Tellis v. City of Coquitlam and others, 2025 BCHRT 108
Date Issued: May 6, 2025
File: CS-005994
Indexed as: Tellis v. City of Coquitlam and others, 2025 BCHRT 108
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Richard Tellis
COMPLAINANT
AND:
City of Coquitlam and Lee Knowles and Sarah Bull and Sean O’Melinn and Aaron Hilgerdenaar
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(d)(ii)
Tribunal Member: Edward Takayanagi
On his own behalf: Richard Tellis
Counsel for the Respondents: Carolyn MacEachern
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Richard Tellis filed a complaint alleging the City of Coquitlam and its employees, Lee Knowles, Sarah Bull, Sean O’Melinn, and Aaron Hilgerdenaar discriminated against him in service based on his race, colour, and ancestry contrary to s. 8 of the Human Rights Code . Mr. Tellis says when Mr. Knowles issued him a bylaw enforcement notice, he made discriminatory remarks, and the other respondents failed to respond to his complaint about Mr. Knowles.
[2] The Respondents deny discriminating. The individual Respondents apply to have the complaint dismissed as against them under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) of the Code . They say proceeding with the complaint as against the individual Respondents would not further the purposes of the Code because the City has irrevocably agreed to indemnify and take responsibility for the individual Respondents’ conduct, should the complaint succeed.
[3] For the following reasons, I allow the application and dismiss the complaint as against the individual Respondents. My decision turns on whether the conduct alleged has a measure of individual culpability that warrants proceeding against any of the individual Respondents. In my view, it would not further the purposes of the Code to proceed against any of them in light of the City taking responsibility for their conduct.
[4] To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision. I make no findings of fact.
II BACKGROUND
[5] Mr. Knowles is a bylaw inspector for the City. His duties include issuing bylaw enforcement notices. Mr. Hilgerdenaar is the City’s Manager of Bylaw Enforcement and Animal Services. Ms. Bull is the City’s Supervisor of Bylaw Enforcement and Animal Services. Mr. O’Melinn is the City’s Business Services and Licensing Manager.
[6] On September 10, 2021, Mr. Knowles and another bylaw inspector were patrolling a City park when they observed Mr. Tellis sitting on a bench smoking. They advised Mr. Tellis that smoking was not permitted in the park.
[7] During the interaction, Mr. Tellis ran away from the bylaw officers. They called the RCMP for assistance. They eventually caught up to Mr. Tellis and, in the presence of the RCMP officers who attended, they issued a bylaw enforcement notice to Mr. Tellis for smoking in the park.
[8] Mr. Tellis alleges that during this interaction Mr. Knowles made derogatory comments about him, saying “how do you people get through life,” and “you brown people are all the same.” Mr. Knowles denies making any such comments.
[9] On September 14, 2021, Mr. Tellis attended the City to dispute the bylaw enforcement notice.
[10] On September 26, 2021, Ms. Bull phoned Mr. Tellis about the notice to advise him of the options to either pay the fine or proceed to an adjudication hearing on the merits of the notice. Mr. Tellis hung up on Ms. Bull and stated he did not consent to her calling him.
[11] Mr. Tellis says that during the phone call he raised his allegation about Mr. Knowles’ discriminatory statements and was told by Ms. Bull that it was not important, and this was not the time to discuss those allegations. Ms. Bull disputes that Mr. Tellis raised the subject of Mr. Knowles’ alleged comments.
[12] Next, Mr. Tellis says that he left voicemail messages for Mr. Hilgerdenaar on or about November 1, 2021, and for Mr. O’Melinn on or about January 1, 2022. He says he requested a phone call to discuss his complaints about Mr. Knowles’ statement and Ms. Bull’s refusal to discuss the issue. Mr. Tellis says neither Mr. Hilgerdenaar nor Mr. O’Melinn ever called him.
[13] Both Mr. Hilgerdenaar and Mr. O’Melinn say they do not have any records or recollection of ever receiving a voicemail message from Mr. Tellis.
III DECISION
[14] The Respondents argue that it would not further the Code ’s purposes to proceed against the individual respondents: Daley v. BC (Ministry of Health) , 2006 BCHRT 341. They ask that the complaint against the individual Respondents be dismissed under section 27(1)(d)(ii).
[15] There are strong policy reasons that favour complaints against individual respondents. As the Supreme Court of Canada has acknowledged, “the aspirational purposes of the Code require that individual perpetrators of discrimination be held accountable for their actions”: British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal v. Schrenk, 2017 SCC 62 at para. 56. This is especially true for allegations of discrimination with a high degree of personal culpability, like sexual or racial harassment: Daley at para. 53.
