Mr. S v. Mr. B (No. 2), 2025 BCHRT 101
Date Issued: May 2, 2025
File: CS-008804
Indexed as: Mr. S v. Mr. B (No. 2), 2025 BCHRT 101
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Mr. S
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Mr. B
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO LIMIT PUBLICATION
Rule 5
Tribunal Member: Devyn Cousineau
Counsel for the Complainant: Jacob Henderson
Advocate for the Respondent: Theo Terry
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Mr. S filed a human rights complaint against Mr. B. In an earlier decision, the Tribunal declined to accept the complaint for filing because it did not allege facts that could contravene the Human Rights Code: Mr. S v. Mr. B, 2024 BCHRT 348 [ Decision ]. As a result of this Decision, Mr. S’s human rights complaint is not proceeding.
[2] The Tribunal published the Decision on its website, using the parties’ full names. Two weeks later, at Mr. B’s request, it temporarily removed the Decision from the website to give Mr. B an opportunity to apply for an order retroactively limiting publication of the parties’ names. That application is now before me.
[3] Mr. B asks the Tribunal for an order to retroactively limit publication of the parties’ names in the Decision and prohibit the publication of information that could identify the parties in this complaint. He says that Mr. S’s allegations against him are damaging to his reputation and wellbeing. Mr. S opposes the application.
[4] For the following reasons, the application is granted in part. I order that:
a. the Decision will be retroactively anonymized and re-published without using the parties’ names; and
b. no person may publish the parties’ names in connection with the Decision.
II BACKGROUND
[5] Mr. B and Mr. S live in the same neighbourhood. In his human rights complaint, Mr. S alleged that Mr. B confronted him with homophobic and transphobic slurs and physically assaulted him. He alleged that this was a violation of s. 7 of the Human Rights Code, which prohibits discriminatory publications.
[6] At the outset of its process, the Tribunal asked the parties for submissions about whether the complaint was filed in time and, if not, whether the Tribunal should exercise its discretion to accept the complaint late: Code, s. 22. That is the issue addressed in the Decision. In the Decision, the Tribunal determined that the complaint did not contain any timely allegations that could, if proven, violate s. 7 of the Code. It declined to accept the complaint for filing. The Tribunal closed the complaint file.
[7] Mr. S has filed a petition seeking judicial review of the Decision.
III DECISION
[8] Complaints at Tribunal are presumptively public: Mother A obo Child B v. School District C , 2015 BCHRT 64 at para. 7. This openness serves four main goals: maintaining an effective evidentiary process, ensuring that Tribunal members act fairly, promoting public confidence in the Tribunal, and educating the public about the Tribunal’s process and development of the law : Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General) , [1989] 2 SCR 1326 at para. 61; JY v. Various Waxing Salons, 2019 BCHRT 106 at para. 25. These goals align with the purposes of the Code , which include fostering a more equitable society and identifying and eliminating persistent patterns of inequality: Code , s. 3. The main way that the Tribunal furthers these purposes is through its public decisions: A. v. Famous Players Inc. , 2005 BCHRT 432 at para. 14.
[9] The Tribunal has discretion to limit publication of identifying information where a person can show their privacy interests outweigh the public interest in full access to the Tribunal’s proceedings: Tribunal Rules of Practice and Procedure [ Rules ], Rule 5(6); Stein v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2020 BCSC 70 at para. 64(a). The Tribunal may consider factors like the stage of the proceedings, the nature of the allegations, private details in the complaint, harm to reputation, or any other potential harm: JY at para. 30. It may also consider whether the proposed limitation relates to only a “sliver” of information that minimally impairs the openness of the proceeding: CS v. British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal), 2019 BCCA 406 at para. 37.
[10] The parties have structured their arguments using the relevant factors that the Tribunal identified in JY. I do the same in this decision.
A. Stage of the proceedings
[11] In JY, the Tribunal explained:
There is greater scope for limiting public access at early and interlocutory stages of the Tribunal’s process, before the Tribunal has made any decision on the merits of the complaint: A [ v. Famous Players, 2005 BCHRT 432] at para. 11. The Tribunal will often make an order restricting publication up until the hearing of the complaint, at which point the balancing of interests may change. [para. 30(a)].
[12] Here, the Decision was made at the most preliminary stage of the Tribunal’s process. None of the allegations have been proven. In fact, Mr. B’s response to the complaint was not an issue in the Decision, which turned on an assessment of Mr. S’s bare allegations. The effect of the Decision was to bring the complaint to an end. This means that, subject to the outcome of the judicial review, Mr. S’s allegations will never be tested and Mr. B’s defence will not be published.
