Cheema v. Innomar Strategies Inc., 2025 BCHRT 109
Date Issued: May 6, 2025
File: CS-007818
Indexed as: Cheema v. Innomar Strategies Inc., 2025 BCHRT 109
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Rupinder Cheema
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Innomar Strategies Inc. aka AmerisourceBergen Specialty Group Canada Corporation
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)
Tribunal Member: Edward Takayanagi
Counsel for the Complainant: Joseph Chien
Counsel for the Respondent: Chanelle Wong
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Rupinder Cheema applied for a job as a nurse with Innomar Strategies Inc. aka AmerisourceBergen Specialty Group Canada Corporation. She alleges Innomar discriminated against her in employment based on mental disability contrary to s. 13 of the Human Rights Code when it revoked a job offer after she disclosed her disability.
[2] Innomar denies discriminating and says it revoked the job offer for wholly non-discriminatory reasons: Ms. Cheema’s failure to disclose limits and conditions on her nursing license which is a key requirement of the job. It applies under s. 27(1)(c) to dismiss the complaint because it says there is no reasonable prospect Ms. Cheema will be able to establish a connection between her mental disability and the revocation of the job offer.
[3] For the following reasons, I deny the application to dismiss. I am not persuaded that there is no reasonable prospect Ms. Cheema’s complaint will succeed. The parties dispute the reason for revoking the job offer which raises a foundational issue of credibility that I cannot resolve on this application based on the evidence before me.
[4] To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision.
II BACKGROUND
[5] The background is taken from the parties’ materials. I make no findings of fact.
[6] Innomar is a company that provides patient support services and operates infusion and injection clinics.
[7] Ms. Cheema is a registered nurse. She has a history of substance use disorder (alcohol) in remission. She is registered with the BC College of Nurses and Midwives. The College regulates nurses and, where it deems it necessary, places restrictions or conditions on a nurse’s ability to practice.
[8] In 2020, Ms. Cheema applied for a job with Innomar as a field nurse. The role involves providing infusion/injection therapies to patients in their homes or specialized clinics. The job requirements include being a qualified registered nurse with a valid license to practice.
[9] On or about November 18, 2020, Innomar conducted a phone interview with Ms. Cheema.
[10] On November 25, 2020, Innomar phoned Ms. Cheema and gave her a verbal job offer. On the same day, Innomar emailed the College asking for information about any limitations and/or suspensions on Ms. Cheema’s license to practice.
[11] On November 26, 2020, the College emailed Innomar and said, “Ms. Cheema has a health impairment and she has agreed to commit to and follow the gradual return to work process as recommended by her physician…Please note that Ms. Cheema is entitled to practice at full scope in British Columbia.”
[12] On December 3, 2020, Ms. Cheema disclosed to Innomar portions of her consent agreement with the College setting out her history of substance use disorder.
[13] On December 4, 2020, Ms. Cheema followed up with Innomar and informed it that she did not have any job restrictions on her license and did not require any accommodation for work. She said that she gets regular substance screening so may need to leave work at those times.
[14] On December 15, 2020, the College wrote Innomar to provide additional information about its consent agreement with Ms. Cheema. The College informed Innomar that pursuant to the terms of the consent agreement Ms. Cheema was under medical monitoring for her recovery management.
[15] On December 16, 2020, Innomar emailed Ms. Cheema and said, “we are conducting our background checks and have a flag on your license. Innomar needs to connect with the BC College of Nursing Professionals for more information.”
[16] On December 22, 2020, Innomar emailed Ms. Cheema and revoked her job offer. It said, “Due to discrepancies in the information you provided, Innomar Strategies is unable to proceed with your candidacy at this time.”
III DECISION
[17] Innomar applies to dismiss Ms. Cheema’s complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c) The onus is on Innomar to establish the basis for dismissal.
[18] Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing.
[19] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence ” : Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal) , 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan , 2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77.
[20] A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority , 2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission , [1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 at para. 27.
[21] To prove her complaint at a hearing, Ms. Cheema will have to prove that she has a characteristic protected by the Code (in this case a mental disability), she was adversely impacted in employment, and her protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education) , 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33.
[22] Ms. Cheema needs to prove that her disability was a factor in the revocation of the job offer. It need not be the sole or overriding factor: Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeuness e ) v. Bombardier Inc. , 2015 SCC 39 at paras. 45-52.
[23] Innomar focuses its submission on nexus, the third Moore factor. It says there is no reasonable prospect that Ms. Cheema’s complaint can succeed at a hearing in establishing that her disability was a factor in Innomar’s decision to revoke the job offer.
[24] Many human rights complaints raise issues of credibility. This is not, by itself, a sufficient reason to deny an application to dismiss: Evans v. University of British Columbia , 2008 BCSC 1026 at para. 34. However, if there are foundational or key issues of credibility, the complaint must go to a hearing: Francescutti v. Vancouver (City) , 2017 BCCA 242 at para. 67.
[25] These principles are important here, because the parties disagree on what is a foundational issue of whether Ms. Cheema’s disability was a factor in Innomar’s decision to revoke the job offer.
[26] Innomar argues that its decision to revoke the job offer was based solely on Ms. Cheema’s failure to disclose information about limitations on her license. Innomar says that the timing of the decision is insufficient to support a reasonable inference of discrimination. It concedes that it was informed of Ms. Cheema’s disability in the correspondences of November 26, December 3, December 4, and December 15, 2020, but says it was not the content of the information disclosed but rather Ms. Cheema’s failure to be forthright with that information earlier which was the reason for their decision. Specifically, they say Ms. Cheema was given an opportunity to disclose conditions and limitations on her license and she failed to do so giving rise to serious concerns about her ability to fulfill the requirements of the job.
[27] I am not persuaded that the facts alleged, if proven at a hearing, are not capable of supporting a reasonable inference that Ms. Cheema’s disability was a factor, in whole or in part, with Innomar’s decision to revoke the job offer.
[28] First, the evidence before me identifies a temporal connection between Ms. Cheema’s disclosure of her disability, and her job offer being rescinded, which I find brings the allegation out of the realm of conjecture. In particular, Ms. Cheema appears to have disclosed the specific nature of her disability on December 3, 2020, one week after she was given a verbal job offer. Within three weeks of this disclosure, Innomar revoked the job offer. I am satisfied that the information before me meets the low threshold at this stage to bring Ms. Cheema’s allegation out of the realm of speculation and conjecture.
[29] Second, with respect to Innomar’s non-discriminatory reasons for revoking the job offer, I am not persuaded that Innomar is reasonably certain to prove a non-discriminatory reason. This is because the disclosure of Ms. Cheema’s disability and of conditions on her nursing license occurred concurrently, and the information is intertwined to a degree that I cannot say Innomar is reasonably certain to prove its decision was solely for non-discriminatory reasons.
[30] The evidence is that on November 26, 2020, the College disclosed that Ms. Cheema has a health impairment and that she is entitled to practice at full scope. On December 3 and 4, 2020, Ms. Cheema provided information about her substance use disorder and stated that she did not have any restrictions on her license. The College disclosed to Innomar on December 15, 2020, details of Ms. Cheema’s medical monitoring for her recovery management and other details of the consent agreement.
[31] While it may well be that Innomar decided to retract its offer of employment independent of the disclosure of her mental disability, based on the materials before me I am not persuaded that Innomar is reasonably certain to establish its reason for not hiring Ms. Cheema at a hearing. Accordingly, as I am not persuaded that the complaint has no reasonable prospect of success, I deny the application to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c).
IV CONCLUSION
[32] I deny the application to dismiss the complaint.
Edward Takayanagi
Tribunal Member