Drakes v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia and others, 2025 BCHRT 103
Date Issued: May 2, 2025
File: CS-003951
Indexed as: Drakes v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia and others, 2025 BCHRT 103
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Dion Drakes
COMPLAINANT
AND:
ICBC and Doug Cooper and Catherine Dixon and Bit-Chan Eun
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)
Tribunal Member: Edward Takayanagi
On his own behalf: Dion Drakes
Counsel for the Respondents: Deborah K. Lovett, KC
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Dion Drakes filed a complaint alleging ICBC and its employees, Doug Cooper, Catherine Dixon, and Bit-Chan Eun discriminated against him in the area of services on the basis of his race contrary to section 8 of the Human Rights Code . Mr. Drakes is African Caribbean. He says ICBC delayed the renewal of his driver’s license and investigated his residency because of his race.
[2] The Respondents deny discriminating and apply to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c). The Respondents say Mr. Drakes’ complaint has no reasonable prospect of succeeding at a hearing because they are reasonably certain to establish that the residency review was for solely non-discriminatory reasons arising from their requirement to confirm a person is a resident of BC under the Motor Vehicle Act ( MVA ).
[3] Mr. Drakes did not respond to the application. The Tribunal set a schedule for submissions by a letter dated July 4, 2023. Mr. Drakes did not file a response by the deadline of September 12, 2023, or at all. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that Mr. Drakes had notice of the application and an opportunity to file a response submission. I find there is no unfairness in making this decision on the materials before me.
[4] For the following reasons, I allow the application. On the materials before me, I am persuaded that the Respondents are reasonably certain to establish they had a wholly non-discriminatory reason for their conduct and therefore Mr. Drakes’ allegation that his race was a factor in the adverse impact has not been taken out of the realm of conjecture.
[5] To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision. I make no findings of fact.
II BACKGROUND
[6] ICBC is a Crown corporation responsible under the MVA for issuing driver’s licenses. Mr. Cooper, Ms. Dixon, and Mr. Eun are employees of ICBC.
[7] An applicant for a driver’s license must have a primary residence in BC: MVA s. 24.1(1).
[8] On October 15, 2020, Mr. Drakes attended an ICBC Driver Licensing Office to renew his driver’s license. Mr. Drakes was issued an interim driver’s license while his renewal was pending. During his interaction with an ICBC employee, Mr. Drakes said “I am a Canadian resident but don’t necessarily live here.” The comment was recorded in Mr. Drakes’ renewal application.
[9] On December 31, 2020, Mr. Eun, emailed Mr. Drakes to advise him that his renewal was under review and asked questions about whether he ordinarily resided in BC.
[10] On January 7, 2021, Mr. Drakes responded to the email and said he did not split his time between BC and another jurisdiction but in the previous year he had left BC for a year on February 22, 2019, and returned on February 20, 2020.
[11] Mr. Eun requested Mr. Drakes provide some proof of his current residence in BC.
[12] On January 18, 2021, Mr. Drakes emailed Mr. Eun to say he had sent a copy of his residential tenancy agreement as proof of his residence in BC.
[13] On January 19, 2021, Mr. Eun emailed Mr. Drakes to say he was satisfied with the documents submitted and the proof of residency and the file would be closed. He informed Mr. Drakes he could attend a licensing office with his identification and receive his driver’s license.
[14] On the same day, Mr. Drakes complained to ICBC’s Fair Practices Department that he was racially profiled because his residency was scrutinized. He spoke to Ms. Dixon who explained ICBC’s requirement to confirm residency in BC before issuing a driver’s license. This information was confirmed by Mr. Cooper, the manager of Fair Practices, in a letter dated May 4, 2021.
III DECISION
[15] The Respondents apply to dismiss Mr. Drakes’ complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c).
[16] The onus is on the Respondents to establish the basis for dismissal.
[17] Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing.
[18] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence ” : Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal) , 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan , 2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77.
[19] A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority , 2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission , [1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 at para. 27.
[20] To prove his complaint at a hearing, Mr. Drakes will have to prove that he has a characteristic protected by the Code (in this case his race), he was adversely impacted in service, and his race was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education) , 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33.
[21] In his complaint Mr. Drakes asserts that his race was the reason his residency was investigated. He says he believes ICBC’s records were falsified to justify their investigation.
[22] The Respondents focus their submissions on nexus, the third element of Moore . They say there is no reasonable prospect of Mr. Drakes proving a nexus between his race and ICBC’s investigation of his residence because their conduct was wholly for non-discriminatory reasons-ICBC’s obligation under the MVA to confirm a person is a resident in BC.
[23] It is undisputed that residence in BC is a requirement for ICBC to issue a driver’s license. It is also undisputed, in the absence of any submissions from Mr. Drakes, that Mr. Drakes told an ICBC employee that he does not necessarily live in Canada. The statement is recorded in ICBC’s contemporaneous records as the reason Mr. Drakes’ application was referred for review.
[24] In my view, the documentary evidence is inconsistent with Mr. Drakes’ assertion that ICBC chose to review his renewal application because of his race. ICBC has provided contemporaneous documentary evidence showing they are required under their governing legislation to only issue drivers’ licenses to residents of BC, and that Mr. Drakes made a statement that suggested he did not meet that requirement. Further, the documentary materials support the Respondents’ position that the reason for investigating Mr. Drakes’ residence was consistently communicated to him at various points by Mr. Eun, Ms. Dixon, and Mr. Cooper.
[25] In light of the entirety of the evidence before me I am persuaded that there is no reasonable prospect that Mr. Drakes could succeed in establishing that there is a connection between his race and the adverse impact. The Respondents have provided evidence contradicting the assertion that Mr. Drakes’ race was a factor in their investigation of his residency. There is nothing in the materials before me to take Mr. Drakes’ allegation that his race was a factor in the Respondents’ decision to investigate his residency or that ICBC’s records are fabricated out of the realm of conjecture. There is no evidence before me to support such an inference that is more than mere speculation.
[26] Accordingly, I am satisfied his complaint has no reasonable prospect of succeeding at a hearing and dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c).
IV CONCLUSION
[27] I allow the application and dismiss Mr. Drakes’ complaint under s. 27(1)(c).
Edward Takayanagi
Tribunal Member