working from home. But there is no evidence before me, and I do not understand Worker C to argue, that the Ministry allowed any other child protection workers to work from home, before 2020.
[78] The accommodation process spanned a period including late 2020 and early 2021, when working from home became more common for Ministry workers, due to the pandemic. I do not understand the Ministry to argue that it would have been undue hardship to allow Worker C to work from home, during this period. But the materials filed by Worker C in this complaint focus on the decision that she could not work from home in the months after she first went on leave, and do not address the possibility of working from home in 2020 or later. By this time, it appears there was medical evidence indicating Worker C was restricted not only from working at the Ministry’s office in the Community, but also from working with any of the co-workers she previously worked with there. In light of this evidence, it appears that working from home would not have been an appropriate accommodation, as Worker C would still have had to communicate with her former co-workers in the Community.
[79] In her submissions, Worker C says she could have worked in a different satellite office, approximately 53 kilometres from the Community. But there is no evidence before me that she or anyone else suggested this option at any time during the accommodation process. Rather there is evidence she told the Ministry she could not commute more than 32 kilometres from the Community, after the return to work trial in the first satellite office. Moreover, it appears this option would still have required Worker C to communicate with her former co-workers in the Community office.
[80] Finally, I address Worker C’s allegation that the Ministry gave her incorrect information about the possibility of a gradual return to work, in December 2020. In her amendment to the complaint, Worker C says the Ministry was not forthcoming in discussions with WCB about her return to work, and she did not return to work, at that time, due to delays and confusion caused by the Ministry. But Worker C’s response to the application to dismiss did not refer to the possibility of a return to work in 2020, and she did not provide any evidence relevant to this allegation.
[81] There is no dispute that the medical evidence established that Worker C could not work at the Ministry’s office in the Community, or with her co-workers from that office, but she was otherwise able to return to work, by late 2020. Nor does she dispute that she told the Ministry she was not prepared to move out of the Community, or commute more than 32 kilometres, and there was no other Ministry office within 32 kilometres. PSA case notes, provided by the Ministry, appear to show that PSA investigated whether there were positions available for her at other provincial government offices in the Community, starting in November 2020. The notes say PSA asked these other offices if they could “host a trial” for her, but as of February 18, 2021, PSA still had “no leads”. The notes show that the Ministry stopped looking for other places for Worker C to work on March 3, 2021, after Worker C advised that she was unable to return to work after all.
[82] Worker C does not dispute the evidence in the case notes, and she does not say what more the Ministry and PSA should have done to support her return to work, in 2020 and 2021. Nor does she suggest it was unreasonable for PSA to stop looking for other positions for her, in March 2021.
[83] Considering all the evidence about the Ministry’s accommodation process, I find the Ministry is reasonably certain to prove it discharged its duty to accommodate Worker C. Most of the relevant facts are not in dispute. The Ministry attempted to return her to work in a way that accommodated her restrictions, in December 2018, apparently on the assumption that she would be able to return to work in the Community before long. When that assumption proved incorrect, the Ministry accommodated her leave from work. After the Ministry received medical information that she would never be able to return to work with her co-workers from the Community office, PSA looked for other positions for her, until she advised that she would not be able to return to work at all.
[84] As noted above, the denial of Worker C’s request for vacation time, in December 2018, could weigh against a finding that the Ministry is reasonably certain to prove its conduct was justified. This decision by the Ministry was understandably frustrating for Worker C. But in the context of the entire accommodation process, including the Ministry’s accommodation of her absence from work for extended periods of time before and after the gradual return to work trial, I find there is no reasonable prospect that the denial of vacation time on one occasion will establish that the Ministry failed to reasonably accommodate Worker C.
[85] For these reasons, I am satisfied the Ministry is reasonably certain to prove it discharged its duty to accommodate Worker C. This means the complaint has no reasonable prospect of success.
IV CONCLUSION
[86] The complaint is dismissed.
Andrew Robb
Tribunal Member
This version of the Reasons for Decision has been amended in accordance with the Tribunal’s decision on December 16, 2025:
[1] The name of the Complainant is anonymized to Worker C.
[2] References to place names and the identities of other individuals have also been anonymized.
Andrew Robb
Tribunal Member
[1] The Community is slightly closer to a different city, but there is no evidence that either party ever considered whether Worker C could work there, and in the materials before me neither party suggests this option should have been considered.