[16] On the other hand, naming individual respondents can complicate and delay the resolution of complaints, exacerbate feelings of personal animosity, and cause needless personal distress to individuals who are accused of discrimination: Daley at para. 54. Because employers and institutional respondents are liable for the acts of their agents, they will be responsible for any remedy ordered by the Tribunal: Code , s. 44(2); Robichaud v. Canada , [1987] 2 SCR 84. In those situations, the remedial aims of the Code may be most fairly and efficiently fulfilled without holding individuals liable.
[17] The Tribunal balances all these considerations to decide whether the purposes of the Code are best served by having a complaint proceed against individuals as well as an institutional respondent, or against the institutional respondent only. It has identified the following factors as relevant:
a. whether the complaint names an institutional employer as a respondent and that respondent has the capacity to fulfill any remedies that the Tribunal might order;
b. whether the institutional respondent has acknowledged the acts and omissions of the individual as its own and has irrevocably acknowledged its responsibility to satisfy any remedial orders which the Tribunal might make in respect of that individual’s conduct; and
c. the nature of the conduct alleged against the individual, including whether:
i. their conduct took place within the regular course of their employment;
ii. the person is alleged to have been the directing mind behind the discrimination or to have substantially influenced the course of action taken; and
iii. the conduct alleged against the individual has a measure of individual culpability, such as an allegation of discriminatory harassment.
Daley at paras. 60-62.
[18] In my view, each of the factors in Daley favours dismissing the complaint against the individual Respondents. I will address each factor in turn.
[19] First, the City has accepted liability for any acts or omissions of the individual Respondents in their capacity as employees of the City and takes responsibility for satisfying any remedial orders. I am satisfied that the City has the capacity to satisfy any monetary award that may be ordered on account of the conduct of the individuals. Further, one of the remedies Mr. Tellis seeks is steps or programs to address the discrimination. This is not a remedy that individual employees have the ability to grant. It is the City that has the capacity to fulfill any remedial order.
[20] Second, the alleged discriminatory conduct occurred in the course of the individual Respondents’ employment with the City. The undisputed evidence supports that each of the individual Respondents were acting within the course of their respective work duties when the conduct complained of is alleged to have occurred.
[21] Mr. Tellis argues that the individual Respondents were not performing their jobs dutifully and therefore were not acting within the scope of their employment. I do not agree. Allegations about whether an individual Respondent was performing their job well are more in the nature of criticism about the quality of services provided by the Respondents and do not take the conduct outside of the scope of employment.
[22] Third, I am unable to find the alleged conduct has a measure of personal culpability warranting proceeding against any of the individual Respondents. The alleged conduct of Ms. Bull, Mr. Hilgerdenaar, and Mr. O’Melinn is that they did not respond to Mr. Tellis’ complaint about Mr. Knowles making discriminatory statements. In my view, in all but Mr. Knowles’ case, nothing in the nature of their alleged conduct is capable of rising to a level of personal culpability that requires individual responsibility.
[23] Mr. Tellis alleges Mr. Knowles said, “how do you people get through life,” and “you brown people are all the same,” in the course of giving him a bylaw enforcement notice. Mr. Tellis says these comments were discriminatory and based on his race, colour, and ancestry. I agree that these comments seem extraneous to Mr. Knowles’ work. Comments arising from generalizations and stereotypes based on race are certainly significant and should be discouraged. In my view, however, Mr. Knowles’ alleged conduct is arguably distinguishable from the type of egregious behaviour, such as repeated sexual or racial harassment in the workplace, which attracts individual liability: Daley at para. 62; Murphy v. Lafarge of Canada and others , 2006 BCHRT 558 at paras. 35-36. Therefore, I find this is a neutral factor as it relates to the s.27(1)(d)(ii) analysis.
[24] Based on the information before me I am not persuaded that allowing the complaint to proceed against the individual Respondents would further the purposes of the Code . The City has accepted responsibility for the individual Respondents’ actions and said it would be responsible for any damages that are ordered, in the event that there is a finding of discrimination. Most of the individual Respondents’ alleged conduct was squarely within the scope of their employment. Mr. Knowles’ alleged conduct is a neutral factor in the analysis. Weighing on all the foregoing, I find it would not further the purposes of the Code to proceed against any of the individual Respondents.
IV CONCLUSION
[25] I allow the application and dismiss the complaint as against the individual Respondents, Lee Knowles, Sarah Bull, Aaron Hilgerdenaar, and Sean O’Melinn.
Edward Takayanagi
Tribunal Member