[13] Mr. S argues that Mr. B had the opportunity to put forward his version of events in his timeliness submissions but chose not to. He argues that, in his timeliness submissions, Mr. B did not deny making the statements. He says that this case is distinct from Famous Players because Mr. B has not alleged that the complaint was brought in bad faith or for a malicious purpose.
[14] Respectfully, I am not persuaded by these submissions. First, Mr. B did deny the conduct in his submissions. However, his response was not material to the issue that the Tribunal had to decide. Second, there is no requirement that a party allege bad faith to support limiting publication. Rather, the point is that the public interest in knowing the parties’ identities is diminished for a decision that simply sets out unproven allegations at an early or interim stage of the Tribunal’s process. In my view, this factor weighs in favour of limiting publication.
B. Nature of the allegations
[15] In JY, the Tribunal explained:
Certain types of allegations are more likely to attract the public’s “prurient” attention: C.N. v. Health Authority , 2014 BCHRT 265 at para. 51. This is particularly the case where allegations involve sexual harassment or impropriety. In addition, the Tribunal may consider whether the subject matter of the complaint is purely a private dispute between the parties, or whether it engages the public’s interest in the operation of large or public institutions: C.N . at para. 49; B. v. Victoria School District 61, 2014 BCHRT 105 at para. 11. [para. 30(b)]
[16] I agree with Mr. B that this factor also weighs in favour of limiting publication of the parties’ names. The Decision reproduces Mr. S’s allegations about Mr. B, which reflect behaviour that the Tribunal identified as “repugnant”, “particularly repugnant”, and “offensive”. This includes allegations that:
a. Mr. B called Mr. S a “faggot”, a “fucking transvestite faggot” and other homophobic slurs;
b. Mr. B physically assaulted Mr. S;
c. Mr. B has a history of making racist and sexist comments to people in their neighbourhood; and
d. Mr. B said to Mr. S “your father deserved to die and he should have taken you with him”.
I accept that these are the sort of allegations that are likely to attract public attention, particularly in a small community.
[17] Mr. S argues that the nature of the allegations weighs in favour of full openness. He argues that there is a public interest in publishing allegations which may demonstrate a pattern of abusive behaviour against him and others: Toronto Star v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2018 ONSC 2586 at para. 111; JY at para. 44. In this case, he argues that Mr. B is a “chronic offender” and the public has an interest in knowing about the allegations against him.
[18] I accept that, if the Tribunal heard this complaint on its merits and concluded that Mr. B engaged in the conduct alleged, there would be a public interest in publishing his identity. However, as I have said, the allegations are untested and unproven. Beyond his assertion, which is disputed, Mr. S has not pointed to any evidence of a “pattern” of behaviour that attracts the public interest. On the contrary, at this stage this is a private dispute between two individuals, which does not engage a broader public interest: JW v LS, 2023 BCHRT 30 at para. 27.
[19] In my view, the nature of the allegations weighs in favour of limiting publication.
C. Harm to reputation
[20] A person’s reputation is central to their sense of worth and value, and reputation is intimately related to the right to privacy: Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 SCR 1130 at paras. 107-121. In some cases, potential harm to reputation will justify an order restricting publication: JY at para 30(d).
[21] To begin, Mr. B argues that a layperson may not fully appreciate, reading the Decision, that Mr. S’s allegations are contested and unproven. Mr. S disputes that there is any ambiguity in the Decision.
[22] I acknowledge that, in the Decision, the Tribunal states clearly that it is not making any findings of fact (para. 2) and is considering whether Mr. S’s allegations “could arguably constitute a contravention if they were proven” (para. 7). However, I agree with Mr. B that non-legally trained readers may not understand the significance of these caveats. For example, the Decision refers to “the offensive nature of the comments” (para. 18), “[Mr. B’s] slurs” (paras. 19 and 21), and “[Mr. B’s] propensity to make racist and sexist remarks to those he comes into contact within the neighbourhood” (para. 20). I agree with Mr. B that there is a risk that members of the public may read these allegations as having a basis in fact, rather than simply being allegations, particularly if the Decision is selectively quoted.
[23] In this context, Mr. B says that publishing his name in the Decision creates a risk of harm to his reputation in two realms: his employment and his relationship with his caregivers.
[24] Regarding his employment, Mr. B explains that he does casual work for members of his community. He says that this is his only source of income, and it depends entirely on his reputation. He has expressed a real concern that people may not hire him if they learn he has been accused of racist, sexist, homophobic, and transphobic behaviour towards another member of the community.
