Taggart v. Buds Cannabis and others (No.2), 2025 BCHRT 129
Date Issued: June 6, 2025
File: CS-005495
Indexed as: Taggart v. Buds Cannabis and others (No.2), 2025 BCHRT 129
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Christopher Taggart
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Buds Cannabis and Megan Turpin and Dustin Ereiser
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT [RECONSIDERED]
Section 27(1)(c)
Tribunal Member: Edward Takayanagi
On their own behalf: Christopher (Adam) Taggart
For all Respondents: Megan Turpin
I INTRODUCTION
[1] In Taggart v. Buds Cannabis and others , 2025 BCHRT 107 [the Original Decision ], I denied the Respondents’ dismissal application. After making that decision, I discovered that the Respondents had filed evidence, which was not brought to my attention and which, as a result, I did not consider in making the Original Decision. This was not fair. To remedy this unfairness, I am reconsidering the Original Decision in light of the Respondents’ documentary evidence submitted in support of their dismissal application: Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure , Rule 36; Zutter v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights) , 1995 CanLII 1234 (BC CA).
[2] Based on the whole of the submissions and evidence now before me, I have reached a different conclusion from the Original Decision. I am persuaded that Mr. Taggart’s complaint has no reasonable prospect of succeeding at a hearing and dismiss it under s. 27(1)(c) of the Human Rights Code .
II RECONSIDERATION
[3] The Tribunal has a very limited jurisdiction to reconsider its decisions. The decision “cannot be revisited because the tribunal has changed its mind, made an error within jurisdiction or because there has been a change of circumstances”: Chandler v. Alberta Association of Architects , 1989 CanLII 41 (SCC), [1989] 2 SCR 848 at 861. The Tribunal may reconsider its decision where there has not been procedural fairness and the interests of fairness and justice require it to do so: Fraser Health Authority v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal , 2014 BCCA 499 at paras. 141 and 160.
[4] This is a case where I find such an extraordinary remedy is appropriate. The Original Decision turned on the lack of evidence supporting the Respondents’ arguments. Because of a Tribunal error, I did not consider the evidence that the Respondents had submitted to the Tribunal. This was unfair. In these circumstances, I find it appropriate to reconsider the Original Decision and I do so below.
III BACKGROUND
[5] The background to Mr. Taggart’s complaint is set out in paragraphs 8 to 12 of the Original Decision. I will not repeat it here. In brief, Mr. Taggart alleges their former employer, Buds Cannabis, and its owners Megan Turpin and Dusin Ereiser discriminated against them on the basis of mental disability. They say the Respondents did not pay them at the correct rate of pay and bullied them. They say they went on medical leave, and their employers did not subsequently contact them which they understood to be a constructive dismissal.
[6] The Respondents deny discriminating. They concede that there were some errors in calculating Mr. Taggart’s payroll but say they were later corrected. They deny terminating their employment and say Mr. Taggart informed them they were quitting on an online public review site.
IV RECONSIDERED DECISION
[7] Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing.
[8] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence ” : Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal) , 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan , 2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77.
[9] A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority , 2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission , [1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 at para. 27. The onus is on a respondent to show a complaint does not have a reasonable prospect of success, rather than on a complaint to show discrimination: Stonehouse v. Elk Valley Coal (No. 2) , 2007 BCHRT 305 at para. 11.
[10] Many human rights complaints raise issues of credibility. This is not, by itself, a sufficient reason to deny an application to dismiss: Evans v. University of British Columbia , 2008 BCSC 1026 at para. 34. However, if there are foundational or key issues of credibility, the complaint must go to a hearing: Francescutti v. Vancouver (City) , 2017 BCCA 242 at para 67.
[11] To prove their complaint at a hearing, Mr. Taggart will have to prove that they have a characteristic protected by the Code (in this case a mental disability), they were adversely impacted in employment, and their mental disability was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education) , 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33.
[12] The Respondents’ submission focuses on the second and third elements of Moore . They say Mr. Taggart has no reasonable prospect of establishing they suffered an adverse impact in employment because the evidence will show Mr. Taggart resigned and was not fired. They also say Mr. Taggart was paid their full wages.
[13] Based on the materials before me, I am persuaded that Mr. Taggart’s complaint has no reasonable prospect of success.
[14] First, the Respondents say they did not fire Mr. Taggart, they quit. The Respondents submitted a screenshot of a public post made by Mr. Taggart in 2021, stating “consider this my resignation.” In my view, the undisputed evidence that Mr. Taggart publicly resigned from Buds Cannabis contradicts their assertion that they were fired. Therefore, I am persuaded that Mr. Taggart’s allegation that their employment was terminated has not been taken out of the realm of conjecture and has no reasonable prospect of success at a hearing.
[15] Second, the Respondents have provided documentary evidence inconsistent with Mr. Taggart’s assertion that they were not paid their full salary and were bullied. The Respondents provided decisions from WorkSafeBC and Employment Standards as well as copies of correspondence between the parties. The Employment Standards decision finds that “Buds Cannabis resolved all outstanding pay issues.” A detailed breakdown of Mr. Taggart’s total payment including their hourly wage, statutory holiday pay, and vacation entitlement is included in the materials. In their response submission, Mr. Taggart agrees they were paid in full by the Respondents. I am persuaded by the undisputed fact that Mr. Taggart was paid all monies they say there were owed. The assertion that they were not paid their full wages has not been taken out of the realm of conjecture and has no reasonable prospect of success.
[16] Third, the decision of WorkSafeBC and the correspondence submitted into evidence contradict Mr. Taggart’s assertion that the Respondents harassed and bullied them. I make no finding of fact but nevertheless apply a content-based analysis to gauge the relative strengths and weaknesses of the case to determine what aspects of the complaint do not rise above conjecture: Ritchie v. Central Okanagan Search and Rescue Society and others , 2016 BCHRT 110 at para. 120.
[17] Mr. Taggart alleges in their complaint that Ms. Turpin bullied them. They say in their response to the dismissal application that Mr. Ereiser “went on a vulgar rant against mentally ill people.” There are no other details of the bullying and harassment allegation and no documentary evidence to support these allegations. Instead, WorkSafeBC says in its written decision that “the evidence does not support that there was any targeted harassment by the Employer.” There is no contemporaneous correspondence between the parties that mentions bullying or Mr. Ereiser making discriminatory statements.
[18] In light of the evidence before me, including the WorkSafeBC determination that there was no evidence of harassment, I am persuaded that Mr. Taggart’s vague allegations about harassment do not rise above conjecture. On the whole of the evidence, I am persuaded that Mr. Taggart has no reasonable prospect of establishing that they were bullied and harassed by the Respondents. Mr. Taggart has not taken his allegation out of the realm of conjecture. As a result, Mr. Taggart’s complaint has no reasonable prospect of success and I dismiss it under s. 27(1)(c).
V CONCLUSION
[19] I dismiss the complaint in its entirety under s. 27(1)(c).
Edward Takayanagi
Tribunal Member