MR v. BC Ministry of Children and Family Development and another, 2025 BCHRT 110
Date Issued: May 8, 2025
File: CS-005608
Indexed as: MR v. BC Ministry of Children and Family Development and another, 2025 BCHRT 110
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
MR
COMPLAINANT
AND:
His Majesty the King in Right of the Province of British Columbia as represented by the Ministry of Children and Family Development and the Employee
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO LIMIT PUBLICATION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c) and Rule 5
Tribunal Member: Edward Takayanagi
For the Complainant: No submissions
Counsel for the Respondents: Julia Roe
I INTRODUCTION
[1] MR alleges that His Majesty the King in Right of the Province of British Columbia as represented by the Ministry of Children and Family Development [ MCFD ] and its Employee discriminated against them based on mental disability and family status in the area of services contrary to s. 8 of the Human Rights Code by rejecting their application for adoption. MR says MCFD rejected their application because they are a single parent with an alcohol addiction.
[2] The Respondents deny discriminating and apply to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c). They say there is no reasonable prospect the complaint will succeed because there is no nexus between MR’s protected characteristics and the adverse impact alleged. In the alternative, they say there was a bona fide and reasonable justification for their actions, namely its legitimate concerns about the best interests of the children. The Respondents also apply to anonymize the names of the individual parties and the children.
[3] MR did not respond to the applications. The Tribunal set a schedule for submissions by a letter dated July 2, 2024. MR did not file a response by the deadline of September 13, 2024, or at all. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that MR had notice of the applications and an opportunity to file a response submission. I find there is no unfairness in making this decision on the materials before me.
[4] For the reasons that follow, I allow both applications. On the anonymization application I find the privacy interests of the individuals outweigh the public interest in the identities of the parties. On the application to dismiss, I am persuaded that MCFD is reasonably certain to establish there was a bona fide and reasonable justification for refusing MR’s application to adopt and therefore the complaint has no reasonable prospect of succeeding at a hearing.
[5] To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision. I make no findings of fact.
II BACKGROUND
[6] MCFD is an arm of the BC government with the authority and responsibility to deliver services to families and children in accordance with the Child, Family, and Community Services Act [ CFCSA ]. The CFCSA provides that the best interest of the child is the paramount consideration in MCFD’s provision of services: s. 4.
[7] The Employee is an Adoption Team Lead for MCFD, responsible for screening applications for adoption in accordance with the CFCSA and the Adoption Act .
[8] MR is a single parent of two children. They say they have an alcohol addiction disorder.
[9] On June 29, 2021, MR applied to adopt their great niblings who were in the custody of MCFD.
[10] MCFD screened MR’s application to adopt. MCFD concluded that it would not be in the best interests of the children to proceed with MR’s application. The Employee met with MR on November 25, 2021, to advise them of MCFD’s decision. MCFD issued a letter dated November 29, 2021, providing written reasons for their decision.
[11] MCFD said they had concerns due to MR’s history of engaging in violence, excessive alcohol consumption, reports of assaulting and engaging in physical violence towards their children, a history of kicking their children out of the family home, consistent failure to engage with support services, and history of police incidents. They also noted that MR reported their children have diagnoses and behaviours that may negatively interfere with MR’s ability to provide care and stability for the great niblings in MR’s home.
III DECISION
A. Anonymization
[12] The Respondents seek an order anonymizing the names and identifying information of the individual parties and all minors involved in this complaint. For the following reasons I anonymize the names of the complainant, their family members, and the employees of MCFD referred to in the complaint.
[13] The Tribunal has discretion to limit publication of identifying information where a person can show their privacy interests outweigh the public interest in full access to the Tribunal’s proceedings: Tribunal Rules of Practice and Procedure [ Rules ], Rule 5(6); Stein v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2020 BCSC 70 at para. 64(a).
[14] The Tribunal may consider factors like the stage of the proceedings, the nature of the allegations, private detail in the complaint, harm to reputation, or any other potential harm: JY v. Various Waxing Salons, 2019 BCHRT 106 at para. 30. It may also consider whether the proposed limitation relates to only a “sliver” of information that minimally impairs the openness of the proceeding: CS v. British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal), 2019 BCCA 406 at para. 37.
[15] Rule 5(7) provides a presumption that a minor’s privacy interests outweigh the public interest in access to the Tribunal’s proceedings. In this case, I find that naming any of the children in the complaint would impact their privacy interests, as the complaint involves their care and home life. Further, I find that naming the Complainant could serve to identify the children through association. Accordingly, I anonymize the names of the Complainant, who will be referred to as MR, and all minors involved in this complaint.