[25] Regarding his caregivers, Mr. B says that he has complex health needs and is dependent on various healthcare providers from diverse backgrounds. He is concerned that his relationship with these healthcare providers may be jeopardized if they learn about Mr. S’s allegations against him. He says this poses the risk of seriously affecting his wellbeing and quality of life.
[26] Mr. S argues that these claims of harm are speculative. By Mr. B’s own admission, some members of the community are already aware of the Decision. He has not submitted evidence that he has lost work as a result. Regarding Mr. B’s caregivers, Mr. S argues that healthcare workers are sophisticated individuals who would understand that the Decision contains allegations only, and who in any event are duty bound to provide adequate care. He points out that some of Mr. B’s healthcare providers have been aware of the proceedings since at least July 2024, and Mr. B has not identified any examples of where this has impacted the care he’s received.
[27] On balance, I consider this to be a neutral factor. It is reasonable to expect that Mr. B’s reputation could be negatively impacted by the allegations made against him in this case. As I have said, those allegations are of very serious conduct that could have implications for Mr. B’s ability to work and interact with racialized people, LGBTQ2S+ people, women, and people from other marginalized groups. At the same time, the risk of harm is somewhat speculative at this stage and there is no evidence that Mr. B’s reputation has been impacted in circumstances where some members of the community are already aware of the Decision.
D. Other potential harm
[28] Finally, the Tribunal will consider any other potential harm that a person may experience because of public disclosure: JY at para. 30(e).
[29] Here, Mr. B says that he has already experienced serious harm from the temporary publication of the Decision. In his affidavit, he describes very serious impacts on his mental and physical health, which have affected his quality of life and his ability to care for his mother. He says that he feels like he has already been vilified in his community. I place significant weight on this evidence, and find it weighs in favour of limiting publication.
E. Countervailing considerations
[30] Finally, I consider three other factors which Mr. S argues weigh against limiting publication of the parties’ names in this case.
[31] First, the Decision was publicly available, with the parties’ names, for two weeks. During that time, Mr. B says that some members of his community learned about the Decision. This diminishes Mr. B’s ongoing privacy interest and undermines the effectiveness of any order the Tribunal makes now. I agree with Mr. S that this is a factor that weighs against retroactively limiting publication: RR v. Vancouver Aboriginal Child and Family Services Society (No. 3), 2019 BCHRT 269 at paras. 10-11. At the same time, these concerns are mitigated by the fact that the Decision was only published for a short period, and does not appear to have been published or reported anywhere else.
[32] Second, Mr. S – the complainant – opposes the order. In my view, this is significant. These are Mr. S’s allegations. I am sensitive to the harm that can be caused by restricting a person’s ability to talk about their own experiences, particularly in the context of discrimination. Mr. S argues that preventing him from talking about his own allegations is contrary to the Code’s purpose and effectively punishes him for attempting to seek redress.
[33] In my view, this concern is best addressed by clearly establishing the scope of my order. I am not restricting Mr. S from talking about his allegations. I am only removing a “sliver of information” from the information available to the public through the Tribunal’s Decision: CS at para. 37. While this does not completely insulate Mr. B from the effects of Mr. S’s allegations, it does offer some protection while at the same time balancing Mr. S’s interests.
[34] Finally, Mr. S argues that he faces the prospect of harm if the Tribunal grants the order to limit publication. He alleges that, since the Decision was released, Mr. B has continued to target him, including charging at him with a gardening tool. Mr. B denies doing this. Mr. S argues that granting Mr. B anonymity in this complaint will “embolden him” and expose Mr. S to further harm. Mr. B strongly disputes this suggestion, and argues that “it is equally, if not more likely, that limiting public will defuse tensions within the community and lesson the interpersonal animus between the parties”.
[35] I am not persuaded that this is a factor which weighs against limiting publication. I agree with Mr. B that, if Mr. S feels unsafe, his proper recourse is with the police and not publicising unproven allegations.
IV CONCLUSION AND ORDER
[36] On balance, I am persuaded that Mr. B has identified strong privacy interests that weigh against publishing his name in the Decision. In order to effectively protect Mr. B’s identity, it is also necessary to limit publication of Mr. S’s name. I order that:
a. The Decision will be retroactively anonymized and re-published without using the parties’ names.
b. No person may publish the parties’ names in connection with the Decision.
[37] These orders do not affect the ongoing judicial review proceedings, or any future decisions the Tribunal may be required to make. In the event the Decision is remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration, Mr. B must renew this application.
Devyn Cousineau
Vice Chair