Taggart v. Buds Cannabis and others, 2025 BCHRT 107
Date Issued: May 6, 2025
File: CS-005495
Indexed as: Taggart v. Buds Cannabis and others, 2025 BCHRT 107
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Christopher Taggart
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Buds Cannabis and Megan Turpin and Dustin Ereiser
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)
Tribunal Member: Edward Takayanagi
On their own behalf: Christopher (Adam) Taggart
For all Respondents: Megan Turpin
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Christopher (Adam) Taggart filed a complaint alleging his former employer, Buds Cannabis, and its owners Megan Turpin and Dustin Ereiser discriminated against him on the basis of mental disability contrary to s. 13 of the Human Rights Code . He says he was bullied at work and after he went on medical leave he was fired.
[2] The Respondents deny they discriminated and apply to dismiss the complaint.
[3] The Tribunal reviewed the complaint and the response to the complaint as part of the Tribunal’s Case Path Pilot, where a case proceeds directly to a hearing unless it is determined that there may be a more fair and timely way to resolve it. The Tribunal initially assigned this complaint to the hearing path. The Respondents asked to file a dismissal application, saying they had new information, including decisions from the Employment Standards Branch and WorkSafeBC. The Tribunal granted the request and allowed the Respondents to file an application to dismiss under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code .
[4] Although the Tribunal only allowed the Respondents to file under s. 27(1)(c) only, the Respondents instead selected on their dismissal application form that they are filing under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) and (g) arguing it would not further the purposes of the Code to proceed with the complaint because the underlying dispute has been resolved or remedied, and another proceeding dealt with the complaint. They did not file under s. 27(1)(c) as allowed.
[5] The Tribunal will generally not consider dismissal on grounds other than those it permitted under the Case Path Pilot. There may be a narrow exception if the Tribunal decides it promotes the fair and timely resolution of the complaint to do so. The Tribunal exercises this discretion sparingly: Ibrahim v. The Owners, Strata Plan LMS 1222 and another , 2024 BCHRT 183 at para. 5. I decline to exercise that discretion here and have only considered the Respondents’ submissions under s.27(1)(c).
[6] For the reasons that follow, I deny the application to dismiss. To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision.
II BACKGROUND
[7] I take the background material from the parties’ submissions. I make no findings of fact.
[8] Mr. Taggart was hired to work at Buds Cannabis in May 2021. Ms. Turpin and Mr. Ereiser were his bosses.
[9] Mr. Taggart alleges that he was told he would be paid a wage of $15.50 per hour but was only paid $15.00 and not credited for his actual hours of work. Mr. Taggart says he was not given a copy of his employment contract when he requested it and given contradictory information about the details of his job.
[10] Mr. Taggart alleges that as a result of his interactions with Ms. Turpin and Mr. Ereiser his mental health declined, and he went on a medical leave on August 16, 2021. He says that during his leave his employers did not contact him, which he took to be a constructive dismissal.
[11] The Respondents deny discriminating. They agree that there were some errors in Mr. Taggart’s payroll but say they were later corrected. They deny terminating his employment and say Mr. Taggart informed them he was quitting on an online public review site.
[12] The parties agree Mr. Taggart filed claims with WorkSafeBC and the Employment Standards Tribunal and those proceedings have concluded.
III DECISION
[13] Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing.
[14] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence ” : Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal) , 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan , 2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77.
[15] A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority , 2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission , [1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 at para. 27. The onus is on a respondent to show a complaint does not have a reasonable prospect of success, rather than on a complainant to show discrimination: Stonehouse v. Elk Valley Coal (No. 2) , 2007 BCHRT 305 at para. 11.
[16] The Respondents deny discriminating and say they treated Mr. Taggart fairly, including by giving him a raise during his employment, supporting his medical leave, and cooperating with WorkSafeBC and Employment Standards in their investigations. They say the decisions of WorkSafeBC and the Employment Standards Tribunal found no discrimination. I understand the Respondents to be arguing that there is no reasonable prospect that Mr. Taggart’s complaint will succeed because other proceedings have found against him.
[17] I am not persuaded that this complaint has no reasonable prospect of succeeding at a hearing. This is because the Respondents have not provided any evidence in support of their arguments. They assert that they communicated by text with Mr. Taggart about his payment concerns, but no copies of those communications are before me. They say Mr. Taggart resigned by a public post but did not submit a copy of such a post. They referred to decisions in other proceedings but did not provide copies of those decisions or even a neutral citation so that I can confirm the existence or contents of those decisions. In short, the Respondents’ submissions consist of bare assertions that they disagree with Mr. Taggart’s allegations of discrimination and equally bare assertions that other tribunals have made findings that could impact Mr. Taggart’s likelihood of success in his complaint before this tribunal. In my view, this is insufficient to persuade me that there is no reasonable prospect that Mr. Taggart’s complaint will succeed at a hearing on its merits.
[18] As I noted above, I have only considered the dismissal application under s. 27(1)(c). Even if I had exercised my discretion and considered the Respondents’ application under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) and (g), I would reach the same conclusion. On the materials before me, which are notably missing any decision from other proceedings, there would be no basis for me to conclude that the underlying dispute has been remedied by the parties or that another proceeding has dealt with the complaint.
IV CONCLUSION
[19] I deny the application to dismiss Mr. Taggart’s complaint. This matter will proceed to a hearing.
[20] I encourage the parties to take advantage of the Tribunal’s mediation services to explore the possibility of resolving the complaint through mutual agreement.
Edward Takayanagi
Tribunal Member