[16] I also find the stage of proceeding, nature of the allegations, and the harm to reputation are factors that support anonymizing the names of the employees of MCFD.
[17] This application arises in the early stages of the Tribunal’s process. The allegations are unproven at this stage, which affords greater scope for limiting public access. I have dismissed the complaint below, which I find weighs in favour of an anonymization order: The Complainant v. BC Ministry of Social Development and Poverty Reduction and others , 2023 BCHRT 29 at para. 15.
[18] The complaint makes allegations of discrimination by the individual Respondent in their capacity as an employee of MCFD. The Respondents say that unproven allegations would have a real and substantial harm to the professional reputation of the individual Respondent who is still employed by MCFD and responsible for assisting vulnerable families, children and youth. In the circumstances of this case, I accept that there is significant potential harm to the professional reputation and career of the individual Respondent and any other MCFD employee implicated in the complaint if their identities were made public on the basis of unproven allegations.
[19] Under the circumstances, I find it appropriate that an anonymization order should extend to all individual parties and employees of MCFD named in the complaint to be effective.
B. Application to Dismiss
[20] The Respondents apply to dismiss the complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c). The onus is on the Respondents to establish the basis for dismissal.
[21] Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing.
[22] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence ” : Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal) , 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan , 2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77.
[23] A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority , 2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission , [1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 at para. 27.
[24] To prove their complaint at a hearing, MR will have to prove that they (1) have a characteristic protected by the Code (in this case family status and mental disability); (2) they were adversely impacted in services, and (3) their protected characteristics were a factor in that adverse impact. If they did that, the burden would shift to the Respondents to justify the impact as a bona fide reasonable justification. If the impact is justified, there is no discrimination.
[25] Accepting for the sake of this application that MR could establish a prima facie case, I am persuaded the complaint has no reasonable prospect of success because I am satisfied the Respondents are reasonably certain to prove its actions were justified: Purdy v. Douglas College and others , 2016 BCHRT 117 at para. 50.
[26] To justify denying MR’s adoption application at a hearing, the Respondents would have to prove that: (1) they adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the function being performed, (2) they adopted the standard in an honest and good faith belief that it was necessary to the fulfillment of that legitimate purpose; and (3) the standard is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of that legitimate purpose. This third element encompasses their duty to accommodate MR to the point of undue hardship: British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), [1999] 3 SCR 868 [ Grismer ] at para. 20.
[27] Regarding the first two elements, I accept that the Respondents are reasonably certain to prove that MCFD’s standard of making decisions in the best interest of the children in accordance with the CFCSA and Adoption Act is rationally connected to their duty of ensuring the safety and well-being of children in their care. I also accept that the standard was adopted by MCFD in an honest good faith belief that it is necessary to fulfill their statutory duties.
[28] I turn to the third element which requires that MCFD demonstrate it could not have done anything else reasonable or practical to avoid the negative impact on MR: British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Comm.) v. BCGSEU , 1999 CanLII 652 (SCC), [1999] 3 SCR 3 at para. 38.
[29] The evidence before me is that when MCFD was assessing MR’s application to adopt it considered information that MR had multiple interactions with the police for violent offenses, a history of physical fights with – and violence against – their children, recent history of relapsing alcohol addiction, and repeated resistance to counselling, coaching or accessing MCFD’s resources for parents. The materials indicate that MCFD had concerns about the safety, well-being, and stability for the great niblings based on this information.
[30] Further, the evidence is that MCFD determined that the risks to the safety of the great niblings could not be mitigated because the events and behaviours that gave rise to the risks were too extensive and recent.
[31] I am satisfied that even if MR’s mental disability and family status were a factor in MCFD’s decision not to proceed with MR’s adoption application, it was only in the context of the problematic behaviours that gave rise to the concerns about the safety and well-being of the great niblings. I am satisfied that the Respondents’ actions were not guided by stereotypes or assumptions about single parents or people with alcohol addiction but based on MR’s specific history of problematic behaviour and the concerns about the best interests of the children that arose from those behaviours. As such, the Respondents are reasonably certain to prove at a hearing that MR’s adoption application was rejected based on what was in the best interest of the great niblings, as MCFD is required to do under the CFSA .
[32] As I noted above, MR did not respond to this application. I have reviewed the complaint to determine whether MR has provided any evidence or argument that might show the Respondents are not reasonably certain to prove their conduct was justified. I have found none.
[33] Therefore, I conclude that the complaint has no reasonable prospect of succeeding. I grant the application to dismiss under s. 27(1)(c).
IV CONCLUSION
[34] The complaint is dismissed in its entirety under s. 27(1)(c).
Edward Takayanagi
Tribunal Member